


CHINA
AND THE
POWERS



Designed for the Institute of Politics, 1926.

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES SUPERIMPOSED

This map shows the relative size of China with her dependencies as compared with

CHINA AND THE POWERS

BY

HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON

NEW YORK

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY

MCMXXVII

1927.

COPYRIGHT, 1927, BY HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON
FIRST PUBLISHED, FEBRUARY, 1927

PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.
FOR THE JOHN DAY COMPANY, INC.
BY THE QUINN & BODEN COMPANY, RAHWAY, N. J.

To

E. E. N.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON was born in Chicago in 1884. He was educated in Chicago schools and at Dartmouth College, from which he was graduated in 1905.

In the intervals of an active law practice, Mr. Norton found time for the study of history, political science, international law and international relations. At the close of his service as an officer in the army during the war, he became Executive Officer of the California Immigration Commission. Interest in the Japanese problem led him to the Orient, where he lived for some years and traveled extensively in Japan, Siberia and China.

Since his return to this country, he has studied and written on international affairs. He has lectured at various universities, at the conference on China at Johns Hopkins, and at the conference on Far Eastern affairs of the Harris Foundation at the University of Chicago. He was chairman of the conference on "The Chinese Republic and the Powers" of the Institute of Politics, Williams-town, in the summer of 1926.

He is the author of *The Story of California*, *The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia* and, jointly with H. G. W. Woodhead and Julean Arnold, *Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem*.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	FOREWORD	ix
I	THE VALIDITY OF THE REPUBLIC	3
II	FOREIGN RIGHTS AND CHINESE PROTESTS	22
III	THE CHAMPION OF THE OCCIDENT	52
IV	THE RUSSIAN BEAR AMBLES EASTWARD	73
V	THE CHAMPION OF THE ORIENT	102
VI	THE INTERESTED REFEREE	124
VII	THE PUZZLE OF CHINESE POLITICS	146
VIII	CHINA CATCHES UP WITH THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION	167
IX	UNDERMINING THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE	184
X	POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE	204
XI	DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES	220
XII	WHITHER?	243
	REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY	254
	INDEX	261

MAPS

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES	<i>Frontispiece</i>
THE FAR EAST	29
THE CHINESE REPUBLIC	75
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST	115
RAILWAYS OF MANCHURIA	149

FOREWORD

TO present the problems of China is no easy task. In that land of some four hundred million people driven hither and thither by military, political, economic, and social forces seemingly beyond their power to control, it is a difficult matter to get at the roots of things and to diagnose the causes of China's ills. Too often the attempt is made to simplify the problem by treating China as an isolated land, as if it were still cut off from the rest of the world by the Great Wall and the Seven Seas. Such artificial simplification makes possible the suggestion of solutions which, despite their apparent obviousness, fail utterly when subjected to practical tests.

China, whether happily or not, is a part of the modern industrial world and is surrounded by highly organized, nationalistic, not to say imperialistic, states. China is a part of this world and this world is a part of China. Each of the surrounding states feels itself as deeply concerned in the solution of China's problems as are the Chinese people themselves. It is idle to rail at the policies pursued by European nations and Japan. Their governments are impelled by the same motives as our own—by the same motives which prompt the activity of the Chinese student movement—the advantage of their own countries. Only as we accept these factors as essential elements shall we be able to gain any clear understanding of which way progress lies in China.

FOREWORD

This essay attempts to set forth the various aspects of the Chinese situation, each in its relation to the others, to the end that the problem of China and its relation to the world may be viewed as a whole. Only so can an effective solution be discovered.

Many years of study, including long residence in north and south China, Japan, and Siberia, have given the author some first-hand knowledge of conditions in the Far East and led him to tentative conclusions in regard to them. The book would not be what it is, however, were it not for the assistance, often unwitting, of the members of the conference on "The Chinese Republic and the Powers" of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown in August, 1926. Here were gathered experts on all phases of the Far Eastern problem: Chinese, Japanese, Russians, diplomats, missionaries, educators, business men, economists, sociologists, and military men. To all of these the author is indebted for suggesting, criticizing, approving, and hammering his convictions into the form here presented. His conclusions, however, in no sense embody the sentiment of the conference: they are the author's own as they emerged from the fires of its debates.

A similar word must be said in regard to the references in the bibliographies. The inclusion of any volume simply means that the reader may find in it a more elaborate treatment of some or all of the subject-matter of that chapter. It does not imply that its author would support the conclusions of the present writer. In many cases there would be vehement disagreement.

The author wishes to express his appreciation of the courtesy of the editors of *Asia*, for their permis-

FOREWORD

sion to make use of the material of Chapters IV and V, much of which has been published in their pages; to the editors of *Commerce and Finance* for similar permission in connection with Chapter VII; and to the editors of the *New York Herald-Tribune* for a like courtesy in connection with material scattered throughout the book.

H. K. N.

New York, January, 1927.

CHINA
AND THE
POWERS

I

THE VALIDITY OF THE REPUBLIC

SINCE the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the proclamation of the establishment of a republic to succeed the age-old Chinese Empire, we have become accustomed to referring to the country as a republic and to thinking of it and its political operations in terms and phrases used in republics as we know them in the Occident. Recent developments in China and in the relations of that country with the other nations of the world have given rise to many questions as to the reality of republican forms of government in China. There has followed a closer and more critical examination of the governmental processes there and a revaluation of the terms used to describe them.

Some of the factors which we imply in the use of the word "republic" are a constitution, an executive, and a legislative body made up of representatives chosen by a more or less wide-spread popular suffrage. Then there must be a judicial machinery engaged in interpreting and enforcing such laws as are passed by the legislative body. Back of all of these there is a citizenship qualified to think along political lines and sufficiently informed to build up an intelligent mass attitude which might legitimately be called "public opinion." An examination of these factors as they exist in China reveals very little of substance to give reality to the terms of republicanism either as they are used in

the West or as they are repeated by the Chinese students when they depict the remarkable progress made by their countrymen and assail the interference of foreign Powers.

The Provisional Constitution of the Chinese Republic was adopted March 11, 1912, by a heterogeneous assortment of delegates from the provinces which had adhered to the republican cause. Some of these delegates were chosen by provincial assemblies; others were nominated by republican generals; some were chosen by that peculiar process of gravitation into public service which is characteristic of Chinese local government; and still others simply presented themselves with no other credentials than their own presumption.

Ever since the adoption of this provisional constitution, efforts have been made to draft a permanent constitution to take its place. These efforts culminated in the promulgation, on October 10, 1923, of the present constitution, the provisions of which give somewhat more power to the president, but which otherwise change very little the form of the government as far as its legal outline is concerned.

It is not needful to go into the details of the provisions of the constitution which served the republic during the first twelve years of its life. It was ignored, changed, amended, disregarded, flouted, and violated whenever occasion demanded by the wielders of the real power of the country. In this respect it would appear that its successor, so far at least, has been no more favored. The conditions of turmoil, disorder, military banditry, and general disregard of law and of orderly procedure, are now sufficiently well known abroad so

that it is necessary only to suggest some of the provisions of the present constitution to show what honor they enjoy in the breach and how little in the observance.

"The Republic of China shall be a unified Republic forever," confidently predicts Article I.

"The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the whole body of the people," theorizes Article II.

"The territory of the Republic of China consists of all dominions in the possession of China. The territory and its divisions and areas shall not be altered except by law," hopes Article IV.

"The residences of citizens in the Republic of China shall not be entered or searched except in accordance with the law," says Article VII, despairingly.

"Citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to petition Parliament and to state grievances in accordance with the law," sententiously proclaims Article XVI.

"Citizens of the Republic of China shall have the right to vote and to stand for election in accordance with the law," Article XVII dreams of a far future.

"Citizens of the Republic of China shall have the obligation to pay taxes in accordance with the law,"—and in many other ways—Article XI might have truthfully added.

"Citizens of the Republic of China shall have the obligation to serve in the army in accordance with the law," says Article XX, ruefully.

"Citizens of the Republic of China shall have the obligation to receive elementary education," breathes Article XXI in prayerful aspiration.

"The ordinary session of Parliament shall commence on the first day of the eighth month of each year," impotently orders Article LII.

"The President shall be elected by the Presidential Electoral College, composed of the entire membership of the two Houses of Parliament," Article LXXII provides, with scientific forethought.

"The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the Republic, and shall be in command thereof," the Constitution provides in Article LXXXII, as all good constitutions should.

There is not the slightest semblance of compliance with any of these provisions of the constitution, and many more of its hundred and forty-one articles are in similar case. The corresponding articles of the provisional constitution were likewise disregarded in their day. The constitution as a factor in the life of the republic is merely an academic document, as yet wholly unrelated to the realities of government.

The executive branch of the government has undergone somewhat similar vicissitudes. Yuan Shih Kai, the first president, was an able executive and gave the country a real government. His authority, however, was exercised not in accordance with the constitution, but in constant violation of it, and his rule more nearly resembled that of a military dictator than that of a constitutional president. Upon his death in 1916, Vice-President Li Yuan Hung succeeded to the presidential office, to come almost at once under the menace of military leaders, who used their command over large bodies of troops to advance their personal and pecuniary purposes. Their aggression soon proved too much for

President Li, who gave place in 1917 to Vice-President Feng Kuo Chang, the last president who retained any shadow of executive authority. He was succeeded in 1918 by Hsu Shih Ch'ang, an old mandarin who was placed in office by and for the controlling military clique, and whose sole influence in the government was such as he could exercise by intrigue and by playing off one faction among his masters against another. President Li was recalled to office in 1922, upon the overthrow of the men who had installed Hsu; but despite the promises of victorious military barons, he found the position of chief magistrate no more congenial than before, and departed hastily between days in 1923. His successor was the notorious Tsao Kun, an ignorant and dissolute soldier whose election cost him between ten and eleven million dollars (silver) in bribes to the members of parliament. This heavy investment proved unprofitable, and Tsao Kun was succeeded in 1924 by Tuan Chi Jui, who modestly took the title of provisional chief executive rather than that of president. He, in turn, left office in the early part of 1926, since which time the chair of the chief magistrate has been vacant. The lack of official head, however, has apparently caused no added inconvenience to the nation at large, if in fact it has been noticed.

The rôle played by the legislature in the history of fifteen years of Chinese republicanism has been no less erratic than that of the executive. The first parliament, assembled in 1912, came to grips at once with Yuan Shih Kai and soon found that it had met its master. Parliament was determined that the powers of sovereignty should be exercised virtually in their entirety

by the legislative branch of the government, and that the president should be reduced to a figure-head. Yuan Shih Kai was not built for a figure-head and took the offensive against parliament. He first drove out those members who were hostile to him, and as their departure left the parliament without a quorum, he dissolved it entirely in 1913, and carried on the government unassisted until his death in 1916.

When Li Yuan Hung succeeded to the presidency he recalled the parliament, although its three-year term of office had already expired. Various arguments were advanced to prove its legality. The most plausible was that during the time when it was prevented from meeting by Yuan's order, its powers were in suspense and that the time of suspension should not be counted in reckoning the term of office of its members.

The three years of exile had taught its members nothing of political wisdom, and the old struggle between legislative and executive branches was renewed. Against Li alone the legislature might have been successful, but under pressure of the military leaders, who were already obtaining a sinister influence in political affairs, President Li again dissolved the parliament in 1917. By 1918 the military chieftains were supreme and they conceived the idea of legalizing their position by having a parliament of their own. The so-called "Tuchuns' Parliament" was composed of delegates chosen to represent the various provinces by the military barons. Probably a good half of them would not have dared show their faces in the provinces they were supposed to represent. None the less, they served the purpose for which they were called together and, following instruc-

tions, elected Hsu Shih Ch'ang president. Having performed this onerous task, this parliament passed from view without further troubling the waters of Chinese politics.

Meantime, such members of the old parliament as retained sufficient enthusiasm gathered at Canton where a government was set up under the leadership of Sun Yat Sen, which stoutly maintained that it was in reality the constitutional government of all China. There is some doubt as to whether a full quorum of the original members of the old parliament ever gathered at Canton; but, as none of their acts beyond the election of Sun Yat Sen as president ever had any effect, the matter is not important. Of greater interest, perhaps, is the theory on which they justify their continuance as a parliament six or seven years after the term for which they were elected had expired. The contention is made that the military leaders at Peking had illegally dissolved the first parliament, and had illegally prevented the election of its successor. To admit under these circumstances that the first parliament lost all standing with the expiration of its three-year term, would be to allow the republic to expire by default in the face of military aggression. Therefore, it was argued, the members of the old parliament who continued to function in their representative capacity, if they did not actually constitute a parliament, were in fact trustees of the political powers of the republic until such time as a new parliament could be elected.

While this argument is somewhat tenuous, the claims of the old parliament were recognized by Peking when Li Yuan Hung returned to the presidential office

in 1922. Once more he recalled the original parliament to assemble at the northern capital where, after considerable negotiation and political activity, it betrayed its protestations of regard for the public interest by selling the presidency to Tsao Kun for ten million dollars cash in hand paid. In addition, it managed to agree upon the long-discussed question of the permanent constitution, which was promulgated the day Tsao Kun took office. After that, the activities of the people's representatives ceased to be legislative, became political and were soon lost in the whirl of events which brought on a new three-cornered civil war.

One of the implications of a republic is a legislative body made up of representatives chosen by a more or less wide-spread popular suffrage. It is evident that such a legislative body has not yet graced the Chinese Republic. Neither of its two assemblies had any basis in popular suffrage. In fact, in the greater part of China, popular suffrage is a far distant dream. In Hunan, in Chekiang, and in Canton there has been popular balloting on provincial affairs. Even in these more advanced provinces we have yet to hear of an unexpected landslide against the authorities in control. And in the remainder of China, a man who has cast a ballot—nay, a man who knows what a ballot is—is a rarity.

As the legislature had always been too much engrossed in political affairs and the perquisites of office to attend to the more prosaic matter of devising a code of laws for the Chinese Republic, this latter task was left to a commission of experts. These, with the assistance of several foreign advisors, have compiled a number of codes and laws including a criminal code,

naturalization law, some commercial and mining regulations, and some temporary regulations governing civil procedure. These have been promulgated from time to time by presidential mandate, with or without parliamentary sanction as the exigencies of the occasion might demand. Viewed objectively, and without reference to the legality of their enactment, the codes and laws promulgated are of excellent quality and bear comparison with those of any country. They have not been completed as yet, but if the remainder of the task is as well done as that which has been accomplished so far, China will have a set of laws for which she will need apologize to no one. Unfortunately that is where the matter ends. The laws read very well, but it is difficult to point to any one of them which is enforced throughout the country or in any large portion of it.

An inherent difficulty in the new codes is that the Chinese language is limited in its vocabulary and has few terms in which modern legal principles can be stated. In writing new codes the compilers have frequently been constrained to resort to new characters which were devised by the Japanese for their own modern codes. These characters may carry meaning to the men using them, and when defined may be understood by a few who have been thoroughly trained in foreign jurisprudence. Among these are most of the members of the Supreme Court in Peking. As for the rest of the country, it is now and will be for many years, impossible to secure a sufficient number of properly trained men to furnish, for all the courts, judges who have any conception whatever of what the new codes

mean. They may be told the pronunciation of the Japanese ideographs. Some attempt may be made to explain to them the meanings which they convey. But it will be a generation or two before the principles which it has been intended to introduce are generally recognized by the judges, let alone by the people to whom the laws are supposed to apply.

The main reason why Chinese law is not translated into practice, however, is the fact that the writ of the central government does not run beyond the walls of Peking; that it has no shadow of power to establish or maintain a court in any part of the country. The courts are established and the judges appointed by the local military barons, who are much more interested in using the courts as instruments of extortion for enriching their coffers than they are in the purveyance of abstract justice. They tolerate no trifling with their wishes, and any attempt to substitute the execution of law and the dispensation of justice for the more pecuniary purpose of the tuchuns results in the prompt substitution of a more amenable judge.

Lest exception be taken to this estimate as based solely upon the unsympathetic observations of foreigners, it is well to have before us a statement of Tang Shao Yi, a man who ranks high among his countrymen for ability and integrity. A student of Columbia University, he served under the empire in a number of responsible positions, among them vice-president of the Board of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Communications. He represented Yuan Shih Kai at the peace negotiations in Shanghai and later became premier of the new republic. He denounced Yuan, however, when the

latter attempted to mount the throne, and his stand had no little to do with thwarting that ambitious program. Tang Shao Yi later associated himself with Sun Yat Sen in his attempt to preserve the republic, but found the southern leader too impractical to work with. Since 1922 he has not held office but is the unofficial leader of the less radical wing of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party. His good faith and loyalty are not open to question, but he insists upon seeing things as they are. Mr. Tang, whom we shall quote on other occasions, says in regard to this matter of the courts:

The sanctity of law courts is an elementary condition in the development of good government. In China, unfortunately, a system has come into existence of certain individuals regarding themselves as superior to the courts and they not only cannot be subjected to judicial procedure but they interfere with the operations of justice. They write letters to the judges making suggestions as to decisions. They insist upon the appointment of their henchmen as judges and order such judges to obey their dictates. They even hold courts of their own on the subterfuge that they are enforcing martial law, and they throw men into prison without due process of law.¹

From this brief sketch it is apparent that in no one of the three departments, which are usually considered the essential framework of a republican government, has China attained sufficient success so that she may say that either her executive, her legislature, or her judiciary is more than a mockery. Her constitution and laws exist on paper; but, without the proper functioning of the governmental authorities, they are no more

¹ From the *North China Daily News*, quoted in the *China Weekly Review*, October 31, 1925.

than paper and constitute not a republic but an architect's plan.

Indeed, it may well be asked whether China is a state at all in the sense in which that term is used in international law. Before a state aspires to recognition as such in the family of nations, it is supposed to be capable of "exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace, and of entering into all international relations with the other communities of the globe."²

It is quite obvious that the present political nebula known as the Chinese Republic cannot comply with these conditions. It cannot exercise control over all persons within its boundaries, it cannot make war or peace, and it is not able to perform its international obligations. It is this condition which complicates the problem for the United States and the other foreign Powers. We have no official concern with the form of government which the Chinese may select for themselves or which may be imposed upon them by military autocrats. The choice of the form of government in any state is the sole privilege of the people who wield power in that state. But we are concerned with whether there is any state at all with which we and other nations can deal under the generally recognized principles of international law. The absence of any authority in China which exercises effective control over the country has already been noted. Two or three other factors may be men-

² Moore, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 1, Page 15.

tioned which emphasize the impotency of the nominal authorities.

Few governments, and practically no newly established governments, have attempted to sustain themselves without some organized military force, usually an army and, if the country has a coastline or navigable rivers, a navy. The constitution of China provides that the president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy. China then contemplates the use of military force. Nor does China lack an army. While the number varies from month to month, there are at present about twenty-five armies operating in the country. The difficulty arises from the fact that no one of these is under the authority of the central government. It would be so fantastic to think of any one of them obeying the constitutional commander-in-chief, that it has never occurred to him to issue a military order. These armies are the personal followers, constituted in large measure of organized bandits, of the various military governors or tuchuns, who carry on a system of feudal warfare, with Peking and the revenues of the national government as the prize of victory. While none of these many armies is subject to the orders of the central government, all of them manage either by force or blackmail to secure a greater or smaller share of the public funds.

The Chinese navy, consisting of some fifty vessels and boats in different degrees of dilapidation and manned by about eight thousand, five hundred men, splits up into squadrons and plays much the same game as that of the army, attaching itself to this or that leader according to his ability to make financial com-

pensation. As a result of these conditions prevailing among its armed forces, the government of China is utterly powerless in the face of domestic insurrection or of aggression from abroad.

While financial conditions are not necessarily a criterion of whether a state exists or not, they furnish us with some measure of the efficacy of its operations. If the conditions are sufficiently bad, they might well indicate that the state is so feeble as to be practically non-existent. There are no accurate figures as to the amount of Chinese indebtedness. In the absence of any properly constituted authority for incurring indebtedness, obligations have been undertaken by various ministers, sometimes with and sometimes without the knowledge of the rest of the government. The result is that nobody either in or out of China knows exactly what the financial obligations of the country are, or to whom money is owing. Various estimates have been made, however, and these indicate a present national indebtedness in excess of \$1,200,000,000 gold. This indebtedness is being increased by annual deficits of some \$250,000,000 each year.

Part of this indebtedness is in the form of well-recognized loans or indemnity obligations, and is secured upon the customs receipts. These receipts are handled by foreign administrators, and the service of these particular obligations is in all respects regular. Aside from these items, the annual expenditures of the Chinese government are estimated to be about seventeen times its annual revenue. The excess of outgo over income is made up by repeated short-term loans, at ruinous rates of interest, and the life of a finance minister is a con-

tinuous, feverish search for ready cash. If the organization of a state is so feeble and ineffective that its financial statement is allowed to come to this pass, it is hardly hypercritical to suggest that China is not only not a republic, but not a state at all.

From a theoretical point of view the various sections of the country dominated by this or that tuchun are a closer approximation to real states than the republic itself. These military adventurers sometimes pay lip-service to Peking, when it is to their advantage to do so, but they pay nothing else when it can be avoided. All of the locally collected taxes and revenues are appropriated to their own use and they rule their principalities with irresponsible despotism. As Tang Shao Yi puts it: "The military chieftains regard the territory which they and their retainers have taken as personal domains, in which they act as petty kings and in which they tax the people as they please with a view to increasing their own wealth. . . . Military commanders devise their own tax schemes to raise more revenue to pay their soldiers and to enrich themselves."

These principalities, practically independent of Peking, are thus more truly political entities than the Chinese Republic as a whole. But they too are utterly unstable. Fighting, treachery, and intrigue are constantly shifting their boundaries and their rulers. The tuchuns have not sought recognition by foreign Powers, preferring to go their wilful way and let the responsibility for their aggression rest with Peking, where foreign diplomats may obtain what redress they can.

There is a fundamental cause back of all this political disintegration. One of the factors which is considered

essential to the functioning of a real republic is a citizenship qualified to think along political lines and sufficiently informed to build up an intelligent mass attitude which may legitimately be called "public opinion." For reasons which will appear more clearly when we come to examine the economic and social conditions in China, the Chinese people constitute no such citizenship. Book education of any sort is the possession of extremely few. The ability to read with any facility the difficult characters of the Chinese language is confined to about one per cent of the population. And in the estimate of those best qualified to judge, not one-tenth of these are able to read and understandingly interpret a modern discussion of political issues.

We have heard of late of the "unanimity of public opinion in China" for treaty revision, the abolition of foreign privilege, and other matters. But true "public opinion" must be based upon the ability of the public to understand two or more divergent interpretations of any particular issue, to weigh them and choose between them. In China public opinion based upon such ability is confined to a small fraction of the people. The so-called "public opinion" which reaches such a striking degree of unanimity is the result of endless agitation among the masses of the ignorant population, agitation in which all of their ills have been ascribed to the foreigner and his treaties. It has none of the characteristics of public opinion; it is almost pure mass emotion. Not only is it not in itself public opinion, but it overwhelms the feeble public opinion which does exist. We know how powerful is this element of mass emotion even in countries of long experience with dem-

ocratic government, where it affects but a minority of the population. Its effect in China, then, where it is ninety-nine and a half per cent strong, is overpowering.

Mass emotion may be considered as legitimate an expression of the desires of a people as intellectual opinion and entitled to respect as such. There is, however, a vast difference. Public opinion expresses itself through political processes; mass emotion expresses itself through mob action. The one strives to be constructive; the other is rarely anything but destructive. Chinese history offers infinite illustration of this fact. As each of its successive dynasties has degenerated to the point where its rulers could no longer be tolerated, the Chinese have risen and destroyed the dynasty. "It has exhausted the mandate of Heaven" was their impressive rationalization. But the influence of the people ceased with the destruction. Never has there been a case where these judges of heaven's will have been able to give it constructive expression. After the fall of each dynasty, there has been a period of anarchy which continued until some foreign adventurer or some Chinese of outstanding military ability has seized the throne, ruthlessly stamped out opposition, sternly suppressed all political will other than his own, and reestablished the traditional despotism of China. Thus is vouchsafed a new mandate of heaven.

The lesson is clear. Mass emotion can destroy; it cannot build up. It is a constant invitation to military usurpation of the powers of government. It results inevitably in the establishment of authority by force. More often than not that force has come, not from some unification of effort among the Chinese them-

CHINA AND THE POWERS

selves, but from some more highly organized people outside. Never has it resulted in the peaceful and orderly establishment of a government, and never has it had, nor does it now have, the slightest tendency in the direction of the establishment of a republic or any other government in which there is popular participation. The constant fighting among China's tuchuns to-day is but the recurrence of the old struggle to establish a despotism upon military foundations. Thus it is that we have a nominal republic whose constitution and laws are mere scraps of paper, whose president is a shadow, whose legislature is a memory, and whose courts are a byword.

And yet there is at least one element in the Chinese situation which is indicative of the existence of a state in the territory which we know as China. That element is recognition by the other nations. All the great Powers, and practically all the other states of the world officially recognize the government at Peking as the government of an existing state and they are dealing with it, in so far as its own limitations will allow, on that basis. Thus China is officially, and by the forms of international law, a duly constituted and recognized member of the family of nations. That there is a large element of fiction in this position is generally appreciated, and some of the difficulties of dealing under the forms of international law with an entity which has so few of the characteristics of a state will be discussed later. The situation may be summarized, perhaps, by saying that China is a vast, amorphous theocratic empire in process of transition from mediævalism to modernism; that this process will ultimately result in its crystallizing into one or

more modern states; that this process has not yet gone far enough so that China as a whole, or any section of it, is capable of assuming and discharging the obligations inherent in a modern state, and that until this stage is reached it is idle, if it is pertinent, to ask whether China is a republic.

Despite the amorphous quality of the present political entity known as the Chinese Republic, the states of the world which have interests in the Far East have elected to deal with it as a state in the customary, international forms. Envoys are accredited, diplomatic notes are exchanged, and the usual forms of international correspondence are carried on between the government of Peking and the states surrounding China. The formal recognition of her statehood is complete, but the fact is that internationally speaking, in the space where the Chinese state should be, there is a political vacuum. International politics, no less than nature, abhors a vacuum. Into it press with all the power of economic and military expansion the surrounding states. That even the fiction of China as an independent state has not long since disappeared, is due solely to the restraining pressure of these states upon each other. It is thus that the Chinese problem becomes in a very peculiar and a very real sense an international problem with its ramifications leading to all of the great capitals of the world.

II

FOREIGN RIGHTS AND CHINESE PROTESTS

THE unique condition which prevails in China, the impossibility of applying there the ordinary procedure of international relations, has made it necessary for other nations to devise various means by which they might secure protection for their nationals, their property, and their commerce, through some action of their own. The right to exercise this unusual authority has in most cases been granted by China in treaties, some of which have been made willingly, some of which have been the result of defeat in war, and some of which have been purchased by bribery of officials.

A feature of practically all the treaties which China made with different Powers until after the World War, is the "most-favored-nation" clause. This clause is common enough in treaties between various states, and simply provides that the nationals of the state enjoying the clause shall be treated as well as any other foreigners in the country concerned. This provision may entitle the foreigner to rights as great as those of the native citizen or subject, but frequently it entitles him only to more limited privileges.

In China, however, this clause has operated in a different way. By force or fraud or bribery, one foreign Power would obtain for its nationals rights and privileges greater than those enjoyed by the Chinese themselves. By virtue of the most-favored-nation clause in the treaties with a score of other Powers, their nationals

immediately acquired the same extensive rights and privileges. Thus the treaty relations of China with the foreign Powers in the last century have continuously placed the foreigners in a more and more favorable position, while China has been constrained to concede greater and greater infringements upon its own sovereignty.

Neither the most-favored-nation clause nor any other provision in the treaties ever worked in the contrary direction. There was no means by which China, having recovered some particular right or privilege from one foreign Power, could get it back from the others except by separate negotiations with each. Such negotiations were doomed to failure in advance, because if any Power gave up a right which was still enjoyed by the remaining Powers, it immediately placed its own nationals at a disadvantage and subjected them to losses which handicapped them in competition with the nationals of other countries for the trade and commerce of China. Thus it was necessary for only one nation to secure a right from China for all to enjoy it. To retract that right China must gain the simultaneous consent of all nations concerned—a highly difficult task.

Until 1842 both the commercial and political relations between China and the Powers of Western Europe and America were carried on without treaty regulation. This resulted in irritations from which sprang most of the later difficulties between China and the foreign Powers. The only place where foreigners were allowed to land for the purpose of trade was at Canton, as far as possible from the seat of government at Peking. The Peking bureaucracy held itself in such

high regard that it considered affairs of trade and commerce quite beneath its notice and entrusted the handling of the unwelcome foreigners to the local officials in Canton. The Peking mandarins, reiterating the formula that the emperor they served was the Son of Heaven, the ruler of all on earth, with its corollary that all peoples outside the Celestial Empire were utter barbarians and destined by heaven to pay homage and tribute to its representative in the Forbidden City, were determined to keep the foreign traders in a position of abject servitude. They held the local officials at Canton responsible for the enforcement upon the foreigners of such regulations as would keep constantly in mind the great extent of their inferiority to the people, and especially the rulers of China. Such a situation was not conducive to the best of feeling and the foreign traders constantly chafed at the restrictions placed upon them and repeatedly endeavored to regularize trade along the lines pursued elsewhere.

An additional element of confusion and dispute was the amount of port dues to be paid by ships and the duties to be paid on goods imported into China. As there was no regular published schedule, the actual amount paid was the result of bargaining between the traders and Chinese officials. As the amount of profits accruing to each side was dependent upon the result of these negotiations, the discussions were often acrimonious and always protracted and unsatisfactory.

Animosity increased until it finally resulted in war between Great Britain and China in 1840. This war is known as the Opium War. Because the specific article over which the quarrel arose was opium, the Chinese

contention is that the war was undertaken by Great Britain in order to force opium into China for the profit of the British traders. The British rejoinder is that the connection of opium with the war was entirely incidental and that its real purpose was to secure honest and regular trade conditions.

Whatever the moral questions might be, the result embodied in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 was the opening to foreign trade of Canton and four other ports, including Shanghai, the cession of the barren island of Hongkong to Great Britain, and the agreement that China should levy a five per cent tariff on both imports and exports. As the five per cent provision still left room for bargaining as to the value on which the five per cent was to be levied, a schedule was drawn up of the specific duties collectable on all articles of trade.

This was the beginning of the "conventional tariff" against which China has in recent years protested so vehemently. As is evident from the manner in which it came into being, the conventional tariff was not imposed upon China with any intention of restricting her revenue. On the contrary, because foreign trade was for the first time regularized, it furnished a new source of revenue to the Imperial Government. Also at that time there was no question of protection of Chinese infant industries to be considered. Nor did the fixing of the specific duties operate to China's disadvantage until a later time. In fact during the first two decades of the conventional tariff the fixing of specific duties operated to China's benefit, as falling prices made the actual collections more than five per cent of the value of the

goods. Hence the first revision of the tariff schedule was asked by the Powers in order to make it conform with the terms of the treaty. A fairly consistent rise of prices from that time onward has operated to decrease the percentages collected under these schedules and there have been several revisions to bring the rates to an effective five per cent. The last of these was in 1922, pursuant to an agreement made at the Washington Conference.

A foreign right in China which has caused as much discussion as the customs tariff is that of extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality from the point of view of the foreign national in China is his right to be judged in civil or criminal matters by the law and the officials of his own state instead of by Chinese law and officials. It is a right which has in a number of cases been demanded by the more highly organized western Powers for their nationals sojourning in less developed though independent countries, the old Turkish Empire for example.

Extraterritoriality in China was first foreshadowed in the Treaty of Nanking, but it was an American who elaborated it and made it a real factor in the Chinese situation. Caleb Cushing went to Macao as American Envoy to secure a treaty with China after the cession of Hongkong. He believed that America, in order to secure for herself an equal opportunity in the great markets of China, must have some equivalent of this British base at the very entrance to the country. America was not disposed to take territory in the Far East, and Cushing conceived that if American traders were made secure under American law and American administra-

tion of justice in China itself, they would be at no disadvantage as compared with British traders operating from Hongkong. Full extraterritorial rights were granted by China in the Treaty of Wanghsia to such Americans as came within her borders. By the most-favored-nation clause in treaties made after this by other Powers, this right of extraterritoriality was extended to practically all foreigners in China.

Another right of which the foreigners in China have availed themselves is that of establishing foreign residential concessions in the vicinity of the open or "treaty" ports. China's ideas on sanitation and on other features of city life were somewhat different from those prevailing in the Occident. The vast concentration of humanity in Peking, the capital of China, a city of about a million inhabitants, has yet to build its first sewer. The demand for fertilizer for the raising of vegetables and garden truck disposes of the most serious results of such sanitary conditions, but in general the streets are filthy and the smells sometimes nauseous to the less callous senses of the West. It is quite possible by taking over a Chinese house and installing modern sanitary equipment to convert it into a most comfortable and attractive home even for the fastidious foreigner, but once the owner emerges from his compound gate he is again in the midst of China.

If the foreigner who was led by trade or missionary zeal to make his residence in China was desirous of establishing a residential district after his own manner outside of the Chinese cities, the Chinese were no less ready to allow him that privilege. It was not a difficult matter then to secure from the Chinese the land or so-

called "concession." In practically every case where concessions have been obtained, the land designated by the Chinese for this purpose has been the least desirable and the least valuable in the immediate neighborhood of the treaty port concerned. Thus at Canton the foreign concession, Shameen, was a mud flat in the river. At Shanghai, the magnificent modern city which visitors are prone to think of as Shanghai, but which is in reality a suburb of the great Chinese city of that name, has been built upon swamp lands which were considered worthless by the Chinese at the time the concessions were granted.

Ordinarily a concession was granted to a foreign government whose consul took over its administration and made leases or deeds to such of its nationals as wished to acquire them. In some cases two or more concessions were combined to form an "international" settlement. This occurred at Shanghai and at Tientsin in the case of the British and American concessions. It is the international settlement which constitutes the greater part of the foreign city of Shanghai, although the French settlement is of almost equal importance. As trade developed, more foreigners came to live in the concession or settlement, more elaborate buildings were erected, streets and later boulevards were paved, police and fire protection were provided and all of the machinery of Western municipal administration was introduced. In the international settlement at Shanghai this administration was transferred from the consul to a Municipal Council elected by the foreign taxpayers.

As these foreign cities grew up beside the old Chinese cities they began to attract the Chinese them-



selves, especially those of the wealthier classes. The broad paved streets, the cleanliness, the order and security of the foreign settlement offered an attractive contrast to the narrow, filthy lanes and crowded disorder of the Chinese city. Chinese were allowed to obtain property in the foreign settlements and at Shanghai the present Chinese population, including all classes, is approximately eight hundred thousand, while the foreign population is only about thirty thousand. The administration, however, remains entirely in the hands of the foreigners.

Another form of foreign rights in China is that granted in railway concessions. In a territory larger than that of continental United States and populated by four times as many people, railways properly conducted are a most profitable form of enterprise. The Chinese, however, for various reasons which will be discussed later, have never undertaken railway building on any extensive scale. Foreign capitalists have therefore secured concessions for railway lines in various parts of the country. They furnish the necessary capital, construct the road and either operate it or control its operation until such time as the capital loan has been repaid. The French have thus built railways in the south of China, the British in the neighborhood of Canton and Shanghai, British and Germans from Nanking to Tientsin and on to Peking and Mukden, Belgians from Peking to Hankow; the Russians across Manchuria and the Japanese, after capturing part of this line from the Russians, have greatly extended its mileage in southern Manchuria.

These railroad lines under foreign domination car-

ried not only a possibility of profit to the foreigner, but gave to the nation controlling them a dominating influence in the whole economic life of the regions which they traversed. There sprang up a rivalry between the various great capitalistic Powers to secure exclusive rights for railway construction in the regions in which they were especially interested. Thus large sections of China were staked out as the particular "spheres of influence" of this or that foreign Power. The Powers either agreed among themselves not to seek concessions in the other's sphere, or one Power would secure the promise of China not to grant concessions to any other Power in the territory concerned. The French marked out the southern provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and southern Kwangtung. The British dominated the remainder of Kwangtung and the whole of the Yangtse Valley, Germany reserved Shantung as its sphere, while Russia and Japan, after a long struggle in which each tried to secure the whole of Manchuria for itself, were constrained to divide it between them.

Another implication of the spheres of influence was that the great, loosely organized empire of China would not be able to survive the onslaughts of European imperialism and that sooner or later the country would break up and be apportioned between the various European Powers. So the sphere of influence looked not only to an immediate economic advantage, but marked the territories which the various empires expected to absorb when the final break-up of China should come. It appeared along toward the end of the last century that this break-up was imminent and the various Powers redoubled their efforts to stake out portions of

Chinese territory for themselves. This led to the Boxer Revolt in China and the formulation of the "open door" doctrine by the United States.

This policy will be discussed later. For the present be it sufficient to note that China did not break up, and that spheres of influence, while the expression still retains some descriptive value, have ceased to be an important factor in the Chinese situation.

This is not true of a by-product of the sphere of influence system, the territorial lease. The sphere of influence was a sort of negative concession in which China agreed not to cede or lease any territory in a certain region to any Power other than the one with which the agreement was made. The territorial lease, however, was a positive act by which China transferred to a foreign Power, not the sovereignty over the territory concerned, but the right to exercise all governmental authority therein. Thus Germany obtained a lease on the harbor of Kiaochow, including the town of Tsingtao, on the southern shores of the Shantung Peninsula. Russia followed by demanding a lease on the Liaotung Peninsula including the ports of Dalny and Port Arthur. Great Britain obtained a large tract, known as Kowloon on the mainland opposite Hongkong, the control of which she contended was necessary to protect the island, and also the harbor of Weihaiwei on the northern shore of the Shantung Peninsula opposite the Russian lease at Port Arthur. France secured the harbor of Kwangchowwan between Hongkong and her Indo-Chinese territories. Italy in her turn attempted to secure the lease of a harbor, but by the time she entered the competition, the Chinese government had recovered

sufficient courage to refuse, and the Italian project failed.

Meantime another form of foreign right in China, more subtle and in some cases giving a higher degree of control to the foreigner, was the making of foreign loans. Up to the time of her war with Japan in 1894-95, the Chinese government had had no occasion to borrow money. But in order to carry on the war she borrowed from Great Britain, and in order to pay the indemnity required by the Japanese, she borrowed from the French and Russians. These were comparatively small amounts, and not until China was forced by the Protocol of 1901 to shoulder a huge indemnity for the damage caused to foreign Powers and their nationals during the Boxer rebellion, did her foreign indebtedness become a real burden to the country. Since that time she has borrowed with increasing readiness at ruinous discounts and usually for wholly unconstructive purposes vast amounts of money for which she has bargained away railway and other concessions of enormous value.

The Boxer indemnity and a number of other loans were secured upon the customs revenues. In the middle of the last century, during the Tai Ping rebellion, the rebels drove the imperial forces out of the city of Shanghai. The customs officials fled with the departing troops. Foreign trade continued through the settlement and the American, British, and French consuls, considering the question as to what should be done about customs duties in the absence of any agents and customs officials, finally required their nationals to pay into their consulates the usual customs duties. When the rebellion was finally suppressed, the consuls accounted to

Peking for the money thus collected and to the astonishment of the Imperial Government, the amounts turned over greatly exceeded the amounts which formerly had been returned by its own collectors. What seemed an excellent idea flashed across the mandarin mind. Why not let the foreigners continue to collect the customs duties and thus permanently increase the revenues accruing to Peking? This idea took shape in the organization of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service which after a few years was placed under the administration of Robert Hart, as Inspector-General. Under his direction, the Maritime Custom Service extended its operation to all the ports of China and organized various allied services such as the coastal survey, the maintenance of light-houses, and other aids to navigation and later established a postal service. All of these except the postal service have remained under the customs administration and this in turn has always been under British direction. By special agreement with the Chinese it was provided that it should remain so as long as Great Britain predominated in the foreign trade of China. The post-office has since been organized as a separate service under French supervision.

This foreign administered customs service has been for many years and is now the most important source of income of the central government at Peking. In 1913, when a loan of \$125,000,000 (gold) was made to the republican government for reorganization purposes, the salt gabelle or salt tax was also placed under British administration. This is the second more important source of income of the Chinese government. The administration of these two services, in striking contrast to the

Chinese administered financial services, has been strictly honest according to western standards and throughout their operation there is no suspicion of the "squeeze" which is an accepted feature of Chinese financial administration.

In recent years, since the Peking government became the plaything of the Chinese military barons, it has become the custom for each adventurer, as he and his fellows obtained recognition from the foreign Powers as the "government" of China, to force loans from the Chinese banks on the security of the customs "surplus"—this surplus being the amount by which the customs revenue was expected, through the natural growth of commerce, to exceed the revenues already pledged.

There are other rights which the foreigners enjoy in China which, while less important than those already mentioned, should not be lost sight of in a discussion of the Chinese problem. Among these is the right of the foreign Powers to maintain their legations at Peking in a fortified quarter, administered entirely by themselves and from which the Chinese are excluded. This was a direct outcome of the attack upon the foreign legations by the Boxers in 1900. The right of fortification carries with it the right to maintain troops in the quarter and the additional right obtained at the same time to keep open the railroad from Peking to the sea and to establish foreign garrisons at Tientsin. Some of the nations, notably Japan, have arrogated to themselves the right to maintain consular guards at their various consulates on the theory that extraterritoriality imposes upon them the duty of protecting their own consulates and of having sufficient forces at hand to suppress any riot by

their own nationals. These consular guards were often regular troops by another name, and have been scattered widely over Chinese territory, especially in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The further extension of the extraterritoriality idea led to the establishment by various foreign Powers of their own post-offices in China. America had one at Shanghai. The British and French had several and the Japanese had some three hundred. In general the use of these by foreigners was an advantage to them and of no particular disadvantage to the Chinese, but it was soon found that they afforded a means of introducing various articles into the country without submitting them to customs examinations or even against national prohibitions. This offered an easy way for Japanese engaged in the sale of morphia to introduce the drug into China without incurring the trouble and risk of smuggling it. These considerations, together with the fact that the French were ably administering the Chinese post-office, led to an agreement at the Washington Conference under which all foreign post-offices in China have been withdrawn.

Russia, when she obtained the concession for the Chinese Eastern Railway across the sparsely settled and often bandit-ridden plains of Manchuria, obtained also the right of guarding this property by garrisoning the railway route with Russian troops. This right, in so far as the part of the Chinese Eastern surrendered to the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War and now known as the South Manchurian railway is concerned, has been taken advantage of by the Japanese. The Japanese also established a considerable garrison in their concession at Hankow, six hundred miles up the Yangtse River, after

a disturbance caused by the anti-Japanese boycott. This garrison, however, was withdrawn at the time of the Washington Conference.

Another matter which has given rise to some dispute is the concession of telegraph, cable, and wireless rights. The Danes, backed by the British, have connected China with Europe by land telegraph. The British have made the same connection by ocean cable. British, Japanese, and American interests are now engaged in rivalry for the establishment of wireless stations on Chinese soil. The British and the Japanese claim to have contracts giving them exclusive rights which were violated by the later American concession. America, insisting upon the open door principle, refuses to recognize the monopoly features of the other concessions and there the matter rests.

Such are the various rights which the foreign Powers have obtained in China in their attempt to secure in their relations with this great section of the world's population the same degree of security and facility for trade and commerce that ordinarily exists in the relations between two normally organized states under the general principles of international law. These rights are a kind of appendix to international law for use in China alone. No one of them would be necessary, and in the face of Chinese opposition no one of them would be desirable, if China were effectively organized with a modern centralized government of sufficient power and authority to control its own territory, its own people and its own officials, and to accept responsibility for the protection of foreign life and property within its jurisdiction. Viewed from this angle the foreigners look upon

these matters as sacred rights obtained and consecrated by treaty agreement with the government of China. They are rights upon which hundreds of millions of dollars have been invested, a vast commerce built up and the lives of thousands of foreigners planned.

Within the last two decades, however, the combined influences of the Chinese revolution and the return to China of students learned in western ideas of international law with its implications of independence and national sovereignty, the catchwords and slogans of the great war, and the success of Bolshevism in Russia have injected a new element into Chinese life. Nationalism is wholly alien to the old Chinese mentality. The loyalty of the Chinese is to his family. Patriotism in the Occidental sense was a conception almost unknown to the Chinese. But the combination of the forces mentioned has served to give birth to and nourish a lusty youth, a very genuine Chinese nationalism. To be sure, the number of Chinese who understand the meaning of this new quality is an infinitesimal fraction of the population. Yet it must not be forgotten that this small fraction, composed largely of the student class, is not only the articulate part of the nation but the part to which the rest of the nation is prone to look for leadership. Even though the ardent orators of Young China are unable to establish their claim that they speak with the voice of the Chinese people, they cannot be dismissed as a few thousand unruly adolescents whose antics may be disregarded. They may not have the active support of the four hundred million Chinese, but they have to meet the opposition of very few.

Young China has been able to spur the Chinese people

into an aggressively nationalistic attitude. The watch-words of equality, independence, self-determination and national sovereignty have become fetishes to be worshipped in complete disregard of the fact that they imply a degree of political consolidation and governmental organization which has not yet been approached in China. The reason that the United States and Great Britain in their relations with each other are equal, independent and self-determining, and in complete control of their own sovereignty, is because each is able by the exercise of its own powers to extend to the other all of the protection and security which foreigners have attempted to obtain in China by means of the unusual procedure against which the Chinese now protest. But the protests are none the less vehement, and the demand for equality with other nations is insistent in spite of the fact that the essentials which make for equality are wholly lacking in China itself. It is even difficult for the zealots of Young China to comprehend this necessity. Their favorite dialectic is to cite the faults of other peoples. What if China is overrun with bandit armies? Are not New York's gunmen known to all the world? What if she does not pay her debts? Have we not heard of the failure of prominent European nations to pay theirs? What if her courts are wholly powerless? Are there not miscarriages of justice even in England? Many similar sarcastic inquiries spring readily to their lips and they do not easily concede that milk with five per cent of water is quite a different substance from water with five per cent of milk.

Even though the desire of Young China may outrun the progress of reconstruction, the new nationalistic

movement has nevertheless brought home to the foreign Powers the necessity of a revaluation of their position in China and has made the readjustment of foreign rights in that country an issue of pressing importance.

To the Young Chinese the whole system is not one of rights but of privileges, privileges extorted by superior military force, privileges which contain no element of right and which must be completely abolished in order that China's sovereignty may be restored without derogation or impairment. While they do not forget the other rights, their attack is concentrated upon the conventional tariff and extraterritoriality. They feel that if these can be abolished it will not be hard to do away with the others.

Their argument on behalf of freedom to fix their own tariff schedule is almost, if not quite, unanswerable. They point out that every free and independent state fixes its tariff schedules as its own interests may dictate. It is only by the exercise of this complete freedom in the matter of tariff schedules that China can protect and develop her own native industries, give employment to her crowded population and prevent the huge market of China from becoming a dumping ground for foreign goods paying only a nominal duty. Still more important, they argue, is the matter of revenue for the central government. The customs revenue is now its chief source of income, an income which has already been shown to be wholly inadequate to cover its expenditures. It is contended that a scientifically drawn tariff would vastly increase the revenue of the central government and thus enable that government to put down insurrection, establish order, and maintain itself upon a basis

which would command the respect of the Chinese and foreign Powers.

Against the revision of the Chinese tariff schedules are ranged foreign manufacturing interests, particularly those of Japan and Great Britain. One of China's greatest imports from these two countries is cotton, in the form of yarns and piece goods. Both Great Britain and Japan have serious industrial conditions at home. They already have large numbers of unemployed and if the Chinese market for their cottons were cut off, many hundreds of thousands more would be thrown out of work. Thus, while China's right to build up her own cotton industry is indisputable as a matter of theory, nevertheless as a matter of practice the governments of Great Britain and Japan must be expected to make such efforts as they reasonably can to hold down the Chinese tariff on these articles and to delay as long as possible the day when China shall be enabled to erect a tariff wall about her cotton market.

These exigencies of the economic situation, while in the back of every mind in connection with the tariff negotiations, are not spoken of officially. Other reasons must be given to justify opposition to tariff autonomy. One reason so advanced is that in the absence of any real central government and in the constant change of overlords in Peking, through the varying fortunes of civil war, an increase in the customs revenue would not afford any benefit to China, it would simply rivet the tuchun system upon the country and multiply the millions which the war lord who controlled the capital would be enabled to drain out of the national treasury.

Particularly is it charged that if the administration

of the Maritime Customs Service were removed from the control of foreigners as a result of tariff autonomy, the consequences would be disastrous for China. Chinese appointees would have no protection against the demands of the military rulers in the various provinces. These rulers would order all customs receipts turned over to them and it would be a rare occasion when a customs dollar would reach Peking from any province not under the immediate control of the military chieftain holding the capital at the moment. It is highly probable that such a result would follow the removal of the customs service from foreign control. Realizing this, the Peking government has officially announced that it does not intend to alter the present arrangement in that regard.

On the question of extraterritoriality, there is much more room for disagreement between the advocates and the opponents of its abolition. As we have seen, extraterritoriality was established in China as a means of giving to foreign nationals, their property, and their commercial operations such protection as would be obtainable without such provision from a modern organized state under the rules of international law. In a country where the administration of law was largely personal and subject to all of the corrupting influence which that implies, a country where such written laws as existed were hardly known to the people, a country where the emperor himself opposed making the courts reliable because it might encourage litigation, the Western Powers did not feel that they could submit their nationals and their property to the local jurisdiction.

At the time when the right was granted there were

CHINA AND THE POWERS

very few foreigners in the country. Many of them were turbulent sailors, and the Chinese officials were not at all reluctant to turn over to foreign officials the responsibility of keeping them in order. It was not until the increasing intercourse with the West brought in traders, missionaries, merchants, bankers, tourists, and refugees by the thousands—all of these and their governments using and abusing the right of extraterritoriality—that it began to operate to the disadvantage of the Chinese. Instead of an unimportant obligation, it assumed the appearance of a most valuable privilege. When the students told their fellow countrymen that China was the only independent state which still submitted to such a derogation of its sovereignty, sentiment soon began to run strongly in favor of its abrogation. As extraterritoriality is but a temporary expedient and it is the intention that it shall be abolished as soon as adequate protection to foreign interests can be ensured under ordinary methods by the Chinese government, there is no foreign opposition to its ultimate disappearance. But it is quite obvious that under the conditions outlined in the last chapter, this right will not be willingly relinquished at present.

The spokesmen of Young China, however, are impatient of delay and insist on immediate abolition. They dwell on all the evils of the system, the fact that it is a derogation of China's sovereignty, that it is abused in its operation, that it gives foreigners advantages over the Chinese in their own country, and that the justice dispensed by the consular courts is frequently of a very poor quality. All of these charges are to some extent sustained by the facts, and the foreign governments

concede the desirability of abolishing extraterritoriality as soon as conditions in China warrant the belief that its purpose can be attained in another way.

China herself has been able to do little to establish such conditions. As far back as 1902 and 1903 the British, Japanese, and American governments agreed to the abolition of extraterritoriality on condition that China should adopt judicial codes and establish an adequate machinery for the administration of justice along modern lines and when "other considerations" warranted them in so doing. This phrase, according to long-established diplomatic practice, allowed the Powers a loophole for refusing to abolish extraterritoriality even if China succeeded in establishing an adequate judicial system. The spokesmen of Young China have seized upon this phrase and held it up as evidence of the duplicity of the foreign Powers. They would have it appear that extraterritoriality persists solely because the Powers want to keep the right, and that they are hiding behind this general requirement as to "other conditions." So heated have they become on this point that they have lost sight of the one condition which was specified with all clearness, namely that the "state of the Chinese laws and arrangements for their administration" should be such as to warrant the abolition of extraterritorial rights.

China's plea both for customs autonomy and for the abolition of extraterritoriality was made at the Peace Conference at Paris, but the questions involved were not deemed pertinent to the work of that Conference or within the powers of the delegates there assembled. The plea was renewed with added vehemence at the Wash-

ington Conference and there received the attention of the assembled Powers. They agreed in the customs matter to hold a conference at Peking within three months after the ratification of the treaties. This conference was to "prepare the way for the speedy abolition of *likin*¹ and for the fulfillment of the other conditions" made in the abortive treaties of 1902 and 1903, in which China was to be granted the right to make a fifty per cent increase in her tariff duties, thus bringing the tariff up to seven and one-half per cent of the value of the goods. The Powers also agreed at Washington to send to China qualified representatives who should examine the state of the laws in China and the present provisions made for their administration, with a view to making suitable recommendations to their respective governments as to extraterritoriality.

The action of the Powers on the extraterritoriality matter was too prompt for China, and she asked that the convening of the extraterritoriality commission be

¹ *Likin* literally means "one part in a thousand." The name is generally applied to the system of interior toll barriers, where dues are levied upon goods and merchandise in transit from one part of the country to another. The system had its beginning during the Tai Ping Rebellion to provide the central government with funds for the suppression of the rebel activities. *Likin* was gradually extended and barriers were erected all over China, not only at the provincial boundaries, but at many points in the interior of the provinces. The amount collected on the shipment of goods, instead of being "one part in a thousand," may run up above fifteen or twenty per cent of its value if its route happens to take it across any appreciable number of barriers. This impediment to internal commerce is the more aggravating in that the schedules of rates to be collected are very indefinite, and the sum to be paid frequently reaches the extreme limit of the amount the traffic will bear.

delayed for one year while the Chinese government gathered the necessary data for its examination. But both the extraterritoriality commission and the customs conference were delayed far beyond the one year extension by the failure of France, and for a time of Italy, to ratify the Washington agreements. Both of these countries took advantage of China's extremity to bargain their ratification of the Washington agreements in return for a decision in their favor of impending questions entirely unrelated to either the tariff or extraterritoriality. With Italy it was a question of certain interned ships. In the case of France it was the so-called gold-franc controversy. The Boxer indemnity was payable in francs. When the agreement was made a franc was worth approximately twenty cents. When the dispute arose francs were worth less than half of that amount and were rapidly falling in value. France herself was paying such obligations as were payable in francs in the depreciated currency. The Chinese government desired to make its payments to France in the same currency. France, however, refused to accept payment in anything but gold francs or their equivalent and would not allow the Washington agreements to become operative until China had accepted her point of view. By August of 1925 these matters were out of the way and France and Italy ratified the Washington agreements.

The tariff conference met in October and the extraterritoriality commission in December. The long delay had exasperated the Chinese nationalist leaders and they demanded that the tariff conference should go beyond the letter of the Washington authorizations and should

open up the whole question of tariff autonomy. The United States agreed with this view and the other Powers fell into line. Fairly rapid progress was made at first, and in November two resolutions were adopted: one, providing that China should have complete tariff autonomy and should put into effect a national tariff law on January 1, 1929; the other, providing that China would abolish *likin* by January 1, 1929. Some doubt exists as to whether these two agreements are conditional one upon the other. They are not so according to the letter of the resolutions and the British government has stated officially that it does not consider tariff autonomy conditional upon the abolition of *likin*. Chinese officials on the other hand have stated that they would not expect tariff autonomy unless *likin* was abolished. It is generally considered that the abolition of *likin* is impossible as long as the country is divided up among military chieftains who recognize no orders from Peking.

In any case the protracted dispute which arose over the tariff schedule which is to be effective until such time as tariff autonomy becomes operative, would indicate that some Powers at least do not expect tariff autonomy to become effective in 1929. There has gone into the debate over the rates to be used in the interim all of the unyielding insistence upon national interests that was expected to characterize the main debate on the question of autonomy. During this debate the rapid changes in the military situation about Peking finally resulted in the practical disappearance of the Chinese government, and the conference suspended its meetings, declaring that their action was due to the lack of any

Chinese delegates with whom they could conduct the negotiations.

On the question of extraterritoriality China had an unusual opportunity which she practically threw away. For some time after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, China continued to recognize the minister of the former Russian government as the representative of Russia and this minister continued to enjoy the privileges of Russian representative in Peking. He and the consular officials under him continued to exercise jurisdiction over Russian concessions and over Russian nationals in China under the extraterritoriality treaties. By September of 1920, it was fairly evident that there would be no early return of any former government to power in Russia. The Russian envoy in Peking and his consuls represented no existing government and the Chinese authorities finally discontinued relations with them, took over the various Russian concessions, subjected Russian nationals to Chinese jurisdiction, and to all intents and purposes abolished all treaty rights and privileges so far as Russian nationals were concerned. She had already during the war abolished these rights so far as German and Austrian nationals were concerned, but as the status of Germans and Austrians was to be settled in new treaties their position was not greatly affected. The Russian case was different. There were in Shanghai, Tientsin, and especially in Harbin thousands of Russian refugees from the Bolshevik régime. Many of these had lost all of their worldly possessions, others possessed considerable wealth. Upon these latter the Chinese police and judges fairly pounced. They were haled to court on trumped-up charges or none and

subjected to the extortions of a staff of interpreters, the chief of which received the munificent salary of sixty-five dollars a month, at a time when a good Chinese-Russian interpreter in Harbin could earn from three hundred to five hundred dollars a month in commercial work. These interpreters offered evidence for the accused according to the amounts they were paid, and interpreters, judges, and police shared in the proceeds of this legalized extortion.

These results of the loss of extraterritorial rights by Russia have not been conducive to a favorable attitude toward the abolition of extraterritoriality by the other Powers; nor has the necessity felt by German and Austrian merchants to incorporate their business under English or American laws, so that they might in this way secure the protection of extraterritoriality, tended to make the sentiment more favorable.

It is not alone for the foreigners that it is necessary to bring the judicial practices of China into conformity with modern ideas. As late as August 19, 1926, fourteen currency dealers of Mukden, charged with "disturbing the money market," were called into Chang Tso Lin's presence and, after a personal examination, were taken to the execution ground and shot, all in the space of three hours. Small wonder Tang Shao Yi exclaims: "What we need is a thoroughly considered plan which will give the Chinese people a judicial system and a law which will protect them and their property. That cannot be done in a day. Therefore no attempt should be made to accomplish it in a day . . . No system can be suitable for the Chinese people which is not good enough for the foreigners living in China."

The report of the investigating commissioners is not yet available; but it is hardly to be expected, in view of the present distracting political conditions and the prevalence of Chang Tso Lin's kind of "justice" in China, that the attitude of foreign authorities can be anything but opposed to the present abandonment of extraterritorial rights.²

²The report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality, published in November, 1926, fully supports the statements in the text. It points out the abuses of the extraterritorial system and makes recommendations for their elimination. It finds that China has not established a system of laws and courts adequate for modern needs and points out the things to be desired, chief of which is the necessity of freeing the courts from interference by the executive and the military. It suggests that after the principal items of its recommendations have been carried out, the Powers might consider the abolition of extraterritoriality according to such progressive scheme, geographical, partial or otherwise, as may be agreed upon. The report is signed by the commissioners for all the Powers concerned, including China, though the Chinese commissioner, Dr. Wang Chung Hui, noted that he did not approve all of the findings.

III

THE CHAMPION OF THE OCCIDENT

RUSSIA was the first European nation to come into treaty relations with the Chinese Empire when her advancing Cossacks met the troops of Kang Hsi along the upper reaches of the Amur River in the seventeenth century. It fell to Great Britain, however, to lead the real advance of Western commerce and culture into China. In the south, Portuguese and Spanish adventurers had followed the course of the Arab traders of the Middle Ages around to Canton and had carried on half-commercial, half-piratical operations along the southern coast of China. But the East India Company was the first to undertake trade with China in an organized way and to erect "factories," as they were called, in the neighborhood of Canton. Americans and others soon joined in the profitable trade in tea, silks, and opium, but the largest interests, and thus the leadership in disputes between the Chinese and the foreign merchants, was British.

The story of British relations with China is readily available and only the outstanding events can be referred to here. The East India Company's monopoly was dissolved in 1834, and the British government undertook direct supervision of the China trade thereafter. The result of this change was not wholly fortunate. So long as the trade was in the hands of the

East India Company, the disputes with the Chinese officials were considered merely commercial disagreement; they assumed no national significance. When the British sent a Trade Commissioner to supervise the trade, however, the relations between Britain and China became official. National honor was involved in disputes and behind the British Commissioner was the military power of the British Empire.

The Chinese, however, accorded to the official representative of Great Britain no more courtesy than they had shown to the merchants who preceded him. The official communications between Peking and the Viceroy at Canton show very clearly that the mandarins failed to realize that they were dealing with a power entitled to respect in the transaction of international affairs. Great Britain insisted upon trade with China being recognized and controlled by international agreement in order to do away with the petty squabbling and disputes which theretofore had been a running accompaniment to all commercial transactions. The Imperial Court, soaked in the tradition of its own impeccable superiority, not only refused to concern itself with so mundane a matter as commerce, but insisted that China needed none of the products of the outside world. If, said its spokesmen, a dispensation of heaven had made it necessary for the foreign barbarians to seek the silks and teas of China, they must then secure them on such terms as the Chinese were disposed to grant.

This attitude, in a world already on the road to industrialization and feeling the inevitable pressure of British industry for wider and wider markets, was bound to bring China and Great Britain to blows. The ques-

tion of right or wrong in the matter depends upon the philosophy of those who constitute themselves judges. For those who consider that China had the right to live on in the ancient way, surrounded by a wall which shut out all the rest of humanity, Great Britain was undoubtedly an aggressor. For those who feel that all people and all nations must take their part in the economy of the world, exchanging their surplus for the goods of other nations, and developing their resources for the benefit of mankind, China will appear as an irreconcilable reactionary whom it was imperative to force into greater tractability. For these, Great Britain will appear merely as the instrument of the inevitable effort to bring China into the modern world. And for these, also, Great Britain, once embarked upon her course, was led on step by step to her later actions in China which, while they will appear as repeated aggressions to critics of her imperialism, were but part and parcel of the task to which she had fallen heir.

The circumstances which occasioned the first armed struggle were such as to throw considerable moral obloquy upon Great Britain. This dispute arose over the trade in opium. This trade had flourished despite repeated condemnation by Chinese and foreigners, including Britons. The Chinese in both the commercial and official world at Canton made little or no effort to stop the import of the drug. They used the prohibition against it merely as a lever to extort higher payments in the form of duties and fines, thus constituting themselves in some sense "official bootleggers." At last Commissioner Lin was sent to Canton, to put an end to the traffic. The struggle led to an armed conflict in the

so-called "Opium War" of 1840-42. Even ten thousand miles from England the military power of the British Empire was immensely superior to the military power of China, and after the capture of Nanking the Chinese sued for peace.

In the Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842, the British secured the regularization of commerce which they had long sought. The island of Hongkong was ceded to the victor and five ports, including Canton and Shanghai, were opened to foreign trade. A customs duty of five per cent on both imports and exports was agreed upon. In the regulations promulgated by China pursuant to this treaty, it was provided that British consuls should be responsible for the conduct of British nationals in the treaty ports and that all criminal acts of such British nationals should be punished by British officials. Thus was foreshadowed the principle of extraterritoriality. Weight is added to the British claim that the war was not fought over opium by the fact that neither in the treaty, nor in the subsequent regulations, nor in the tariff schedule which followed, was opium mentioned.

Thus was the first breach made in the wall of exclusion which China had attempted to keep in repair about her territory, her people, and her civilization. But the making of a breach did not mean that the Chinese had surrendered. For the time being they bowed before superior physical force. The moment the pressure was withdrawn they set about, with all the subtle means at the command of the Oriental, to whittle away the rights granted by the treaty, and to render valueless such of them as they were forced to recognize.

Tension increased until once again, only fifteen years

after the Treaty of Nanking, the threat of war was in the air. The British, this time assisted by the French, refused longer to attempt to deal with the Chinese government through minor officials at Canton. They went to Tientsin at the mouth of the Pei Ho, a river leading from the coast to within a few miles of Peking, and demanded the right to negotiate with properly accredited envoys of the Emperor. Under the threat of force a new treaty was signed in 1858 to be ratified the following year. The mandarins, whose position at court depended upon the degree to which they were able to maintain the illusion of the exaltation of the Chinese ruler, again procrastinated and stopped the proceedings. In 1860 the British and French appeared at the mouth of the Pei Ho in force and, under the leadership of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, determined to end once and for all time the exasperating comedy of China's assumption of a superiority which relegated all other nations to the position of tribute-bearing barbarians. They demanded recognition of the equality of Great Britain and France with China and the right to send ministers to reside at the Chinese capital.

War ensued. A number of British officers who went forward under a flag of truce were seized by the Chinese and subjected to torture, which resulted in the death of some and the most painful injuries to others. Incensed at this action and convinced that only a reprisal inflicted upon the Emperor, himself, would serve to change the official attitude, the British and French troops advanced upon Peking. They destroyed the Emperor's summer palace at Yuan Ming Yuan, a creation which has excited the admiration of art lovers the world over

and whose magnificence has been compared not unfavorably with Versailles at its best.

The Emperor fled from the advancing barbarians and died before his return to Peking. The lesson was sufficient to teach the mandarins who dominated the court that henceforth the foreigner must not be provoked too far. Not until 1900 was it again necessary for British troops to engage in battle with the Chinese. In that year there was a remarkable recrudescence of Chinese xenophobia due to the skillful manipulation by the Empress Dowager Tse Hsi of a popular movement against the Manchu dynasty. She contrived to turn its force against the foreigners while still managing to disassociate the government from it. Within sight of her palace the Boxer bands attacked the foreign legations. They carried on a siege for over two months before relief could arrive in the form of an international army made up of British, German, Russian, French, Japanese, and American units.

This conflict again resulted in a complete defeat for the Chinese armed forces. The Protocol of 1901 was not a treaty in the sense of being the result of negotiations between China and the other Powers. It was the penalty imposed upon China for her refusal to accept the responsibilities imposed upon her by international law and her utter failure to accord protection to the lives of the foreign representatives and other foreigners legally within her borders. This fact is frequently lost to view when it is suggested that the "treaties" should be revised lest China "denounce" them. The commercial treaties may be revised or denounced, but the Protocol of 1901 is not in that category. It is a penalty

imposed upon a defeated nation and is not subject either to revision or to denunciation by China's act, unless she is prepared to renew the armed struggle which it ended.

On the other hand, the Protocol of 1901 imposes no unbearable burden upon China. It provides for an indemnity which has been paid thus far except where, as in the case of Germany and Austria, China's entry into the World War resulted in its cancellation, and where, as in the case of Russia, the right to further payments has been surrendered. The United States has already remitted most of the indemnity, and Britain and Japan are following this lead. The other provisions of the protocol, such as the right to fortify the legation quarter in Peking, the right to maintain troops in Peking and along the Peking-Tientsin railroad, or the right to keep open the road between Peking and the sea, may constitute infringements on China's sovereignty; but they are such infringements as the foreign Powers have insisted upon until such time as China is able to render them unnecessary. When China will and can protect the foreign envoys in Peking and their staffs, it will no longer be necessary for the foreign Powers to maintain a military establishment in China for that purpose.

The Protocol of 1901 was followed in the next year by a new agreement known as the Mackay Treaty. This was an attempt to restore the relations between Great Britain and China to a friendly basis. It was a treaty of commerce and amity and looked to the eventual placing of Sino-British relations upon the firm foundations of equality under international law. It provided for the abolition of extraterritorial rights as soon as the British

were satisfied that Chinese law and the machinery for its administration were such as to ensure a reasonable measure of protection and justice to British subjects living in China. It provided for an increase in the customs tariff from five to seven and one-half per cent as soon as the irritating *likin* tariffs were abolished.

The *likin* system was sufficiently aggravating to foreigners even in the more ordered days before the Chinese revolution, and both Japan and the United States joined Great Britain in the treaties written in 1902-03 in consenting to an increase of two and one-half per cent in the customs rate in return for its abolition. The Imperial Government, however, did not succeed in abolishing the impost and, since the disintegration of the republic after 1916, all promises or suggestions of abolishing *likin* have been merely idle talk. In spite of the fact that these provisions have never been carried out, the Mackay Treaty remains in being as a promise to China that Great Britain is ready to do her share when China has complied with the required conditions.

The Mackay Treaty was the last important formal treaty made between China and Great Britain until the Washington Conference in 1922. But Great Britain's interest in the Far Eastern situation demanded a very active policy in the years that followed. The traditional rivalry between Great Britain and Russia, which in Europe had centered around the possession of Constantinople, had found its way first into central Asia and then along the northern marches of India. It then reappeared in the Far East with the determined drive of the Russian imperialists across Siberia and northern

China in an effort to reach a warm-water port on the Pacific.

A successful accomplishment of this design would have constituted a serious threat to Great Britain's position in China and the Far East. The Russian advance offered an even graver menace to the Japanese position in north-eastern Asia. The mutual danger led to negotiations between the two island empires which culminated in the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. By this agreement England and Japan each agreed to come to the assistance of the other in the event of an attack by more than one Power. In plain terms this meant that in the expected conflict between Russia and Japan, if Russia were joined by France or Germany, Great Britain would place her forces at the side of the Japanese and prosecute the war in common. The war came in 1904, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance served to prevent the intervention of any other European Power on the side of Russia. Great Britain thus held the ring while Japan drove the Russians back into northern Manchuria and followed that military victory by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905 in such a way as to allow the Japanese to absorb Korea, an operation which was completed in 1910. The following year the alliance was again renewed in terms which included India in its operation. While Japan had received the greater benefit under the alliance up to that time, England was to secure effective aid upon the outbreak of the great war. In September of 1914 Japan entered the war against the Central Powers, and in November captured the German naval base at Tsingtao,

taking over the German interests throughout Shantung. She followed this with an extension of her naval operations in the western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean, assisting to put an end to German raids upon allied shipping and convoying troops and supplies from Australasia to the Mediterranean.

When the conclusion of the war and the final signing of the peace treaties gave Great Britain an opportunity to look about and take account of her position in the Far East, she found much to be complained of in the activity of her ally. Japanese firms had not only cut deeply into British trade, but government-supported enterprises had invaded many spheres of British interest and done much to damage the prestige of Great Britain in China. At the same time the arrival of Japan at the full stature of a "great Power" and her insistent demand at the Paris Conference for recognition of racial equality had aroused suspicion and distrust in the British Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These dominions are sparsely populated and, with rich lands awaiting development, began to fear an Asiatic incursion if Japan was successful in obtaining her demands. The Dominion authorities made no secret of the fact that they thought the time had come when the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be terminated.

To just what extent the Washington Conference was due to the initiative of Great Britain is a matter for historians to determine after the accumulation and weighing of all the evidence. In any event the British government accepted with alacrity the proposal of the United States for a conference to discuss the situation in the Far East and to limit naval construction if an

agreement on policies could be reached. Great Britain heartily seconded practically all of the American proposals at the conference, and the joint influence of these two Powers was sufficient to cause most of their proposals to be written into the agreements of 1922. Foremost among the results of the conference was the understanding that the *status quo* in the Far East should be preserved; that China's independence and administrative integrity were to be respected; and that the four great Powers, Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, were to respect each other's possessions in the Pacific. The dispute between China and Japan over Shantung was settled in China's favor and the American protest against the further occupation by Japan of Russian territory resulted in the withdrawal of the Japanese forces.

At the Washington Conference the British had to some extent recovered their position, and Japan had correspondingly lost ground in comparison with her dominant position in 1920. Britain was perhaps justified in thinking that she had smoothed her course for the immediate future so far as China and the Far East were concerned. An incident of comparatively little importance was to upset her tranquillity and bring about a new conflict that at times savors strongly of those which resulted in the Opium War, the War of 1860, and the Boxer revolt. On May 30, 1925, students and laborers were demonstrating in the streets of Shanghai against the killing of a Chinese laborer in a riot at a Japanese cotton mill. A large crowd of Chinese paraded along Nanking Road in the foreign settlement and approached the Louza police station. Here were gathered

a small number of Sikh and Chinese policemen. The details of what happened are still, and may always be, a matter of dispute. The demonstrators apparently attacked the station and after what the Chinese hold to be all too short a warning, the police opened fire, killing six of the students and wounding others.

The news of this "slaughter of Chinese by the British" went over China with astounding speed and served as a match to set off a veritable explosion of Chinese nationalism directed against all the Treaty Powers, but singling out the British for especial damnation. It so happened that at the time of the Shanghai incident, the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council was an American, but the police were British-trained and in charge of a British inspector, so that Britain was again shouldered with the onus of representing European imperialism as opposed to the independence of China.

The following month this conflict received a new impetus from a still more serious clash at Canton. The British Consul-General at Canton was informed on June 22 that at a student demonstration arranged for the following day, it was the intention of the demonstrators to invade the foreign concession on the island of Shameen, separated from the water-front of Canton by a canal some fifty yards wide. He at once wrote to the Canton government, warning it that precautions would be taken to prevent such invasion and that if force was used it would be repelled with force. The Shameen side of the canal was accordingly banked with sandbags and four machine-guns were set in position. Thus prepared, the foreign community awaited the

demonstration. The following morning the Consul-General and the naval officer commanding stood at the Shameen end of the bridge across the canal. The parade, consisting for the most part of labor unions, students, both boys and girls, and boy scouts, passed the Chinese end of the bridge, shouting diatribes at the foreigners but making no attempt to cross. Following them came a detachment of Cantonese troops several hundred strong, Russian-trained, and fully armed, some with fixed bayonets. These were separated from the student paraders by about a hundred yards. When they were opposite the concession they halted and took firing positions. A shot from one of the doorways on the Chinese side, followed closely by two others, seemed to be an expected signal for the Chinese to open fire. A volley from the troops in the street was supplemented by the rattle of machine-guns which they had placed in the houses above them.

A French resident of Shameen fell, pierced by nine bullets from a machine-gun, and eight other foreigners were wounded. The Consul-General and the senior naval officer sought shelter behind the barricades while the volunteers, who had been standing about watching the procession and, with the passing of the students, had thought the danger was over, rushed to their rifles. The Chinese fire was vigorously returned for a few moments until the commanding officer could get orders to the gunners to stop. It was effective in dispersing the attacking party and the casualties at the short range were numerous. Of the forty-four killed by bullets, twenty-two were soldiers, only four were students, while the rest were bystanders watching the parade. Of the sixty-

five wounded by bullets, forty were soldiers, five students, and the remainder onlookers.

This story is substantiated by many eye-witnesses of several nationalities whose veracity is hardly open to question. Even more significant was the later confession of error on the part of a missionary who, on first hearing of the firing, had issued a statement condemning the act of the British in firing on the parade. Despite the number of disinterested witnesses of the affair, the Chinese published a report of it in which it was stated: "While the student demonstrators were passing the West Bridge, the British in Shameen suddenly opened fire, killing and wounding many in the procession." This attack upon the settlement was heralded throughout China as another massacre of students by British soldiers.

A boycott was declared against everything British, including the port of Hongkong. Trade between Hongkong and the neighboring Chinese ports fell to a fraction of its former size. Chinese servants in Hongkong walked out and not until an agreement was reached in October, 1926, did this great British port begin to emerge from a state of economic siege, from which it suffered a loss estimated at times as high as half a million dollars a day.

A third significant affair was that at Wanhhsien in September of 1926. Wanhhsien is in the upper reaches of the Yangtse River. Many of the inhabitants of this section of the river depend for their living upon hauling the Chinese junks up-stream. The advent of foreign steamships which could make the ascent unaided threatened the livelihood of these people, and their hostility

expresses itself in frequent sniping at foreign vessels from the banks of the river. Especially is this the case after a sampan has been capsized by the swell of a river steamer. Chinese have been drowned in these upsets, and now it is customary to ascribe all capsizings to the steamers, whether there is one in the neighborhood or not. General Yang Sen, in command at Wanhsien, not unmindful of local prejudice, seized two British merchant ships and imprisoned their officers. Two British gun-boats, the "Cockchafer" and the "Widgeon," and a small converted freighter, the "Kiawo," were close by. The "Kiawo" steamed toward the captured ships to rescue the officers and the Chinese opened fire. The "Cockchafer" was immediately under the guns of the Chinese at the moment and was almost smothered by their fire. The "Widgeon" rushed to the rescue and the two replied to the shore batteries while the "Kiawo" steamed alongside one of the captured ships. She did this in the face of the Chinese fire, which could not be returned lest the British officers be injured. The British boarded one of the captured ships and rescued its officers. They shouted to the officers on the other ship to jump and swim for it. This they did, two of them reaching the "Kiawo," the other being killed in the water. When the "Kiawo's" task was finished, the three vessels, their ammunition exhausted, retired, leaving the two merchant ships still in the hands of General Yang Sen. Several officers and men on the gun-boats were killed and wounded, and the number of Chinese killed during the bombardment is reported to run into the hundreds. At first it appeared that this affair would spur the British to strong action, but after some reinforcement of

the British forces in the Yangtse region, an accommodation was arrived at and the seized ships were returned. Distorted reports of the incident served further to inflame the Chinese antagonism against the British. Minister Chu, Chinese representative at Geneva, even denounced the militarism of Great Britain before the League, urged on it appears by the arrival of a numerous delegation of Young Chinese in the Swiss city. His speech made it clear that the three incidents of Shanghai, Canton, and Wanhsien had forced Britain well to the front as the champion or the scapegoat of Occidental imperialism.

While Great Britain has probably not sought the doubtful honor of championing the Occident as against the Orient, her position as the greatest of the world's trading Powers makes it inevitable that she should bear the brunt of the Chinese attack. In China itself the British have by far the largest investments of any of the foreign Powers. The exact amount of the British investment is not ascertainable; but in loans, railway, and other concessions, credits, factories, banks, real and other property in China itself she has a total investment approximating \$1,500,000,000 (silver) or \$750,000,000 (gold). This total is more than ten times the American investment in China and more than twice that of Japan. To this must be added the millions of dollars' worth of value which has been built up in Hongkong and which is dependent upon the continuance of good trade and other relations with China.

Another very material interest which Britain has in China is a market for the products of the Lancashire mills. China consumes a vast quantity of cotton cloth,

and such cotton cloth is chief among the exports of Great Britain to China. The provisions of the treaties by which the duty on cotton piece-goods has been held to five per cent have thus worked to the direct advantage of British industry and of the workers in the Lancashire mills. If the Chinese tariff on cotton goods were increased to a figure which would protect the Chinese industry, the Lancashire mills would be forced to the almost hopeless task of finding another market. Hence Britain's very practical interest in preserving the Chinese tariff schedules.

Large as is Britain's financial and commercial stake in the Chinese Republic, still larger are the implications of its political interest. The dominance of the British Empire in various parts of the Orient from the Mediterranean to the China Sea is not a result solely of British prestige. A judicious and effective application of military force has secured to the British Crown the vast territories over which it holds sway. But the retention and administration of these vast territories are made easier by the prestige of the British Empire and its reputation for invulnerability. A defeat in any part of the world, whether it be military or diplomatic, causes a murmur to run through the life of every alien people now living under the British flag. There may be no wide-spread spirit of rebellion among these peoples; but there is almost always discontent and even incipient revolt at one place or another, and often at several places. When defeat comes and the idea goes abroad that perhaps the grip of Britain is relaxing, that her power is waning, it is an encouragement to those who are already preaching revolt. This may well lead

to an intensification of their efforts and make necessary a reinforcement of British power in their areas with consequent complication of the problems of the British Empire and additional expense upon the English taxpayers. Prestige is a real force in holding the British Empire together and any loss in prestige is a serious matter for the British authorities. A loss in prestige in China, where Britain has been the dominant element for one hundred years, would be a particularly severe blow to the British hegemony in Asia.

Then again the old Anglo-Russian rivalry has survived the great war and the Bolshevik revolution. Formerly it was the rivalry of one capitalistic, imperialist nation against another. But just as Great Britain is willingly or unwillingly the champion of the Occident as against the Orient, so is Great Britain the champion of capitalism against the communism of Russia. As we shall see in examining the interests of Russia in the Far East, and her recent policy in that part of the world, Communist Russia is no whit less imperialistic than was Czarist Russia. The protestations have changed, but the methods employed by the Bolsheviks strongly resemble those of three decades ago and the ultimate aims are strikingly similar. British influence and Russian influence are coterminous from Europe to Japan, just as they were throughout the last century. A defeat for England is a victory for Russia, and victory for England is a defeat for Moscow as it was for St. Petersburg.

It is to be expected under these circumstances that England should see the red hand of Bolshevism in the Chinese agitation against the British position in China. She ascribes to Bolshevik influence the strikes in Shang-

hai, the provocation of the tragedy in Canton, and the later boycott which has worked incalculable injury to the colony at Hongkong. The extent to which Bolshevik influence is actually responsible for these manifestations in China will be discussed later, but the effect of the Bolshevik influence in England may be mentioned here. During the last century England never had any difficulty in organizing her forces against the might of Muscovy. To-day, however, under the influence of the Socialist preaching of internationalism and with the sympathy which the British Labor Party has shown toward the Russian efforts to establish a Socialist government, any attempt upon the part of the British government to repel the influence of Moscow by force must reckon with the probability of a refusal by the workers to co-operate with the governmental authorities.

In this pass England once more regards with interest the position of Japan. Just as the British have found the new Russian government as expansive in its nature as that which it superseded, so too has Japan, and the statesmen of Tokio sleep with one eye open to watch the Russian movements in Manchuria. So far as Russia is concerned, they would welcome British sympathy and coöperation just as Britain would welcome Japanese aid. There is probably no intention on either side of renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It served its purpose and was superseded by the Four Power Treaty signed at Washington, to which the United States and France are also parties; but the unity of British and Japanese interests in the face of an advancing Russia, and the similarity of their needs in the Chinese market, seem to demand a large degree of sympathetic action in the Far

East. However, there is a factor here which must not be lost sight of. Both Great Britain and Japan need access to the Chinese market, but they are each other's strongest competitors in that market. Just as Lancashire would profit greatly if Japanese goods could be eliminated, so would Osaka make tremendous gains if British cottons were out of the way. In her present position Great Britain could hardly hope to exclude Japan, but there are indications that some Japanese interests would be quite willing to work out a combination with China or Russia or with both that would increase the Chinese animosity toward the British without surrendering any essential Japanese rights. In plain words they would be ready to take any necessary measures which might narrow the present anti-foreign feeling into an anti-British feeling, if that could be done without placing weapons in the hands of the Chinese, such as a surrender of treaty rights, which might later be used against the Japanese themselves. That this element is an influential one is indicated by the report that when the British approached Japan on the question of co-operation after the Wanhhsien incident, the Japanese made such exorbitant demands for the recognition of their claims to special rights in China that the British dropped the matter. Thus Japan avoided a definite stand with Great Britain against China.¹

Washington, too, has no predilection for adventuring in the troubled waters of the Far East. The overtures of Downing Street for joint action received no warmer re-

¹The prompt refusal of Japan to accept the suggestions of the British note, published on Christmas day, 1926, is another evidence of Japan's wariness.

sponse there than in Tokyo. The coolness of the State Department was doubtless due to caution rather than to any hostility to Britain. Many students of world affairs in both countries are inclined to urge an increasing measure of Anglo-Saxon coöperation in the interest of world peace and progress. In spite of occasional flare-ups and differences of opinion on the item of war-debts and other minor affairs, there is evidence of closer understanding between the two nations. At least, so far as we can see at present, there is little danger of a rift in their relations. The similarity of ideals and the need of both countries for peace and order and the development of the resources and markets of the world will in all probability bring about increased coöperation between them. But the public opinion of America will stop far short of any joint action of a military character in China unless American lives are lost in sufficient number to arouse the spirit of action. Until then Great Britain must seek her salvation in that country along the paths of diplomacy or, if she resorts to force, play her hand alone.²

² The British communication, published December 25, 1926, marks a definite abandonment of the policy of force. It proposes steps toward the recognition of Chinese claims which, in France and Japan, are viewed as dangerous in that they might lead to the break-up of China. The note, however, must go far to cut the ground from under those who insist that the British policy is still aggressive.

IV

THE RUSSIAN BEAR AMBLES EASTWARD

THE traditional rivalry between the British lion and the Russian bear has already been mentioned. As the one made his way along the southern shores of Asia, the other ambled across its northern steppes toward the inviting waters of the Pacific. The sea was not his original objective. The first Russians who crossed the Ural Mountains in the sixteenth century were not looking for a warm-water port, but for furs. They found it as easy and as much to their liking to take the pelts away from the natives as to hunt the animals themselves. The story of their gains made its way back to Russia; and an increasing number of hard-fisted, rough-mannered, ill-disciplined freebooters were soon pushing their way eastward across the land that had come to be known as Siberia.


The desire for furs kept these forerunners of empire close to the Arctic Circle and carried them to the shores of Behring Sea and even across into Alaska. It was in the latter part of the seventeenth century that the Cossack raiders first came into contact with the Chinese. Under Habarov they had struck southward to the Amur River and had gone down that stream as far as its junction with the Ussuri. The Manchu armies of Kang Hsi had chased them back, however, as far as Albazin, a Cossack stronghold on the upper Amur which was repeatedly

taken and retaken in the struggles between Cossack and Manchu.

Cossack valor might have won, but Muscovite diplomacy betrayed it. An envoy from the Czar, ignorant of the country and scornful of the Cossacks, made a treaty with China at Nerchinsk in 1689, which set the boundary between the two empires at the River Argun and surrendered to the Chinese the stronghold of Albazin. In this, China's first treaty with a European power, the Oriental diplomats clearly outplayed the Russian envoy, a fact which doubtless had its part in confirming the Peking mandarinat in their estimate of their own superior qualities when compared to the barbarians. Another interesting feature of the treaty was the provision for delivering Chinese offenders in Russia to Chinese officials and Russian offenders in China to Russian officials, a species of extraterritoriality which antedated by a century and a half Caleb Cushing's provision in the treaty of Wanghsia.

After the treaty of Nerchinsk, the Russian advance toward the East was halted until the statesmen of St. Petersburg were again stirred to action by the victory of Great Britain in the Opium War. Muraviev was the apostle of the new imperialism. He was sent out as Governor-General of Siberia in 1847; and from the day of his arrival until the signing of the Treaty of Peking in 1860, he spared not a moment in his relentless drive toward the Pacific. The treaty assured to Russia the fruits of his labors. All of the country north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri down to the very boundary of Korea was confirmed to the Czar.

After this mighty forward sweep, Russian imperial-



ism stopped to consolidate its gains. Vladivostok was established as the Russian base on the Pacific and plans were in the making for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to connect it with the capital five thousand miles away. While the plans for this railway were before them, a bright idea came to the bureaucrats at St. Petersburg and the Russian steam roller was again set in motion toward China.

If the new railroad were built entirely in Russian territory, it would have to run through the difficult and comparatively unproductive country north of the Amur. If it could be run directly across Manchuria, it would be nearly four hundred miles shorter, on a much easier terrain, through a country of greater potential productivity, and at the same time carry Russian influence another step southward. Russian diplomacy had learned much since the days of Nerchinsk. By the end of the last century, it knew how to bend the subtle mandarins to its will, and it scrupled not to bend them.

The opportunity for which the Russians had been waiting was offered them in 1895. Japan, victorious in a brief war with China, demanded the Liaotung Peninsula, now known as South Manchuria, as part of the spoils of victory. Russia hurriedly secured the coöperation of Germany and France, and the three Powers "advised" Japan in unmistakable terms to accept an additional indemnity instead of taking the territory. Japan complied. Russia at once sought compensation from China for this act of "friendship." It was forthcoming in the form of a concession to build an extension of the Trans-Siberian straight across from Manchuli to Vladivostok. In the zone of the railway, Russia was to

have her own troops, police, laws, and courts. The Chinese Eastern Railway Company was at once organized with five Russian and five Chinese directors and construction began.

No sooner was this transaction completed than another followed. In 1898 Russia secured a similar concession to build a line from Harbin south to Port Arthur and Dalny at the tip of the very Liaotung Peninsula from which she had advised Japan to retire. The Peninsula and its ports were leased to Russia for a term of twenty-five years. The Chinese Eastern was thus extended southward and the Russian railway system touched at last a port on the warm waters of the Pacific.

The dream of Peter the Great was fulfilled but Russian imperialism was not yet satisfied. Railway zones in Manchuria were good but the whole province would be better. Again occasion followed hard upon desire. The Boxer revolt in 1900, with its attacks upon foreigners, gave Russia an excuse to send her troops all over Manchuria. The province was effectively occupied and it remained only to confirm that status by treaty. In the negotiations which followed the raising of the siege of the Legations, Russia again played the warm friend of China, betraying her European, Japanese, and American allies. In return for this friendship, China was persuaded to allow the Russian armies to remain in Manchuria for two years. At the end of that period Russia notified Peking of various conditions which must be complied with before she would withdraw.

But Japan had not forgotten that it was Russia who had prevented her from occupying the Liaotung Peninsula, nor were the Japanese statesmen unmindful of the

threat to the future greatness of Japan that was embodied in this arrival of the bear on the Asian coasts. The islanders watched closely the manœuvres by which Russia extended the period of her sojourn in Manchuria. They saw with misgiving that China first gave her permission to stay a limited time and that Russia was then determined to remain indefinitely even over China's protest. When the paws of the bear began to show in Korea, Japan added her protest to that of China. When this protest was ignored by St. Petersburg, Japan struck and struck hard. When she had finished, the Russian vision of a Pacific empire had faded into a more distant future. Not only was Russia thrown out of all southern Manchuria, but even her lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and the railway leading to it had been taken from her by Japan.

Roosevelt described the ensuing Peace of Portsmouth as but a truce and prophesied that Russia would come back. Far from settling the points of difference between Russia and Japan, the war had merely served to make clear to them both the essential antagonism between their respective ambitions for Asian hegemony. Russia became more firmly resolved than ever to extend her dominions to the shores of the Yellow Sea; for free and constant communication with tide-water on the east was economically vital to the ten million Russians already in Siberia and the millions more who were destined to settle in that vast expanse. Japan became as firmly resolved that this ponderous mass, with its military and economic threat to her supremacy, should not reach the shores adjacent to her islands; control of the coast line of Asia and domination of the trade that went through

its ports were as necessary for her crowded millions as access to the sea for the Russians.

Thus were the issues drawn, and along these lines the diplomats of Tokyo and St. Petersburg made their moves on the international chess-board. American plans for railway development in Manchuria threw the opponents into each other's arms in 1907 by showing them the possibility that both might lose their high stakes. Russia recognized southern Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of influence and contented herself for the time being with a similar recognition of her own interests in northern Manchuria. Then they presented a united front in opposition to Mr. Harriman's scheme for a globe-girdling railroad that should pass through their part of the world. A still closer agreement followed the proposal made by Secretary of State Knox to internationalize the railways of Manchuria in 1909. Thus the two imperialist bureaucracies agreed to divide the spoils. Both of them knew that any such arrangement was but temporary and that, when they could rid themselves of this outside interference, the final duel must be fought out between themselves.

Meantime Russia was not idle in other directions. If by chance her route to the sea through Manchuria was cut off, there was still another way in which she could attain her aim. The route from Lake Baikal through Urga and Kalgan to the sea at Tientsin, although across a desert country, would be shorter by two hundred and fifty miles than that through Manchuria, and strategically far more significant, since it would bring Peking itself within the Russian sphere. Incited by Russian agents, Mongolia began to seethe. The Mongols had

submitted to the Manchu dynasty, the last rulers of the Chinese empire, but they had never considered themselves a part of China and had always enjoyed a large measure of independence. They were angered, therefore, at the increased Chinese activity in Mongolia in the years just preceding the revolution. More Chinese troops, more Chinese officials, and more Chinese settlers were a threat to the supremacy of the Mongol princes. They turned to Russia as a possible supporter against this Chinese encroachment; and, when the revolution paralyzed the arm of the Manchus in 1911, the Russians promptly recognized Mongol autonomy, and began negotiations to secure their interests in Mongolian territory. These negotiations matured in 1914, and St. Petersburg secured the right to a deciding voice in Mongolian railway construction.

But the World War was already upon Russia, and the vigilant statesmen of Japan, having consolidated their gains in southern Manchuria, were ready for another move forward. Closely they watched the fortunes of Russia in the European war; and when, in 1916, they saw Russia deeply involved, they took advantage of the situation to require Russian approval of all the Japanese advances so far made and to force Russia to cede to Japan that section of the Chinese Eastern Railway between Changchun, its junction with the South Manchurian Railway, and the Sungari River, nearly half of the distance to Harbin.

Then came the Russian Revolution. Japan saw in the disorganization that followed the Bolshevik upheaval a heaven-sent opportunity to push her advance lines far to the west. Under cover of an agreement among

the allies that Japan and the United States should each send in seven thousand troops and the other Powers concerned small detachments only, Japan threw an army of more than seventy thousand men into Siberia and, with hired renegade Russians, took control of the country as far west as Lake Baikal. In this general advance Japan tried repeatedly to seize the Chinese Eastern Railway, but her allies were distrustful of her motives and prevented any such move by establishing an inter-Allied Railway Committee, which placed American engineer officers in all strategic positions.

By the summer of 1920, Russian influence in eastern Asia was at its lowest ebb since 1846. The Soviet government was not recognized in Peking or elsewhere. The Chinese had ousted Russian influence from Mongolia; and Japan had spread herself over all of Manchuria and all eastern Siberia. The bear was driven back into his lair.

Then the tide turned. The mighty bear, freeing himself from tormentors on the west and south, turned eastward again. The allied troops had all been withdrawn in the spring of 1920. The government of Admiral Kolchak, which was dependent upon foreign support, had been crushed and its leader shot. Russian partisan bands drove the Japanese and their Cossack supporters back across Transbaikal and Amur provinces. By winter they had been driven out of all Russian territory except the neighborhood of Vladivostok, the mouth of the Amur, and Sakhalin. The Soviet government did not at once take over this region; the Far Eastern Republic was organized and administered it temporarily.

Meantime reactionary forces under Baron Ungern

von Sternberg had succeeded in driving the Chinese out of the Mongolian capital and establishing there a base of operations against Russian territory. A raid in the summer of 1921 along both banks of the Selenga River was repulsed by troops from Russia and the Far Eastern Republic. These troops pursued the fleeing reactionaries into Mongolia, capturing and dispersing them, and established themselves in Urga.

Having made this gain by force of arms, Russia turned to diplomacy. Her progress henceforth was slower but no less steady. The Chinese capital was besieged by Russian diplomats seeking recognition for the Soviet government. The first move was a dramatic renunciation of claims inherited from the Czarist régime. Moscow offered to deal with Peking upon a basis of complete equality. Territory seized under the Czars was to be returned; the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be delivered to China without compensation; the Boxer indemnity payments were to be renounced; extraterritoriality for Russians was to be canceled; and all treaties unfair to China made by Imperial Russia with Japan or other Powers were to be annulled.

Here was fair talk indeed. And it fell upon ready ears. China had but recently emerged from an experience with the western Powers and Japan that was not calculated to increase her love for them or her trust in their purposes. She had entered the war against Germany at the urgent solicitation of the United States and with the idea that participation would give her an equal voice with the other allies at the peace conference and assure her recovery of Shantung. Instead, she had seen the German rights in Shantung turned over to

Japan and her protests impatiently brushed aside. Not only did China secure no advantage from the treaty of peace, but her erstwhile allies showed no disposition whatever to release her from the leading strings in which they had held her for three-quarters of a century. Leased territories, indemnity payments, extraterritoriality, legation guards, post-offices and tariff rates, all were to remain as they were. China was in bitter mood. And now came Russia offering to relinquish all these privileges and to treat China as an equal. Small wonder that the Chinese people listened with eager ears to the Russian proposals.

But however eager may have been the popular response to such an approach, Chinese officialdom was wary. Russian friendship for China was traditionally expensive. Russian assistance in preventing Japan from taking the Liaotung Peninsula had well-nigh cost China the whole of Manchuria. Russian affection was usually followed by a heavy bill of expenses. It would be as well, before accepting Russia's seemingly generous offer, to make sure what Russia would expect in return this time. Besides, was it necessary to pay anything to secure these proffered advantages? Might it not set a bad precedent for dealing with the other nations? Was not China entitled to all of these things as a matter of justice? Thus thinking, Chinese officialdom fell back upon its old tactics of procrastination. Recognition of the Soviet government was withheld and one by one the proffered gifts of Russia were seized as of right. Residential concessions were taken over; the Boxer indemnity was terminated; extraterritoriality for Rus-

sians was canceled. All this without compensation of any kind to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

While Soviet diplomacy was thus making little headway at Peking another influence was more favorable to Russian ends. American sentiment did not favor the Bolshevik régime, which it was convinced was but a passing phase of the revolution and would some day be superseded by some other and different Russia. For this nebulous Russia that was to come the United States constituted itself in some manner a trustee, in whose behalf it turned the strength of its diplomacy against the imperialism of Japan on the Asian mainland. The Washington Conference was called. The demand of the Russians for participation was ignored but they could find little to complain of in the results. Their interests were amply safeguarded and they reaped substantial benefits. Within a year they were back at the mouth of the Amur, back in Vladivostok, and the territory of the Far Eastern Republic was wholly absorbed by Soviet Russia. Not a foot of Russian soil remained in Japanese hands except the northern half of Saghalin.

One thing China in the reassertion of her rights had dared not do. Even the Powers at the Washington Conference had preferred not to tackle it. That was to interfere with the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway. To tamper with that was to awaken old animosities and latent ambitions which it was the hope of the conference to lay for all time. But Russia—even Soviet Russia—never for a moment lost sight of it nor allowed it to be forgotten. She had long since “defined more clearly” what she meant by promising in 1920 that the railway was to be “delivered to China without compensation.”

She did not mean that "Russia's vital interest in this line, as an integral portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway," was to be disregarded. Persistently she pressed for an agreement with China on this matter. At last came a Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Wellington Koo, who could be persuaded to see things as Russia could. On May 31, 1924, China and Russia entered once more into treaty relations. Russia flattered Chinese vanity and furthered her own influence by despatching to Peking as her representative the first ambassador, L. M. Karakhan, sent by any of the western Powers, all the others being represented by envoys holding the lower rank of minister. In the treaty signed by this ambassador, China recognized the Soviet government as the government of Russia, and Russia confirmed the renunciation of all the privileges which China had taken from her.

But the turning point of the whole treaty was the Chinese Eastern Railway. Here Russia had her way. The anti-Soviet control that had persisted since pre-revolutionary days was to give way to a joint Sino-Soviet control. Five Chinese and five Russians were to constitute the governing board, but in the actual management of the road Russian preponderance was secured by a provision that the manager and one of the two assistant managers should be Russians.

Apparently Russia was making excellent progress. But this valuable agreement was made with the Peking authorities, and the Chinese Eastern lies across Manchuria, where Chang Tso Lin, at odds with Peking, recognized the authority of the central government only when its orders squared with his own desires. Chang's

close association with the Japanese is a matter of common knowledge. He had no intention of turning the railroad over to the Russians against his own or the Japanese interest. He ignored the treaty and all the efforts of Russian and Peking delegates to secure its enforcement.

Russia soon had her chance, however. In August of 1924, Chang and Peking came to open warfare. For public purposes the Soviet officials warned the foreign Powers not to make any attempt to take advantage of the disturbance in China as an excuse for further aggression. Parades were organized in Moscow, and the Russian demands for "Hands off China!" were widely advertised in the East. Though similar publicity was not given to the threatening presence of Red troops in Chang's rear, the Manchurian dictator was fully aware of them and realized their significance. He must either sacrifice the railway or risk complete overthrow. With an acumen which was neither distinctly Chinese nor particularly subtle, he chose the lesser evil. In September an agreement was announced between Moscow and Chang Tso Lin, as the ruler of the "Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces," whereby the latter consented to the arrangement already made by Peking for joint control of the Chinese Eastern.

Thus did Russia, to its immense economic and military advantage, recover its extensive control of the great railway artery that connects its vast interior domain with the port of Vladivostok and holds the possibility of connecting it with some port still farther to the south. Well might Ambassador Karakhan say, as he did on October 5, "The restoration of the Soviet

Union's title to the Chinese Eastern Railway opens up broad vistas for economic and political collaboration with China. At present the Soviet Union is gaining a firm foothold in the Far East by occupying one of the most important positions of which its enemies were trying to deprive it."

Russia's course of action with regard to this Chinese-Eastern affair makes it plain, to all who wish to see, that the essence of the Soviet policy in the Far East is no other in its ultimate aims than the old imperial policy. The instruments are different, the technique is altered, but the goal remains the same. Each policy is but the natural expression of the mighty economic impulse of the Russian mass toward free access to the open sea. The form of government begins to appear as incidental. Back of whatever government exists for the moment, there is the same old Russia, forever encroaching on its neighbors, slowly breaking down all barriers erected against its outward pressure. Soviet policy appears no longer as solely a manifestation of Bolshevik propaganda; it appears in its deeper significance as the expression of Russian national demands. In their Far Eastern policy, if nowhere else, the Soviet authorities have the approval, albeit grudgingly given, of the exiled groups of Russian politicians. No further upheaval in Russia is going to bring into power a government that will have any less aggressive policy in the Far East. Whether the cap he wears be that of Czarist or Bolshevik, Cadet or Menshevik, the Russian bear is in eastern Asia, determined to bathe his paws once more in the salubrious waters of the Yellow Sea.

But the Russians make every effort to disguise their

ultimate purpose. The diplomats of Moscow, exhibiting a skill that frequently threatens the prestige of the "highly trained men" who shape the policies of the other Powers, have evolved a threefold line of attack in Asia. First, Russia concedes many things ostensibly and a few really to give substance to profuse expressions of deep regard for the "downtrodden people" of whatever country is concerned. Second, it gives substantial assistance to any movement in that country to denounce its agreements with other countries, and makes much pother of the imperialism, the militarism, the capitalism of those countries. Thus is friendship for Russia invited, and hostility to other countries fostered. Behind the cover of this favorable situation, Russia takes the third step, that of securing its own objects. There is so much noisy emphasis on the first two steps and the third is so well concealed that Russia has met with considerable success in forcing the hands of the other Powers.

All of this has been most strikingly exemplified in China. Effusive protestations of love for China, love of the Chinese workers, love of justice, love of anything but land, railways and seaports, are showered upon the world. It is to this amorous disposition that Moscow ascribes the upheaval in China. Denials of other propaganda issue rhythmically from the various Russian headquarters. "It is quite natural," says Ambassador Karakhan, "that great significance should be attached to the question of the Soviet Union's influence upon the national revolutionary movement in China. However, this influence is the outcome not, as is said so frequently but without foundation, of Soviet propaganda,

CHINA AND THE POWERS

but simply of the far more effective and momentous fact—the Soviet policy of justice in both word and deed which the Soviet Union has put into practice through the Soviet-Chinese treaty and in all its actions with regard to China.”

The Ambassador will expect many to differ with his assertion about Soviet propaganda. The Bolshevik tendencies at Canton are well known, and *Izvestia*, an official Soviet journal, hails with joy the adhesion of the “Congress of Chinese peasants” in Canton, alleged to be two hundred thousand strong. The placards distributed throughout the region loudly proclaim the hand of Moscow:

Peasants, organize under the banner of the International Soviet!
Arm yourselves! Form village committees of self-defense!

Hail to the union of workingmen and peasants, as leading to the
emancipation of China!

Enough of exploiting the peasants!

Create peasant coöperatives!

Away with the imperialistic missionaries and their churches!

Away with seizing our lands!

Chinese peasants, unite!

How vivid an imagination one must have to picture a group of Chinese peasants composing this militant call to their fellows!

Another incident shows the false meticulousness with which Moscow keeps its hands off Chinese affairs. The International of Trade Unions reports the sending from Moscow to the strike committee in Shanghai of thirty thousand rubles. The strike committee acknowledges the receipt of this assistance and sends to “the freest workmen of the world, our hearty greetings

and the oath of the most oppressed workmen of China to struggle to the end."

Conditions in China have amazingly facilitated the spread of the Russian propaganda. The government has been in the hands of a succession of military adventurers whose primary purpose in securing control of Peking has been the use of the power and the acquisition of the pelf that such control entails. Opportunists of this sort, dominating such governments as the republic boasts, offer a standing invitation to unscrupulous intrigue and conscienceless aggression on the part of foreign Powers.

The determined efforts of the Japanese militarists to extend their continental holdings at the expense of both China and Russia during and after the war made the aggression of Japan, despite her more recent change of policy and a real desire to cultivate China's friendship, an obvious and easy point of attack. In the south, where memories of the taking of Hongkong and Kowloon, as well as the more recent episodes already described, cause Great Britain to be looked upon as no less aggressive than Japan, the attack was easily turned against the British. In addition to these political aggressions, both Japanese and British capitalists are operating factories in various parts of China, especially in Shanghai, where labor conditions, though perhaps not out of harmony with the general level in the country and certainly no worse than those in many native mills, leave much for the skilled agitator to picture as desirable.

The whole Bolshevik program could be and was adapted to this attack upon Japan and her ally of old—

and possibly of the future—Great Britain. The program calls loudly for the overthrow of military aggression and capitalistic exploitation. It insists in stentorian tones on the freeing of oppressed nations and the liberation of oppressed classes. This demand too, was particularly applicable to China's relations with the Powers. That Soviet practice bore little resemblance to Bolshevik professions was not emphasized and, if the governments attacked called attention to the discrepancy, their protests were dismissed as unworthy of belief or pushed into the background by voluble references to the policy of international justice that was asserted to be characteristic of the new Russia.

As a result of this peculiarly favorable aspect of affairs, the Russian activities have been able to give vitality and force to many tendencies in China that, although of great weight, would hardly have got themselves into action for a long sustained struggle. It is a mistake to ascribe all of the trouble in China to Bolshevik activities. There is involved also, and much more deeply, the great body of resentment against foreign self-assertion, which has been forming over a period of years and has now been inflated to proportions that render it potentially dangerous. Bolshevik activity has been but one of the stimuli that have infused this great body with life and put it in motion. It is hardly probable that the Russians cherish any large hopes of causing communism to flourish in the unsympathetic soil of China, but in nationalism they have an instrument quite as handy to their use as communism. So it is chiefly to the fostering of Chinese nationalism that they direct their efforts. Their Soviet technique

lends itself admirably to the furtherance of the old Czarist game—the essentially Russian game—of intrigue in China to open the gates of the East for the advance of the bear.

The Chinese professed to be grateful for the attitude of Russia. Ostensibly they accepted at their face value the Russian protestations of love and “fair dealing.” They dwelt upon the Russian surrender of concessions, Boxer indemnity, extraterritoriality, and so forth, as if Russia had in good faith and with a contrite heart given up these things. But those of us who were in China at the time remember the vehement protest that came from Moscow and China when China canceled these Russian privileges without even asking Russian consent. It is difficult to believe that a people as old in statecraft and as subtle in negotiation as the Chinese has accepted without reservation the Russian proffer of friendship. Surely the Chinese of maturer years and larger experience have seen through the Russian maneuver from the beginning. The students, that whole body of patriotic youth collectively known as “Young China,” whose contribution to the national cause is enthusiasm rather than wisdom, may have been carried away at first, but even they could not long be deceived.

In any case, China, old and young, may be quite willing to indulge in the old Chinese game of playing off one foreigner against another. The Chinese leaders may be quite willing to force the other Powers to accept the idea that Russia voluntarily surrendered its privileges and that, if they would again receive the favor of China, they must go and do likewise. They may be quite willing to hurry the other Powers into surrender of

their privileges through fear that China will "go Bolshevik." In other words, China, young and old alike, may be quite willing to win all it can from the other Powers by the use of the Russian boggy and then turn to them for aid against Russia.

Yet, with the possible exception of Japan, Russia is the only one of the Powers that has been guilty of new aggressions in China since the Washington Conference. That Russian aggressions have been many and serious the record is before the world to show. They consist not merely of the spread of subversive Bolshevik propaganda in a friendly country, but of old-fashioned territorial encroachments of which Romanoff Russia at her best might well have been proud.

First, there is Mongolia. The Soviet troops entered this province in pursuit of Ungern's flying raiders in 1921. When these were dispersed and their leader shot, the Russians did not return to their own land. They had already organized a "People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia" up in Siberia. This consisted of Comrade Bodo, a former typist in the Russian Consulate-General at Urga, and several other semi-educated Mongols chosen from the Mongol population in Siberia. As soon as the Soviet troops were established in Urga, they summoned Comrade Bodo and his confreres and made him president of the Council of Ministers and at the same time Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Mongolian Soviet state. This "independent government" at once addressed an official appeal to Moscow, requesting it "not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia, until there can be a complete removal of the menace of a com-

mon enemy." Moscow replied that the request would meet with "complete satisfaction." A regiment of regular Red troops was sent to replace the Partisans and Cossacks who had taken the city. This force was afterward reduced to a battalion, nominally under the control of the Mongolian War Office "by mutual agreement." They remained in Urga until March of 1925 at least. In that month Ambassador Karakhan officially notified China that the Red troops had been withdrawn. He so notified China because Russia, in the course of her negotiations in Peking, had found it to her advantage to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia. This action may have smoothed ruffled Chinese susceptibilities. But listen to Mr. Chicherin in his report to the Executive Committee on the international situation, made at Tiflis on March 3, 1924. "Our contact with Mongolia is much closer," he says. "We recognize this Republic as part of the Chinese Republic, but we also recognize its autonomy, which is so broad that not only does Mongolia not permit any interference in its internal life on the part of China but also pursues its own independent foreign policy." A withered rind, indeed, is the suzerainty that Mr. Chicherin leaves to China.

More is hardly needed to show the hollow pretense of the Russian professions of international justice. As a matter of fact Russia has separated Mongolia entirely from China and brought it completely under her own control. The existing "government" in Urga is a dummy Soviet government, set up by Russian bayonets and dependent upon them for support. If the Soviet troops have been withdrawn—and some doubt is expressed on that score—enough of them have remained

as legation guards and troop instructors to hold the situation well in hand. Mongolia is no longer under Chinese suzerainty; it is under Soviet rule. If any attempt is made to change this status, the Soviet forces across the border, two hundred miles away, can be returned to their posts in Urga on short notice.

A second example of Russian aggression is the one in Manchuria, already discussed in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway. When Russia extorted from Chang Tso Lin a treaty assenting to Russian control of the railway, she showed the insincerity of her professed respect for Chinese susceptibilities and for the integrity of China by negotiating with Chang as the ruler of the "Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces." This was the only recognition Chang ever received from a foreign Power in his attempted separation of Manchuria from the territory of the Chinese Republic.

Nor has Russian aggression been confined to the outlying provinces. No sooner had the much-heralded "Christian General," Feng Yu Hsiang, betrayed his former commander, Wu Pei Fu, than he began to receive Russian support for his projected struggle with Chang Tso Lin for the mastery of Peking. Feng, with some eight thousand men, was established northward from Peking, controlling a territory in which there were no adequate sources of military supplies. Nevertheless he received them in large quantity. Passenger traffic by motor-car across the Gobi Desert was suspended while the cars were pressed into service to deliver Russian arms and munitions to Feng. A large base was established at Kalgan and a still larger one at Dolonnor, which is less liable to a raiding attack from

Peking. Russia's solicitude for Feng's cause went still further. Mongolian troops to the number of seventy thousand were recruited, equipped and trained by five thousand Russian officers. These reinforcements were to be placed at Feng's disposal when the necessity arose either to defend himself against attack or to drive Chang Tso Lin back behind the Great Wall. Despite ambassadorial preachments, such things are not done for love alone, and Feng knew what sort of price he, or rather China, would have to pay if he secured complete control of Peking.

At first Feng met with startling success. By a flanking movement he forced Chang's forces to withdraw to Tientsin and then, by purchasing the defection of several of Chang's most trusted generals, turned the retreat into what strongly resembled a rout. When it looked as if Chang was definitely disposed of and Feng would be free to turn his attention elsewhere, he made the first move toward the capture of Shantung. Shantung has more than once focused the attention of the world since Confucius was born there. Imperial Germany picked its Bay of Kiaochow as the best harbor on the China coast, and at Tsingtao built the naval station that was to make the Reich a power in the Far East. Japan's grip on Tsingtao after she captured it from Germany in 1915 was relaxed only under a Chinese boycott and added pressure from Great Britain and the United States had made it more costly to hold it than to give it up. With Shantung in the hands of a Chinese faction subservient to Moscow, Russia was again within sight of her cherished goal. First-class railroads already connect Kalgan near the Mongolian

border with Tientsin and Tsingtao. A line from Lake Baikal, no longer than the east and west line of the Chinese Eastern, was all that would be necessary to give Russia not only an outlet on warm water but control of a densely populated portion of China and a naval base which would command the Yellow Sea.

Elated over this success the Bolshevik statesmen hurried on. Large consulates were established in Chinese Turkestan, where half a dozen clerks could do all the legitimate consular business. Russian agents were set to work sowing dissension in Sinkiang, the great western domain of China. The Russian telegraph line was extended into Lanchowfu in Kansu Province to facilitate Russian efforts among the Mohammedans of that region. Far to the south in Canton, Russian success was still more marked. There, in China's most radical center, a government was established which openly proclaimed its friendship with Moscow.

In all of this effort Russia has had more in mind even than the control of China. Moscow would be quite willing to extend its sway over that half of Asia, with its four hundred million people. But beyond that is the desire to use the control of China as a means of renewing her attack upon the nations of Europe, Japan, and the United States. If she could kill the trade of those nations with China, Russia would deal a severe blow to her antagonists. And she would make easier by that much the spread of her doctrines among their unemployed. That the Soviet rulers are quite ready thus to use China as an instrument in her own warfare is clear from the Canton situation. Much of Canton's prosperity is built upon her trade with the British port of

Hongkong. Canton and Hongkong have had their quarrels and there have been strikes and boycotts before this; but a few days of negotiation has always served to smooth things over in the interest of the commerce upon which both alike depend for their well-being. Moscow, however, is interested, not in Canton's well-being, but in Hongkong's suffering. Therefore a boycott paralyzing to both these centers was prolonged for months. Hongkong lost; Canton lost. Moscow alone counted her winnings.

Things seemed to be going so well that the Soviet schemers overreached themselves. A flare-up occurred between their new manager of the Chinese Eastern, Ivanov, and some of Chang Tso Lin's officers. The latter planned to move their troops in the usual way by taking what trains they needed and giving the railway a promise to pay for the service—a promise which was never redeemed. Ivanov refused to allow any more troops to ride until their fare was paid in advance. To Chang's officers this was quite obviously an impertinent interference with the internal affairs of China, and they clapped Ivanov in jail.

The Soviet government, that had never turned a hand to bring succor to the hundreds of Russian refugees who had been thrown into Chinese jails, took quite a different attitude when one of its own was so treated. Ambassador Karakhan promptly served an ultimatum upon Peking demanding the release of Ivanov within forty-eight hours and closing with the threat that if Peking was unable to secure his release, Russia would send troops into Manchuria to free him.

Here was foreign domineering with a vengeance. The

Chinese were as taken aback by this Russian threat as they had been five years before by the promise of equal treatment. Russia after all was no better than the rest. She was just as ready as Britain or Japan to force China to comply with her demands. Her protestations were mere blandishments. These reflections were sharply pointed by the shooting of forty students at the head of a parade which marched to the president's palace to present a petition, an incident which decreased the importance of the incident in Shanghai of May 30.

The result was almost immediately visible. Such support as Feng Yu Hsiang had in the country began to fall away from him. Wu Pei Fu received an access of strength sufficient to enable him to move on Peking. Chang Tso Lin quickly reorganized his forces and started south once more. He and Wu patched up their long and bitter quarrel and joined forces against the Russian-supported Feng. The latter, seeing the game was up, made a hurried announcement about wishing to see other parts of the world and traveled rapidly to Mongolia, whence he is supposed to have gone on to Russia. Chang and Wu drove his Kuominchun, or national army, back through Kalgan and threatened his base at Dolonnor. For the moment the Russian plans had gone sadly agley. Soviet influence was nil at Peking and Moscow was notified by Chang Tso Lin that Ambassador Karakhan, who was responsible for the Russian efforts, must be recalled.

The scene of greatest Russian activity shifted at once to Canton. The Canton armies under the leadership of General Chiang Kai Shek are marching northward, have captured Changsha and Hankow, Wuchang and

Nanchang. Wu Pei Fu has been so badly defeated that he seems to be practically eliminated. Chiang Kai Shek threatens Shanghai. These Cantonese successes, however, are not necessarily to be set down as a net credit in the Soviet ledger. The situation at Canton is still obscure, but there is evidence of an attempt to break away from Soviet leading-strings in some of the more recent happenings there.

Whether Canton is loyal to its Moscow association or not, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Russian threat to the integrity of China on the ground that Moscow has made its effort and has failed. The forces at work long antedate the days of Bolsheviks, and they will in all probability be at work many years hence, whatever may be the fate of the Soviet régime in the meantime. The pressure of Russia upon China, the drive for an open port and warm water, is inherent in the situation in northeastern Asia. It will manifest itself whenever an opportunity is presented. It is a factor which cannot be ignored in attempting to reach any solution of the problem of China.

V

THE CHAMPION OF THE ORIENT

JAPAN played no part in the life of modern China until after the restoration of the Japanese emperor in 1868. The new Japanese nationalism which budded in that year soon came to flower in a yearning for conquest and expansion. Various outlying islands, the Kuriles, the Loo Choos, and the Bonins were first picked up. The war with China brought Formosa under Japanese rule, although the Liaotung Peninsula was lost through the threat of action by Russia, France, and Germany. This peninsula, however, fell to Japan along with southern Saghalin as a prize of the Russo-Japanese War, and Russia's retreat into northern Manchuria cleared the way for Japan to take over Korea in 1910.

Japan's imperialistic progress was most gratifying to her military leaders and inspired some of her more ebullient philosophers to visions of a great Japanese Empire on the adjoining mainland, stretching from Behring Strait well down to Hongkong. And these visions seem to have persisted in the minds of the dominant personalities in Japan during the decade that followed the annexation of Korea. It was with an alacrity amounting to eagerness, then, that Japan in 1914 welcomed the obligations imposed upon her by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and declared war upon

Germany. Her captains perhaps did not have definite objectives but they knew they commanded the most powerful force in the Orient and that in any general re-shuffling of the cards they stood to win rather than lose. With everything in readiness they were alert to take advantage of any opportunity which the fortunes of the great war might bring them.

They began with Shantung. It took but a brief campaign to capture the German positions there and to spread Japanese control throughout the province, a thing the Germans had never attempted to do. This was followed by the Twenty-one Demands upon China, a series of proposals, which if enforced in their entirety, would have converted the Chinese Republic into a protectorate of Japan. The most indefensible of these demands were withdrawn when they became known to the other Powers, but the acceptance of the remainder was procured by means of an ultimatum. Thus was the Japanese lease on South Manchuria, as the Liaotung Peninsula has come to be known, extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years and the Japanese sphere of control expanded across all southern Manchuria and eastern-inner Mongolia. Russia's acquiescence in all this new alignment was obtained by pressure judiciously applied at an anxious moment when the Russian arms were hard-pressed in 1916.

This consolidation of her gains left Japan in excellent shape to seize her next opportunity. It was offered by the Russian revolution. The disintegration of the mighty structure which was Czarist Russia seemed almost to materialize the Japanese visions of a vast continental empire subject to Tokyo. The fingers of the

military men fairly itched to grasp the booty that fate had flung within such easy reach. But some attention had to be paid to international amenities. Unceremoniously to strip an ally who had fallen savored so strongly of ghoulishness that even the Japanese war party hesitated. Some excuse for the invasion of Russian territory must be found. The War-gods of Nippon answered the prayer of their devotees and sent the Czechs. These former unwilling subjects of the Hapsburgs had surrendered to the Russians by regiments to avoid fighting for a cause they detested. After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk they gathered in southern Russia and proposed to make their way across Siberia and the Pacific and hence to Europe to join the allied forces on the western front. Some fifty thousand of them started eastward, the Russians providing trains. Then came rumors. German influence at Bolshevik headquarters was trying to stop the Czech movement. German and Austrian prisoners were being freed and armed against them. They were being attacked and overwhelmed. They must be rescued! Then came politics. A force of fifty thousand of the best trained soldiers in the world could be useful to the allies against the new Bolshevik peril. If the Czechs would turn back and fight the Red armies, the allies would recognize the independence of Czecho-Slovakia. The Czechs in Siberia turned back and reestablished an eastern front.

The change in the status of the Czechs from an escaping host to an advancing army did not occur soon enough to prevent the proponents of allied intervention in Siberia from making use of their supposed

plight. After some difficulty, President Wilson was persuaded to invite Japan and the other allies to join in an expedition to rescue the Czechs. The Japanese accepted the invitation with such alacrity that the United States thought it well to secure an agreement from them that each country should send but seven thousand men into Siberia; an agreement which Japan promptly made and promptly broke. She sent forward seventy-three thousand men beside making agreements with the Chinese politicians in the saddle at Peking, which placed the Chinese forces under the effective control of Japan. There were severe clashes between the allies over the proceedings of this intervention in Russian affairs, and more than once matters came to the point of an open break. It was relief to the Japanese and despair to the Siberians when the United States determined in the spring of 1920 that the Czechs were practically rescued. There was no other legitimate excuse for keeping troops in Russian territory and the American forces were withdrawn. The small detachments of the other allies had already gone and Japan was now free to overrun the country with no other opposition than such as the Russians themselves might offer. The Japanese Army moved forward into full occupation.

The attempt of Japan's militarist party to dominate the adjoining portions of the Asian mainland seemed in the summer of 1920 to have achieved a success beyond the fondest hopes. Japanese troops patrolled Shantung, Manchuria, eastern-inner Mongolia, and Siberia to Lake Baikal. The coterie in control of the Chinese government at Peking was openly pro-

Japanese, and Japanese yen would buy anything in China that Japanese hearts desired.

The only fly in the ointment was the Chinese Eastern Railway. This was supervised by the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, which operated the road largely under the direction of American engineer officers, an arrangement holding over from the days of the joint intervention in Siberia. These American officers had repeatedly foiled the attempts of Japan to secure control of the road. The board, with its irritating Americans, remained a thorn in the side of Japan; but the Japanese held high hopes of eliminating its obstructive influence and were bending every effort to that end. That accomplished, Japan could call upon the lands, the railroads, and the resources of Manchuria and eastern Siberia in any emergency and thus would have Russia effectively bottled up in the interior of Asia. The extent of Japanese territory would be such as to compel the most reluctant to think of Japan as one of the great nations of the earth. Small wonder that the generals of Nippon carried their heads even a bit higher than usual.

However, the tide of events had already turned against Japan. Kolchak, the ill-fated dictator of the Omsk government, who had enjoyed allied and especially Japanese sympathy and support, had fallen back before the advancing Red army. In the fall of 1919 his power was broken. The Soviet forces marched eastward unopposed. Soviet rule was established as far east as Irkutsk, just west of Lake Baikal. Between the Lake and the Pacific the Siberians rose in overwhelming numbers against the Japanese and the Russian reactionaries who had erected so-called "governments" on Japanese

support. Japan must send heavy reënforcements into Siberia and undertake warfare on a large scale or else withdraw. Neither internally nor in its international relations was the island empire in a position to support a war against Russia and, to the bitter disappointment of the Japanese generals, they were forced to withdraw their troops from Siberia. Back to the coast they came, retaining their grip at last only on Vladivostok and the region about the mouth of the Amur River.

The mood of the militarists was sullen, and their outlook on life was not made brighter by the receipt, in July 1921, of an invitation to come to Washington and discuss Far Eastern matters. They distinctly preferred to work out such Far Eastern issues as interested them in their own way, unhindered by advice or criticism from America or other Powers. But Japan could not afford to be absent from the conference. Japanese leaders were afraid to isolate their country. They feared the loss of the society of the "great Powers." After some hesitation and some jockeying to limit the scope of the agenda, they accepted the unwelcome invitation.

Despite their apprehensions, Japan gained some substantial advantages at the Washington Conference. The Japanese navy became supreme in the waters of eastern Asia, and the Four-Power Treaty confirmed the Japanese position in the Pacific. But the Washington Conference, whatever advantages it gave the Japanese, demolished what was left of their newly acquired continental empire. As a direct result of the conference, Japan was constrained to relinquish Shantung to the Chinese and, as an indirect result, to turn over to the Soviet government the remnant of Japanese holdings

in Siberia, with the single exception of northern Saghalin. The Tuchuns' War had ousted the friends of Japan at Peking, and a prolonged Chinese boycott of Japanese goods had damped the ardor of Japan for further adventure in China. Except for Saghalin, which Japan clung to as security for the settlement of a claim for the massacre of seven hundred Japanese at Nikolaievsk, Japan by the end of 1922 was once more within its 1905 boundaries.

The complete failure of the aggressive policy seems at last to have convinced Japan of its futility. The intransigence of the Russians, the hostility of the Chinese, the animosity of the Americans, the estrangement of their old allies the British, all brought home to the rulers of Japan the need for a revision of their objectives. The negotiations leading up to the formation of the new Consortium with the United States, Great Britain, and France for the regulation of foreign loans to China offered Japan a timely and appropriate opportunity to substitute coöperation with the other Powers in preserving the integrity of China, for the old policy of intrigue and aggression. Japan's acceptance of this opportunity was followed by what has seemed a whole-hearted acquiescence in the other decisions of the Washington Conference and a sincere adherence to the spirit of the treaties that followed it.

Since the trend of these treaties was to bind the Powers to respect not only one another's rights and interests but China's as well, Japan required a new orientation of her Chinese policy. The return of Shantung was the beginning. The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Hankow followed, and various other

measures have been taken which reflect the sincerity of Japan's desire to treat China fairly. The attitude of the present time is a far cry from the swashbuckling of Okuma and Terauchi in 1915. The present policy of "Hands off Peking!" is vastly different from the tone of the Twenty-one Demands.

I would not be understood to argue that Japan has had a change of heart. Japan's preoccupation, like that of any other nation, is with its own interests. Tokyo has not been converted to any sentimental doctrine of friendship and good-will toward China. Like gratitude between individuals, friendship and good-will between nations are apt to resolve themselves into a lively sense of benefits to be received. They represent a policy and not a renunciation. The policy of domination and aggression in China failed to secure Japanese ends. The American policy of friendship and good-will has been fairly successful, and the recent Russian emphasis on a similar mode of dealing with China promised for a time to be no less so. If the competition is to be on that ground, Japan is resolved to meet its competitors there and to make friendship and good-will the keynotes of its own course in China. To say this is not to cavil at the motives of Japan. The friendliness is not less sincere, it is more so, because self-interest rides in the same direction. But at the same time we should neither be shocked nor grieved, if, when Japanese interests demand a partial or temporary departure from the policy of friendship, we find Japan acting accordingly.

The South Manchuria lease is an example of such a parting of the ways. This lease, reserving the sovereignty to China, but giving Russia complete admin-

istrative authority in the territory, was originally made in 1898 for a period of twenty-five years. The original lease, taken over by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, expired in 1923. One of the Twenty-one Demands, however, was for the extension of this lease to ninety-nine years. Japan has insisted upon the validity of this extension; and despite protestations of friendship and good-will, has refused even to discuss the possibility of evacuating this territory.

Japan has not forgotten and cannot forget that across Manchuria lies Russia. Any withdrawal of Japanese influence from the Manchurian provinces would inevitably mean the corresponding extension of Russian influence. The Russian bear would again be within striking distance of Japanese territory. The fertile plains of Manchuria would again be under Russian domination. Its railways would fall under Russian control. An infiltration of Russian troops would follow. The sources of raw materials for Japan would be cut off. Japanese trade would be decimated. Air-bases would threaten Japanese security by land and sea. Such is the picture in the minds of the Japanese, and to them the danger is real and impending. To prevent its realization, therefore, Japan is determined to retain, in one form or another, some measure of control in this portion of Chinese territory.

The subservience of Chang Tso Lin to the Japanese has been frequently asserted. Chang was the leader of a numerous bandit gang at the time of Japan's earlier conflict with Russia. In return for modern arms and ammunitions he rendered signal service to the Japanese cause. Later, he was able to establish himself as the

ruler of the Manchurian provinces. From that time to this he has never appeared hostile to Japan. But he would undoubtedly be glad to bid the Japanese farewell to-morrow—if he could be sure of not having to welcome the Russians the next day! None realizes better than he that he is the buffer between two mighty empires. None knows better than he that it requires a good deal of skill and management to retain his position. Probably he is as independent of Japan as any man could be and remain ruler of Manchuria. As the substitution of Russian domination for Japanese would mark the end of his career, he coöperates with Japan to the extent necessary to preserve his position.

It is as a barrier against Russia that Japan is most interested in Chang Tso Lin. Very possibly the Japanese would be willing to extend to Manchuria their policy of non-interference in political affairs if the Russian menace were definitely removed. But as long as that hovers over the Japanese, they must remain on guard, whatever be the official attitude toward China.

The statesmen of Tokyo have not stalked the bear for thirty years without learning something of its habits. Not a move escapes their attention. Not an advance on Russia's part but is met with a counter-move by Japan. Every step in Russia's forward policy has been closely noted, and elaborate plans are under way to block the path of the bear. In view of its undertakings at the Washington Conference, Japan is not free to resort to military action on the continent. But railways are still looked upon as economic, and therefore peaceful, instrumentalities, and hence there comes about a Russo-Japanese conflict of railways.

When the Trans-Siberian was first built, Vladivostok—Ruler of the East—was to be its eastern terminus, and this new city flourished accordingly. With the completion of the Chinese Eastern, the port enjoyed an increased prosperity. When the original "South Manchurian Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway," between Harbin and Port Arthur, was opened, however, Vladivostok was relegated to the background, and the new warm-water port became the particular pet of the imperial bureaucracy at St. Petersburg. Russia's loss of the South Manchurian Railway in 1905 once more brought Vladivostok into favor with Russian officialdom and restored some of its former prosperity. But the rivalry of Vladivostok with Port Arthur and later with its Japanese successor, Dairen, now became an international rivalry and the more bitter on that account. The Japanese exerted themselves to divert as much traffic as possible to the South Manchurian line and the port of Dairen, where Japanese ships waited to carry the cargoes to all parts of the world. The Russians, on the other hand, strove to retain this traffic on the Chinese Eastern and to bring it to Vladivostok and the Russian carriers waiting there.

While the Czarist organization lasted, comparatively little freight was diverted from the Chinese Eastern. Such traffic until after 1916 never amounted to more than six per cent of the total business that came to the South Manchurian. But in 1917, the year of the Russian Revolution, this percentage jumped to eighteen and in the succeeding years of disorder and intrigue, the amount of such business steadily increased, until in 1925 it reached forty-one per cent of the total traffic of the

Japanese road. Not only was this a large proportion but it was by far the most valuable part of the business. Traffic of this type traveled the whole length of the main line, and there was no loading expense. Its loss, then, would be a serious blow to the prosperity of the South Manchurian and Japanese interests in Manchuria.


When the Soviet government recovered control of the Chinese Eastern in 1924, in accordance with the Russo-Peking and the Russo-Chang Tso Lin treaties, its appointees set about in dead earnest to recover this valuable traffic for their own road. The first move was to eliminate all elements on the staff that were inimical to Soviet rule. It was expected when the treaties were made that the "White" Russians would be superseded by Soviet sympathizers, though it was thought that the Chinese members of the staff would remain. But these Chinese, as must have been known at the time, were of "White" sympathies; and the Soviet management has consistently availed itself of every opportunity to replace them with its own Chinese and Russian protégés. The result of this process will be complete Soviet control of the road, a control that the Russians are prepared to protect in any emergency by heavy concentrations of troops at Manchuli and Pogranichnaya, the two ends of the line.

No figures showing the effect of these changes upon the business between the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian roads are yet available. But under the new circumstances the contest becomes for the Japanese much more than a matter of saving profitable business for the South Manchurian, though that is not to be lost sight of. It becomes part of a much broader struggle

which transcends the sphere of competition in rate-making. It enters the realm of economic and military strategy. Security of Russian control on the Chinese Eastern makes Vladivostok a serious threat to Japan's position in Manchuria. With that link broken, or with Japan in a position to break it at will, Manchuria becomes a safe base for Japanese operations on the mainland. Japan's problem, therefore, is so to dispose its own lines that the Chinese Eastern will become, economically and militarily, as nearly useless as it can be made.

Despite the earthquake in 1923, which destroyed a substantial portion of the wealth of the country, and the consequent demand for the application of all spare capital to reconstruction work at home, Japan has undertaken the financing of an extensive railway program in Manchuria; and, if allowed to complete it, will secure through it more nearly absolute control over the Manchurian provinces than either Japan or Russia has ever exercised. The roads will ostensibly be built by Chang Tso Lin, but the capital will be Japanese, the engineers will be Japanese, the rolling stock will be Japanese, and, in the event of an emergency requiring such action on the part of Japanese generals, they will direct the use of the roads.

One has only to consider the military value of the proposed extensions (see map facing this page) to realize their significance in the game of strategy that is being played in Eastern Asia. Three lines branch from the South Manchurian trunk and turn northward to the Chinese Eastern. Such economic value as these roads may have lies in their ability to draw freight from the



Russian Chinese Eastern to the Japanese South Manchurian and to the Japanese ports. But no one of the projected lines can within any reasonable period be expected to pay its own way. These new railways are essentially military roads in the sense that the demand for them is military and not economic. Let us suppose these projects carried to completion and the short connecting link constructed between the most easterly of them and the Korean port of Seishin; an excellent machine would Japan then possess to make war against the Russians in Manchuria! Troops—even now concentrated at Seishin, in central Korea and in south Manchuria—would be pushed forward at the first moment of hostilities. Other armies would press behind them through the ports of Seishin, Fusen, and Dairen. Up the four lines of railway they would go. The Chinese Eastern would be struck almost simultaneously at four widely separated points and would almost certainly be cut. The most easterly Japanese column would isolate Vladivostok and besiege it from the land side while the Japanese fleet invested it from the sea. Harbin, cut off from assistance on both sides, would have to sustain simultaneous attacks from the east, west, and south. And farther to the west, the last of the new roads would carry the Japanese arms to the western slopes of the Kingan Mountains. There is hardly a possibility of Russia's reversing this process and using the north and south roads to attack Japan, since the Russian road is of broader gage than the Japanese lines and Russian rolling-stock would be useless on them.

Such an attack by the Japanese would be almost overwhelming to the Russian power in the Far East. The

Japanese communications would be well protected behind the Japanese military front, and the Russian road from east to west could be put under fire at almost any point. With Vladivostok invested by land and sea, there would be no large base available in the East. Harbin, surrounded and deprived of rail communication with Russian territory, must speedily fall and open the way for a Japanese expedition northward to cut the Russian railroad along the Amur River. Manchuria and eastern Siberia would be once more in Japanese hands, and the main battle would be joined near Manchuli.

How far back into Siberia Japan could push the Russian forces would be doubtful. But it is hardly probable that the Russian armies, located five thousand miles from the homeland and supplied by a single line of railway, could drive back the Japanese, based as they would be on a network of railways designed for the very purpose of supporting them in this position. Probably Japan would not attempt to push the front very far westward, but she could hold the Manchuli line indefinitely, until the Russians tired of the struggle and sued for peace; a peace that would realize the Japanese dream of an empire on the Asian mainland.

While the major contestants in the great Far Eastern struggle are striving for advantage, much stress is being laid upon the treaty signed by Russia and Japan in January 1925, as the beginning of a rapprochement between the erstwhile enemies. By this treaty Japan recognizes the Soviet government and diplomatic relations are restored; the Peace of Portsmouth is continued in force, but all later agreements between Japan and Czarist Russia are to be revised; nationals of each party

are to receive rights and protection; both parties undertake to refrain from propaganda and to repress such as may come from organizations receiving financial support from governmental sources (this being the first treaty with the Soviet government that specifically binds it to restrict the activities of the Third International); the old Russian debts are to be settled on a most-favored-nation basis; northern Saghalin is to be evacuated by the Japanese; Japanese firms are to secure concessions for one-half the oil fields and such of the coal fields as may be agreed upon in Saghalin for forty to fifty years; and the Russian representative expresses his "sincere regrets regarding the Nikolaievsk incident in 1920."

A paltry return indeed for the tremendous efforts of the Japanese military party during the years 1918 to 1922. But no more was to be had. The only tangible benefit to Japan is the arrangement for oil and coal concessions in northern Saghalin. The value of this arrangement can be only roughly appraised, but the oil estimates are of particular interest. It is not probable that the total Saghalin oil production for the next few years will exceed fifty thousand tons a year. In a speech in the diet a representative of the Japanese Admiralty spoke of the possibility of Japan's obtaining between two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand tons per annum. But he was pleading for appropriations to enable the navy to develop the oil fields; these figures frankly represented a hope rather than an expectation. A more conservative estimate, also made under Japanese naval auspices, is one hundred thousand tons. This is important and highly desirable; but, even with as much as one hundred thousand tons a year from

Saghalin, Japan would still be dependent upon the United States for nearly half its oil supply and upon other foreign sources for another quarter of it.

The possibility of further communist activity in Japan is not the least of the unknown factors in the Far Eastern situation of to-day. Well-qualified observers with an intimate knowledge of Japan assert that, whatever may be the attitude of the Japanese ruling class toward Russia, the Japanese masses have pro-Soviet leanings. A considerable portion of Japan's population has been torn loose from the soil and either recruited to the ranks of the laborers or caught up in the industrial machine. There is in Japan, therefore, an appreciable, dispossessed, proletarian element. It is this element that lends a ready ear to Communist doctrine and serves to spread it through the lower strata of Japanese society. It is impossible to measure accurately the strength of this tendency, and no one can say whether it would be sufficient to overcome the traditional Japanese hyper-nationalism in the event of war. That Moscow will make every effort to develop it to the point where it will, may be assumed.

In any case this treaty is likely to be no more successful in settling accounts between Japan and Russia than have been the many others made and denounced as occasion demanded. These two nations stand face to face in eastern Asia like the proverbial irresistible force and immovable body. The Russians will never stop until they reach warm water; the Japanese will stop at nothing to prevent their doing so. The struggle may go on behind the screen of Chinese civil war for a number of years, and China will suffer accordingly. But sooner or

later the real opponents must in all probability stand forth and Japan and Russia meet again in a struggle *à outrance*.

Japan's interest in Manchuria and China is by no means confined to her political duel with Russia, important a factor as that is in Japan's policy. The astonishing modernization of Japan during the last half-century, its transformation from a balanced agricultural culture to a swiftly developing industrialism, the rapid growth in its population which is partly the cause and partly the effect of this change, are well known. But the extreme delicacy of the economic balance in Japan is not always fully appreciated. An increasing proportion of the food supply must be imported and large quantities of raw materials must be brought in. To pay for this, exports must be constantly increased. China now takes about one-fifth of Japan's exports and furnishes about one-sixth of her imports, mostly in raw materials. Here then is another vital interest Japan has in conditions in China. If either domestic disturbance or foreign interference stops the flow of her raw materials or lowers the purchasing power of her Chinese markets, Japan has at once to meet a severe strain upon her economic and social structure. There is little room for wonder that her statesmen receive with concern the demands of China for freedom to raise the tariff on cotton piece-goods and that there is always a strong pressure at home for a more aggressive and unyielding policy toward these Chinese demands. If China should erect a protective tariff for her own infant cotton industries and Japan should suddenly lose this market for twenty per cent of her exports there would follow

an economic crisis of the first magnitude, an economic crisis which might well cause profound changes in the social organization of the country.

A curious process is now going on which must in time effect deeply the economic relations between China and Japan. Chinese labor in China is competing with Japanese labor in Japan for the privilege of working in Japanese mills. The lower wage of the Chinese laborers exerts a powerful pull on Japanese capital to erect its mills in the treaty ports of China instead of in the cities of Japan. Many such mills are being erected, and in some instances the entire equipment of Japanese mills has been shipped bodily to China and reërected there for operation by the cheaper Chinese labor. Thus is Japanese capital protecting itself against the consequences of changes in the Chinese situation. Japanese labor, however, has not the same opportunity. It must find a solution for its problems at home.

The lively interest which Japan takes in the affairs of China has led her into courses of action which have not always been either commendable or beneficial. We have seen the futility of Japanese attempts to dominate the continent by military force. Part and parcel of this same misguided policy was the squandering of money in Peking during the years preceding the Washington Conference in attempts to control the politics of China. These transactions—known as the Nishihara loans and recently taken over by the Japanese government—are estimated at approximately \$120,000,000 (gold). Other unsecured loans to China total \$21,500,000, while secured railway and other loans amount to nearly \$68,000,000. In addition to these governmental trans-

actions, Japan holds mortgages on the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron Works, China's greatest industrial enterprise, and has private investments in shipping and banking ventures in China totalling another \$100,000,000. Japan therefore has a financial investment in China amounting to nearly \$310,000,000. This is to be compared with some \$750,000,000 invested by the British and about \$70,000,000 by Americans.

From this brief outline it will be seen that Japan, even after the abandonment of her expansionist policy, has interests of the utmost importance on the Asian mainland: political, military, industrial, commercial, and financial. These interests she is quite justified in considering just as closely as she does the interests of China, and it is only the novice in international affairs who will cavil at the Japanese government for carefully weighing China's demand for tariff autonomy against the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of the mill workers of Osaka, or the Chinese desire for complete liberation from treaty restraints against the necessity for the continuous flow of raw materials to the industrial centers of Japan. The desire to be fair to China must be balanced in the counsels of Japanese statesmen by a desire to preserve the welfare of Japan.

VI

THE INTERESTED REFEREE

THE first Americans to discover an interest in the Far East were the early traders, who set out to secure Indian spices and muslins and Chinese teas and silks. They soon found that they could not only buy from the Chinese, but that China offered an excellent market in which to sell furs and opium. American trading ships shared with the British and other foreigners all of the vicissitudes of the early trading days at Canton, when every shipmaster was his own ambassador and all too likely to be his own army and navy. The incidents leading up to the Opium War between Great Britain and China brought increased prosperity to the American traders, a prosperity which was greatly enhanced by the building of the new clipper ships. These ships made world records for speed and drew China appreciably nearer to Europe and America. The expansion of the China trade between 1844 and the beginning of the Civil War brought what at that time seemed enormous profits to the United States and played no small part in furnishing new capital for the development of this country. During those years China bulked larger in the minds of American citizens than she has at any time since. The Civil War and the tremendous industrial expansion which followed it,

pushed China and the China trade into the background, and until 1895 Americans gave little heed to what was going on in the Far East. Then new vitality made itself felt in the trade with China and, with the acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898, began the present period of increased interest in that part of the world.

The commerce with China of the present day is by no means a vital part of the economic activity of the United States. Out of a total foreign trade of nearly ten billion dollars less than three per cent is with China—\$240,000,000 in 1925. There is no essential of our industrial life for which we are dependent upon China, and we have no product of importance of which China is the exclusive purchaser. She is, however, one of our good customers, using large quantities of our kerosene, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and machinery. There are only eight other countries with whom we do a larger business. None of these has that peculiar quality of the Chinese market which is never absent from the mind of even the most hard-headed of business men. That is the tremendous potential buying power of four hundred million people. For a century and a half this buying power has been looked upon as a gold mine for the manufacturing nations. But its great possibilities are still in the future. A people of low earning power are a people of low buying power. The average Chinese buys from the United States goods to the value of twenty-five cents a year. The average Japanese buys three dollars worth and the average Englishman twenty-five dollars worth. While the purchasing power of the Chinese is and always has been low, there always

hovers on the business horizon the thought of the time when their earning power will be increased and of the huge commerce that will ensue if they will take even as much merchandise per capita as the Japanese.

While China has not been a favorable investment market since America achieved her new prominence as a lending power, nevertheless American capitalists have a substantial stake in China. Of Chinese government bonds and other securities American investors hold approximately \$20,000,000 worth. Of railway bonds and similar securities about \$18,000,000 is held in the United States. American manufacturers have extended long-term credits to Chinese enterprises and the amount of these outstanding—much of it overdue—is another \$10,000,000. Banks, trading concerns and others have an investment in lands, buildings and equipment in China running close to \$30,000,000. There is therefore a total of some \$70,000,000 of American money in business investments in China.

This is exclusive of another sum that has been invested by another American interest in China. It is difficult to get reliable figures on the amount of money that is now represented in the missions, hospitals, schools and other religious, social, charitable, and cultural activities of American organizations in China. But the sum total would run close to the \$70,000,000 of American business, if it did not exceed it. This money, which has been contributed by thousands of people all over the United States, has a grip on the imagination of the American people far greater than many times the amount invested in business ventures could have. When it is centered in such magnificent projects as the

Peking Union Medical College of the Rockefeller Foundation and the excellent colleges and universities maintained by mission boards in various parts of China, it has also a strong hold upon the imagination of the Chinese. And the amount devoted to eleemosynary purposes grows every year with little regard for the ups and downs of Chinese commerce or Chinese politics.

Missionary interests have played a prominent part in Sino-American relations since the day when Robert Morrison, a British missionary, had to seek passage on an American ship because the merchants of his own land would not allow him to travel on theirs. Missionaries, familiar with the language and the customs of the Chinese and trusted by them, were indispensable aids to the early diplomats America sent to the Far East. Indeed the missionaries themselves were frequently called upon to assume diplomatic responsibilities. They thus played an influential part in shaping American policy toward China and even in the actual wording of treaties between the two countries. In later years, since the State Department has developed its own facilities and personnel for dealing with Chinese problems, the influence of the missionaries has been transferred to the field of public opinion. Their connection with the churches has always assured them a large audience and one eager to accept as indisputably correct their views on so distant a subject as China.

The missionary pressure upon American policy has not always been exerted in the same direction. In the earlier years of the last century the missionaries contributed largely to the restiveness in this country at China's exclusive policy. They were most careful to protect

missionary interests in the Treaty of Wanghsia. They were the first to transgress the restrictions which limited foreigners to a certain area about the treaty ports. When the right of extraterritoriality alone did not suffice to protect them in the interior of the country, they wrote the so-called "toleration clauses" into later treaties, clauses which gave them rights of travel, residence and property denied to other classes. When the Tai Ping rebels proclaimed a certain interest in Christianity, many missionaries openly favored their cause against the legitimate government. When other rebels or common freebooters have threatened or attacked mission stations, the missionaries have time out of mind summoned Christian gunboats to overawe their enemies and to protect themselves.

A large share of the credit for the leadership in penetrating China in the days when penetration was the dominating idea must go to the missionaries. It is only recently that they have swung over to the more liberal view and urged the relinquishment of special rights, the abandonment of the gunboat policy, the abolition of toleration clauses, extraterritorial jurisdiction and what not. Now large numbers of them are in the van of those who would grant to Young China all its demands either at once or as rapidly as a formula can be found which will satisfy the caution of the less enthusiastic business man.

A curious parallel change has taken place in missionary literature concerning the characteristics of the Chinese. In early tracts they were pictured as heathen of the deepest dye. All of the sinister and evil traits of their nature and their civilization were expatiated upon.

Some of these writings are in striking contrast with ones from missionary sources of more recent date. Now the Chinese are compared very favorably with the peoples of other races and their civilization is frequently painted in colors which fairly glow when compared with the sombre shades in which Occidental civilization is portrayed. One might well carry away the impression that the only thing lacking to make Chinese culture perfect is Christianity and the only good thing in Western culture is that same Christianity.

Behind these outward changes is the purpose for which all of this literature was written. In the early days, when the chief Chinese interest of Americans to whom it was addressed was the saving of souls, it was well to emphasize the wretched state of these idolaters so that the need might be more apparent for Christian work among them and the purse-strings of good church people might be loosened to extend that work. In this the missionaries were eminently successful. They secured huge endowments and vast annual contributions. That end of their problem was in a fair way to solution. Suddenly they found themselves faced with a new difficulty. They were pictured by Chinese agitators as the advance agents of Western conquest, cultural, commercial, even military. Young China rose to heap condemnation upon them as the corruptors of the youth of the country. This Young China was possessed of tremendous influence. It was necessary to placate it or, with the finest kind of equipment at hand, the pursuance of their work of evangelization would be rendered impossible. It was incumbent upon them to take the part of China against what were denounced as the

aggressions of their own countrymen. Once having embraced the cause of Young China politically, they were tied fast to that cause. The slightest recantation, the slightest hesitation, and their usefulness in China would be at an end.

It does not follow from this that all missionaries are lacking in sincerity, though some of them have shown too little of that virtue. The great mass of them are undoubtedly sincere in their beliefs; but it is necessary always to bear in mind that the missionary, like the rest of us, is a human being and that his views are shaped, often quite unconsciously, by his enthusiasms and his interests. No missionary could oppose the Chinese nationalists and remain useful in China. Those that remain are therefore those who embrace the nationalist view. The business man who has money invested in China finds his views discounted forthwith on that account. The views of missionaries on the Chinese question are quite as subject to discount as those of the business man; for while the missionary may not have money at stake, he has what to him is quite as important, his life work. He has as real a personal interest when he advocates acquiescence in the demands of the Chinese patriots, as has the business man when he insists upon China fulfilling the letter of her bond.

The contrasting interests of the trader and the missionary have been important factors in shaping American policy in China, and yet they have not been the sole factors. A third and perhaps determining factor may be called political. Not political in the sense of domestic politics—China, as distinguished from Chinese immigration, has seldom been a domestic issue in Amer-

ica,—but political in the realm of international politics. The political factor in a sense embraces all other factors, including both missionary and the commercial interests, but it includes elements which are different from either of these. For example, if the United States were particularly desirous of carrying out a policy of coöperation with England in Europe, this desire might make itself felt in a slight shifting of emphasis in our Chinese policy so that it might not antagonize British interests in that part of the world. Again, when President Roosevelt notified France and Germany that if either of them assisted Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, America would come in on the side of Japan, he was moved to no great extent by either missionary or business interests, but almost entirely by political considerations.

This is not the place to trace in detail the history of American policy in China. It is necessary only that we understand its substance. Its great aim, sometimes formulated, sometimes not, has been that American citizens should have the same right to trade, preach and travel in China that other foreigners enjoy—in a phrase, “most-favored-nation treatment.” Its favorite means of achieving this aim has been to strive for the preservation of the integrity of China—to make China a strong, independent state, able to hold its own against all comers. If this could be accomplished, American statesmen have felt that they could count upon securing from a self-reliant China treatment for American nationals equal to that granted to any other people.

There have been some minor deviations from this policy, especially in the early days when it was in the

making and when its interpretation was frequently in the hands of individuals months away from Washington and of necessity thrown upon their own resources. Commodore Perry, for example, desired to secure territory for America in the Far East and recommended the seizure of several islands. Others, including the medical missionary, Dr. Peter Parker, were of like opinion. But the main trend in Washington has been fairly consistent. We have wanted no territory for ourselves and we have placed every obstacle in the way of others who had acquisitive desires.

Herein has been the chief difficulty in applying the American policy. If we opposed too strenuously the policies of the European states, imperialistic without exception before the World War, we found ourselves isolated and our very opposition spurring the aggressive Powers to further effort. If we tried to coöperate with the other Powers, there was always present the fundamental antagonism between our policy and theirs. We wanted a strong Asia; they wanted a weak one. Too great an insistence upon our view inevitably drove them away from us and precipitated action detrimental to China. Only when we were willing to go slowly and join them in holding China to a measure of responsibility have we been able to keep them in line with our policy.

The weakness and unreliability of China through all the years of these dealings with Europe and America have been most exasperating to her friends and well-wishers. Never has she given America anything like whole-hearted support and coöperation in her efforts to preserve Chinese sovereignty and integrity against the

onslaughts of other Powers. Never has China risen above her tradition of Oriental flatulence and duplicity. America has often had to champion China's cause against Europe—and China! It is this inherent weakness and unreliability that have necessitated a practice on America's part which has opened the way for the charges of hypocrisy and cynicism from the other Powers. Whenever any Power has wrested a right or a privilege from China, America under its most-favored-nation clause has availed itself of the same right or privilege. There have been two reasons for this, neither of which is necessarily hypocritical nor cynical. First, America's fundamental aim, as has been said, is equality of treatment for her nationals. This aim demanded that she avail herself of all the rights and privileges obtained from China by other Powers. Second, unless America was a party to these rights and privileges, she would be excluded from all international discussion in regard to them and thus restricted in her opportunities to assist China to get rid of them when the time came. For example, the customs conference which opened in October 1925. If America had not been a party to the conventional tariff, she would have had no place in that conference. Her presence there enabled her to make and carry the motion that customs autonomy be restored to China in 1929. America's acceptance of the benefits of foreign aggression, then, has been necessitated both by the duty to secure equal treatment for her nationals and by the policy of assisting China whenever possible to regain her rights.

America's first acquisition of territory in the Far East came all unpremeditatedly in 1898. When war with

Spain loomed as a possibility, American forces were so disposed as to make it possible to strike Spain at every vulnerable point. One of these was the Philippines. Admiral Dewey was sent to Hongkong and ordered to hold himself in readiness for the declaration of war. As a result of his victory at the battle of Manila Bay and the later successes of the American troops, the archipelago was brought under American rule. The possession of these important islands gave the United States an entirely new interest in the Far East and an added weight in the balance of power in that part of the world.

Thus were brought into play the various factors which have shaped American policy toward China since the year 1898. In that very year the "battle of concessions," the concentrated effort of European imperialism to break up and divide between them the Chinese empire, reached its height. Germany seized Shantung, Russia secured the Chinese Eastern concession and the Liaotung lease, Great Britain obtained a large additional area at Kowloon and Weihaiwei. France took Kwangchowwan. Each of these nations staked out a huge sphere of influence about these possessions and claimed it as its own. America's policy of a strong, independent China was apparently speeding to complete failure. It was then that the United States fell back on the open door policy. Secretary Hay's notes outlining this policy seemed to betray the despair of this country in its efforts to preserve the independence of China and asked that in the spheres of influence in process of establishment, citizens of the United States should be subjected to no discrimination in trade matters. Mr. Hay asked

that, if the European Powers were going to move into the Chinese house, they would leave an open door for American trade. He took care to add in later notes, however, that the United States had not retreated from its fundamental policy of Chinese integrity.

It is well to keep clearly in mind the relation between the integrity-of-China policy and the open door policy. The first is aimed against political encroachment by other Powers on Chinese territory and the interferences by outsiders in China's internal affairs. The second is aimed against economic encroachment and the setting up of spheres of influence in which American traders would be denied equal rights with the nationals of other countries. If the integrity of China were assured, if China were an effective, self-determining state, there would be no necessity for an open door policy. China would control her own commercial as well as political relations. Taken together these two policies summed up America's desire to be fair to China and to assist her against outside pressure. There is room for interesting speculation on whether we should have been in a stronger position in 1899 if we had ourselves been in possession of an American sphere of influence.

However that may be, a half-hearted adherence to the open door principle did not restrain the ambitions of the other Powers. Russia was the most indifferent to this principle and pushed on into Manchuria and Korea. She threatened to absorb even a large portion of China north of the Yangtse and to force her blighting commercial system on much of the vast territory which the United States wished to see preserved as a world market. This was quite as determining a factor in winning

American sympathy for Japan in the struggle that followed as President Roosevelt's political genius and his admiration for the Japanese.

This sympathy, backed up as it was with the more substantial assistance of American loans, was in no small measure responsible for the Japanese victory. This victory, however, though it eliminated the danger of Russian domination in northeastern Asia, did not greatly relieve the general situation. It simply substituted a threat of Japanese domination, and Japan was little, if any, more enthusiastic over the open door idea than was Russia. Japan at once embarked upon that career of aggression on the continent, first in accord with Russia and later at her expense, which she followed up to the time of the Washington Conference.

Such a course could have but one effect upon Japanese-American relations. Any attempt on the part of Japan to dominate China and close its doors to the industrial, commercial, financial, and missionary interests of the United States clashed as sharply with the American policy as a similar attempt by Russia or any other Power. As the Japanese imperialistic policy developed, American sympathy for Japan rapidly turned to antagonism. This would have happened had there been no immigration issue to embitter the relations between the two countries.

Great Britain, meanwhile, found herself the unwilling abetter of Japan's expansionist ventures. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been formed to confine Russia. It had served that purpose, but now it was being used in ways detrimental to British interests in the Far East. Great Britain, therefore, lent a willing ear

when America, realizing that unless a new alignment was made in the Pacific, war was altogether too probable, proposed the Washington Conference. Japan, conscious of the fact that any other course would mean isolation, accepted the invitation to a meeting she would have greatly preferred to avoid.

At the Washington Conference, it was evident that Great Britain had no appetite for further adventures in China. France was reduced to quibbling over minor issues. Both were at one with the United States in the idea that further encroachment on China was to be discouraged. Japan could but yield, and did so as gracefully as might be. She gave up her career of conquest and returned to her pre-war boundaries.

Thus was the United States in a measure successful in reëstablishing its fundamental policy of preserving the integrity of China, of assisting the Chinese people to establish themselves as a united, self-determining state. The principle of the open door was reaffirmed as an extra precaution. On both points the United States now had with it Great Britain, France, and Japan. And here let it be noted—the United States had not “joined the imperialists.” The “imperialists” had joined the United States. And in doing as they had, renounced their imperialism so far as China was concerned.

For the first time China was relieved of the threat of aggression by France, Great Britain, and Japan. But this was not the full measure of her gains. The new International Consortium, formed almost at the same time, was also to make its contribution. This was negative rather than positive. The Consortium has made no

loans to China, but it has effectively put a stop to the indiscriminate lending of funds to irresponsible military adventurers in exchange for railway and other concessions. Japan had been the most flagrant offender in this respect, and the Nishihara loans, apparently a part of the Japanese campaign for domination of the continent, came from sources much too close to the Imperial Japanese government—which has since assumed them—to escape severe criticism.

Quite as important as the negative results of the Washington Conference and the Consortium were the ways opened to China to recover the rights she had lost during the decades of her intercourse with other Powers. Chief among these matters were an increase in the conventional customs tariff, and the abolition of extraterritoriality. China's oft-repeated plea was heard at last, and arrangements were made for a conference at Peking to discuss the revision of the Chinese customs rates and for a commission of inquiry to investigate the conditions surrounding the administration of Chinese law, with a view to a surrender of their extraterritorial rights by the Powers.

These provisions, too, were a victory for the American policy of building up a strong and independent China. So far as the Powers signatory to the Washington conventions were concerned, the American idea had triumphed over the long-cherished scheme for the partition of China among the empires. And when the customs conference met last October, America led the way up another step. Instead of restricting the scope of the conference to the letter of the Washington agreement, which provided merely for an increase in the existing

treaty tariff, the American delegates announced their readiness to discuss complete abolition of the conventional tariff and the recognition of China's right to customs autonomy. Before the conference had progressed very far, they had secured the consent of the other Powers, and customs autonomy was agreed upon, to commence January 1, 1929.

Once again was demonstrated the effectiveness of co-operation—or, as some writers prefer to call it, concurrent action—between America and the Powers. The co-operation was obtained, not on the basis of a surrender of America's cherished aims in China, but upon the basis of upholding those aims. China, as a result, has a better opportunity to realize her aspirations for national independence and the complete restoration of her sovereignty than at any time since the first gun was fired in the Opium War.

But until China's leaders place national above personal interests, until her young patriots awaken to the desirability of internal reconstruction as a condition precedent to the recovery of external prestige, America can but exert herself to hold matters where they stand. She can try to hold the ring—to keep back aggressive forces from outside—while China fights out her battle with the enemies within. When that battle is won, and the ancient race shall once more have asserted its perdurable character, China will receive both the rights and the obligations of national sovereignty.

Upon the forces which play back and forth through the Chinese vacuum, the relations of America with each of the other great Powers concerned have their influence: Great Britain first. Anglo-American solidarity

can hardly be called a fundamental American policy. Yet as a sentiment it has been growing more and more powerful in recent decades. To-day there are large and influential sections of the population in each country that feel instinctively that if civilization in the West is to be preserved and carried on through the coming centuries, an indispensable factor will be the collaboration of America and the British Empire to that end. While this is perhaps not the official view in either country, it may be fairly stated that no government likely to come to power in England and no party likely to come into office in the United States would consider it anything but a world catastrophe if relations between America and the British Empire were allowed to drift into hostility. As long as these two agree it would be difficult for any one else to overthrow the structure of Western civilization. If they should ever come to blows, it would be difficult for any one else to uphold that structure.

Western civilization has not always been poised in such delicate balance and England and America have not always seen eye to eye in the Far East. Yet whatever tradition there is tends to coöperation rather than antagonism, and recent events have done much to insure such coöperation for the future. British territorial aggression in China is a thing of the past. Downing Street will be content henceforth to guard what it has in China and to see that British interests, political, financial, industrial, and commercial are protected against destruction either by the Chinese or by other Powers. There is every evidence that Downing Street fully realizes that the surest way to this protection is along the

lines of American policy.¹ There is still a powerful group of interests which advocates a return to the more aggressive attitude of former years, a group whose dogma it is that "the Chinese understand only the language of force," whose admiration for the "gunboat policy" is undisguised, and whose interests are bound to suffer if there is any appreciable shrinkage in the Chinese market or any limitations of foreign control in that country. This section of British opinion has been somewhat tamed by the disastrous effect of the Canton boycott against Hongkong and is at present less assertive. But it is not convinced, and if the policy of accommodation does not bring substantial results, it will make renewed efforts to take the government back to the old oft-tried policy of military force. Such a development American statesmanship will make every effort to avoid.

The situation with regard to Japan is somewhat similar. The Japanese imperialists are no longer in the ascendant. The government of the island empire is sincerely devoted to a policy of friendship with China, because they believe that is the best policy to promote Japanese interests. This brings Japan officially into line with the American policy. But the more aggressive impulse is still strong among the Japanese. It has its devotees in the realm of political philosophy, in military circles, in industry, and in commerce. It is but held in leash; and if the time comes when the policy of friendship obviously fails, it too will make itself felt once more in governmental circles and we shall again

¹ The British note made public on December 25, 1926, is additional evidence to support this conclusion.

have a Japan less distinguished than the present for its tractability.

Other forces are ready to add their quota to a Japanese policy of opposition to America. The memory of how the diplomacy of the United States defeated Japan's plan for a continental empire still rankles in many a Japanese breast. The definite stop which America has put to Japan's former policy of national expansion, and the immediate opposition which meets any attempt to resume that policy, are deeply resented. More than all these is the smart of what Japan's publicists have chosen to term the "insult" to the Japanese people in the Immigration Law of 1924. That "insult" arises from what is almost universally acclaimed a "discrimination against Japan." Of course there was no discrimination against Japan. The gentlemen's agreement had created a discrimination in Japan's favor as compared not only with the other people of Asia, but with the peoples of all the rest of the world. Under the gentlemen's agreement a Japanese could walk into the American Consulate in Yokohama and in five minutes secure a visa to enter this country. Anybody else, be he Frenchman, Turk or Prussian, must fill out and swear to a lengthy application and wait fourteen days before it was possible to get his visa. We had completely surrendered into the hands of the Japanese government the authority to say who among their people should come to America in any capacity. It was this discrimination in Japan's favor which the Immigration Act abolished. Henceforth Japan was to take her place with the other peoples of Asia and all were to be treated equally. But the loss of a discrimination in one's favor always

rankles even more than the imposition of a new and adverse discrimination. So it is with Japan. She resents as keenly at least the abolition of her former privilege as she would have a new discrimination against her had there in reality been one in the Immigration Act. And all of those Japanese who feel that resentment would weight the scales of public opinion against America if they were not held in careful balance by a government determined to work with America and not in opposition to her so far as China is concerned.

No small factor in this determination is the danger from Soviet Russia. The nature of the conflict between Russia and Japan has already been pointed out. No Japanese statesman can afford for a moment to overlook or disregard it. While the action of America since 1918 has worked distinctly against Japanese expansion and thus in favor of Russian territorial integrity. Japan is quite aware that this is due to no love for Bolshevism on the part of those who preside over our destinies in Washington. Japanese publicists sense our feeling for a balance of power in northeastern Asia. They know that that led to Roosevelt's action in 1904, and they are fairly certain that if Russia starts Pacificward once more, Japan will again be able to call upon American sympathy. And when that time comes, Japan wants no embarrassing incidents nor unsettled issues to cool the ardor of that sympathy. Thus it happens that neither the controversy over Yap, the dispute over wireless contracts in China, nor the immigration question itself has been allowed to arouse an undue amount of public animosity in Japan against the United States.

As to the possibility of war between Japan and Amer-

ica, one would hesitate to say that it could never come. Never is too long a day. But it is not too reckless to predict that if war does come within the next few decades, it is more likely to be of our seeking than Japan's—which is to say, it is not likely at all. We have already seen how dependent is Japan's economic structure upon Chinese markets and Chinese raw materials. That dependence is almost twice as great upon the United States. Japan is dependent upon this country for half of her oil supply, and we furnish a market for her silk which absorbs ninety-six per cent of her national export of that article. Her total exports to this country approach one-half of her entire sales abroad. The great war demonstrated the fallacy of concluding that there could be no war where economic interests were so intertwined, but where there is such a degree of economic dependence it is bound to act as a heavy brake upon any impulse to warlike adventure. Especially is this so where the international situation tends in the same direction. Russia across Manchuria is the best guaranty against any Japanese-American war. Japan could afford to go to war with Russia in some contingencies. The United States at her back would not constitute a threat to her success. But no Japanese statesman in his right mind would seek a war against the United States with Russia at his back.

The American diplomatic position in the Far East seems at the moment to be in as good condition as can be expected in such uncertain waters. Not only are we not threatened in any direction, but we are in a position to call upon Great Britain and Japan for support and coöperation in a policy the ultimate aim of which is to

restore China to the full status of a sovereign power.

The greatest danger is further disintegration in China itself. After all it is not the Americans, or the Japanese, or the British, or yet the Russians, who must work out China's destiny. It is the Chinese. An examination of the trends of thought and action in China, that we may learn something of the direction in which the people of that ancient land are moving becomes, then, most pertinent to our study.

VII

THE PUZZLE OF CHINESE POLITICS

IN order to understand the significance of the political developments in China since the revolution of 1911, the system of government which prevailed in China before that event should be borne in mind. This is desirable for two reasons. First, much of the administrative machinery of the old régime was carried over into the republic. Second, it throws much light on the training of the Chinese people for a democratic system.

The Son of Heaven, as the emperor was called, was the source of all authority under the old system. All decrees were issued by him, or at least in his name. All appointments were made at his direction. The administrative machinery of the empire was, nominally at least, his to make, alter, or destroy. For each of the twenty-two provinces he appointed a governor. Some of these governors had supervisory authority over one or two additional provinces and were then known as viceroys. It was the duty of this official to govern his province in such a manner that its people remained quiet and the proper taxes were paid to Peking. This double check on the efficiency of local administrators was the only means ancient China produced for articulating the provincial administrations and the central government. If the governor was too mild, he would not


be able to send the proper tribute to the capital and would soon find himself out of office. If he were too harsh, he would have to meet riots and uprisings of part of his people, and that too would shortly deprive him of office. A simple system of accountability and yet it worked, when clever men undertook to work it. These men were selected from all over the empire by means of the well-known literary examinations. The successful candidates were appointed to offices and at once became devoted supporters of the imperial régime. By thus drafting off the brains of the country, there were few left who were able to oppose the existing system of government.

Under such circumstances the central authority had no great need of military power. It maintained the examination system and made the appointments to office. In return it was supported by its own officials and received the shipments of grain and other taxes. It did maintain an army, distributed over the country in what were known as "Manchu garrisons," but one which was not sufficient to uphold a severe despotism against popular opposition. The acknowledged right of revolution insured the people a certain median quality in the exercise of authority over them. Beyond this the people took no part in and paid no attention to the affairs of government. Government was the business of the mandarins, the official class, and the sole function of the Demos was to raise particular Hades when things became unbearably bad. This, be it noted, was a wholly negative, a wholly destructive function. Whether they set to work through their guilds, their secret societies, or chance mobs, the purpose was the same—to upset

something that was established. They never set up anything in its place. The business of reconstruction was no affair of theirs. That again was up to the officials class.

The very weakness of the central government was its greatest strength. Its functions were so limited, so little did it interfere with the life of the people of the villages and the towns, that it continued through the centuries because of its momentum, because it was not worth anybody's while to stop it. This sufficed very well until the impact of the more highly organized states of the West shook it to its foundations. At the same time that their inroads upon China's territory and their interference with the life of China's people were weakening the imperial government, their demands upon it first implied that it had, and then forced it to assume, a degree of control that it did not possess. They treated it as if it had the power of the usual government in Europe. When they demanded indemnities or railroad concessions they saw no reason why the Peking authorities could not comply. And they insisted that they should comply. Thus they drove the central government to encroach upon the provinces just at the time when the prestige of the central authority was sinking to its lowest level.

Passing over the ill-fated attempts at reform which were made by the Emperor Kwang Hsu in 1898 and the ensuing Boxer revolt, we come to the precipitation of the final crisis in 1911. In that year the central government arranged for two loans with foreign banks. The first was for currency reform, a measure which would cut across the profits of many strongly organized groups throughout the country. The second was for the



construction of certain railways from Canton to Hankow and from Hankow into Szechuan. These projects were undoubtedly for the benefit of the country, but the lenders overlooked, and the government ignored, the fact that it would injure a section of the population much more articulate than that vague entity known as China. Local interests had already projected railroads along the routes covered by the foreign concession. Provincial governments would have shared in the earnings. To see these favorite projects taken from them by the central authorities and turned over to foreigners was more than could peaceably be borne. There were flare-ups at Canton and at Chengtu, the provincial seat of Szechuan. Forceful opposition to Peking was in the air. But the spark that touched off the revolution was the premature explosion of a bomb at Wuchang. The police found revolutionary flags and literature and a list of those concerned. These had but two courses open to them, imprisonment as traitors with the prospects of an early demise, and open revolution. They chose the latter. Some of the troops mutinied and joined them and they soon had a formidable following. They forced the leadership upon Li Yuan Hung, a cavalry colonel who had had no connection with the revolutionary activities but was prevailed upon to accept the supreme command. He occupied Hanyang and Hankow and awaited developments.

The Prince Regent, thoroughly frightened at these happenings, summoned Yuan Shih Kai, the most able general in China, who had been sent into retirement because of the hostility of men high at court. Yuan accepted the command of the imperial forces with reluc-

tance. Had he so wished, he could have suppressed the revolutionary movement in short order, but he was not at all sure that he wanted to. He reoccupied Hankow and Hanyang and the revolutionaries opened negotiations for peace. Yuan by the exercise of sternness could easily have saved the Manchu dynasty, but he had other fish to fry. He found a shift in affairs at Peking had placed him in complete control, a position he sought to make permanent. He entered into negotiations with the republicans. These were already divided into two groups. There were the followers of Li Yuan Hung at Wuchang and a group of intellectuals led by Wu Ting Fang at Shanghai. These latter busied themselves issuing manifestos and proclaiming the establishment of a republic. It was this latter group with whom Yuan Shih Kai entered into conversations. A week after they began, Sun Yat Sen arrived from Europe, where he had been when the revolution broke out. The Revolutionary Council, as the Shanghai group called themselves, elected him President of the Chinese Republic, thus ignoring Li Yuan Hung.

The republicans insisted upon the abdication of the Manchus. They finally told Yuan Shih Kai that if the Manchus would abdicate, Sun Yat Sen would resign in his favor as president. That was enough for Yuan. He had his henchmen start wiring to the throne urging abdication and in a few days secured the necessary edicts, under which the imperial house secured favorable terms and Yuan was authorized to organize a provisional republican government. Dr. Sun resigned and Yuan became First President by vote of the Revolutionary Council, now become the National Council,

which at the same time voted to transfer the capital from Peking to Nanking. Li Yuan Hung became vice-president.

The issue over the transfer of the capital was the first of many which were to arise between Yuan and the National Council, between whom there was distrust from the start. A timely mutiny in Peking kept Yuan from coming to Nanking. The Council moved to the northern capital and set to work upon the provisional constitution. Their chief aim was to limit the powers of the president. The hostility of the Council toward the president was inherited by the parliament, which met in April, 1913. The strongest party in the parliament was the Kuomintang, or southern revolutionary party, of which Sun Yat Sen was the chief, and which had nearly half the membership of each house. So bitter did the hostility become that by July some of the Kuomintang commanders in the south were openly defiant and Yuan was compelled to suppress them by force. He then proscribed the leaders of the party and Sun Yat Sen fled to Japan.

This demonstration of Yuan's power was sufficient to cow the Kuomintang members of parliament and they passed the new presidential election law as demanded by Yuan. But they immediately tried to recover their lost ground by so drawing the constitution as to reduce the president to a figure-head. Yuan retorted by proscribing the Kuomintang and driving its members from the capital. This left the parliament without a quorum and Yuan formally dissolved it in January 1914. Meanwhile he had installed his trusted followers in the various provinces as military governors, and thus,

in little more than two years from the beginning of its revolution, China was back once more to its normal and traditional form of government, an unlimited despotism unencumbered by any of the forms of popular government. Yuan, as soon as the crisis precipitated by the Japanese Twenty-one Demands had passed, began his preparations to mount the Dragon Throne and establish a new dynasty. This would have completed the usual Chinese process of abolishing one dynasty and installing another.

But this time it was not to be so simple. The Japanese were especially hostile to Yuan because of his earlier opposition to their activities in Korea. They led foreign opposition to his project, securing the collaboration of the British and Russian ministers. More serious opposition came from the south where revolt broke out once more, this time in Yunnan province. Yuan's military commanders, while they were ready to support him as president, were not ready to fight to place him on the throne and he had to forego his great ambition. Yuan died, a broken man, in June of 1916.

Yuan Shih Kai's death carried away China's last great dominating figure. His successor, Li Yuan Hung, was an honest and well-meaning individual who, as we have seen, was forced into a position of prominence upon the outbreak of the revolution in 1911. Li at once recalled the members of the parliament to Peking and attempted to restore republican forms. The matter of a permanent constitution was again taken up and the course of republicanism appeared smoother, when the question of war with Germany arose. On this rock the Chinese ship of state, already sorely battered, finally

founded. There was no Yuan Shih Kai now to make himself dictator of the nation, but there were in various provinces military governors, followers and appointees of Yuan, known as *tuchuns*. These men, in the short space of time since their appointment, had acquired absolute authority in their respective domains, had built up their own armies, and were rapidly accumulating wealth. They were of no mind to have their position weakened by a crowd of civilians in a so-called parliament at Peking. They were watching very closely the progress of affairs and the question of war with Germany seemed to offer the opportunity they wanted. War would place new powers and new monies in their hands and correspondingly weaken the parliamentarians. They were abetted in their desire to enter the war against Germany by the combined influence of all the allied powers, reinforced most strongly by the pressure of the associated power, the United States. Parliament was not opposed to the war, but its members realized full well the danger to republicanism in China if war powers were given to the military party. The *tuchuns* tried to bully them into passing the war bill and they refused. A deadlock resulted and President Li, seeking some way to break it, called in Chang Hsun, the chief of the militarists, as mediator!

Chang mediated by dissolving parliament! This he accomplished so easily that he thought the time ripe for another of his schemes and, before the world realized what he was up to, he proclaimed the restoration of the emperor. This was too much even for the military party and they attacked him at once. The reign of the restored emperor lasted but a few days, when he, and Chang

Hsun along with him, retired from active political life.

The military party was now in complete control and proceeded to form a new cabinet under the presidency of Feng Kuo Chang, the former vice-president, whom Li Yuan Hung had asked to take over the duties of the presidential office.

In return for the declaration of war upon Germany, the Powers recognized this new government and the cause of constitutionalism was finally suppressed in the north. A pretense was kept up by calling an assembly which was composed of the hand-picked delegates of the *tuchuns*. This bogus parliament met in August, 1918, and promptly elected Hsu Shih Ch'ang, an old mandarin who had served long under the Manchus, as president.

The leading chief of the military party was Tuan Chi Jui, who, with his followers, known as the Anfu Club, retained the supreme power during the war and until the summer of 1920. His relations with the militarist party in Japan were thought to be altogether too close, and this was urged against him by other *tuchuns* who envied him his power and the opportunities it brought him. Chief among these were Chang Tso Lin and Tsao Kun, military overlords respectively of the three Manchurian provinces and of the three provinces nearest to Peking. In July of 1920, these two combined forces to oust Tuan and their effort, in what was known as the "Tuchuns War," was successful. They formed a government to suit themselves and proceeded to have it turn over to them all the money in sight for the upkeep of their armies.

Unfortunately for their schemes, the Japanese source

of the money flow was dammed by the Consortium only a few months after they secured control of the outlets. This compelled a succession of overworked ministers of finance to draw the more heavily on other sources of supply to satisfy the avarice of their military masters. The result was that the Peking government hurtled on from penury to bankruptcy and then to utter financial ruin.

Meanwhile events of parallel significance were happening in south China. The southern story begins with the illegal dissolution of the parliament at Peking by the notorious Chang Hsun, in 1917. This spurred the exiled Sun Yat Sen into action. He induced the first squadron of the Chinese navy to go to Canton and proclaim the establishment there of constitutional government. The southern provinces, the ones that had risen against Yuan Shih Kai in 1913, at once gave a tentative adherence to the movement. Even the Kwangsi military leaders, who had been designated by Peking to rule Kwangtung (the province which includes Canton), thought best to profess their adherence. They had no idea, however, of furthering the cause of popular government. Their scheme was to use the movement to gain control of one or two more provinces.

The members of the dissolved parliament began to gather in Canton. Here they declared themselves the legal government of China and elected Sun Yat Sen Generalissimo of the forces of the republic. Sun sent out two expeditions against the northerners, one to Hunan and the other to Fukien. This latter was under the command of Chen Chiung Ming, a Cantonese who had worked with Dr. Sun from the beginning, a man of real

administrative ability. Both campaigns were successful. Hunan and southern Fukien were added to the southern territories. Meanwhile Hsu Shih Ch'ang had been elected president by the *tuchuns*' parliament at Peking and China thus acquired two governments. The struggle resolved itself into a trial of strength between the north and the south.

The foreign Powers urged peace negotiations between the contending parties. Delegates met at Shanghai. The southern delegates demanded that the Peking envoys publish to the world the agreements they had made with Japan. This the north refused to do, and the south, insisting, recalled its delegates.

While this was going on trouble was brewing at Canton. The Kwangsi group plotted with some members of the parliament to get control of the government. They finally put through a scheme to supersede Dr. Sun by a commission of seven, to be known as the Military Government of China. Sun was appointed a member of the commission but, believing such a form of government to be wholly impracticable in the existing circumstances, he withdrew and went to Shanghai. This left the Kwangsi crowd in control in Canton and they soon undertook to sell out to Peking. Upon discovering this the rest of the republican leaders left Canton and joined Sun Yat Sen at Shanghai.

The Peking militarists were now in control in the south as they were in the north. There was only one force which menaced in any way their absolute sway throughout the republic. That was the Cantonese army under Chen Chiung Ming in Fukien. They tried to starve out Chen by cutting off his supplies. He was

able, however, to support his army locally. The Kwangsi men determined to attack and destroy him. Chen did not wait for them. Instead he marched against Canton. The struggle was sharp, but by the end of 1920 Chen was completely successful and the Kwangsi army was fleeing across the border into their own province.

Chen wired at once to Dr. Sun and the other leaders at Shanghai. They returned to Canton and once more set up a parliamentary government. In May of 1921 an extraordinary session of the old parliament, which claimed by this time to have assembled a majority of its original membership, elected Sun Yat Sen "President of the Republic of China." Much ink and good white paper has been ruined in debate as to the relative legality of this election and that by virtue of which Hsu Shih Ch'ang held his office in Peking. That Hsu's election was illegal he himself admitted. There is room for argument in the case of Sun. Probably the latter would have the best of it by a very tenuous theory, but the chief significance of the matter for present purposes is that this was practically the last real concession to the desirability of finding any legal basis for the governments which have been so promiscuously erected in China.

Legal or illegal, there was still plenty of action in the neighborhood of the governmental mockery at Peking. Chang Tso Lin became more and more domineering and ignored the behests of his coadjutor Tsao Kun. The latter remained silent, but his lieutenant, Wu Pei Fu, denounced Chang's actions. Chang, in April of 1922, set forth to suppress this "upstart," but when the struggle was over, he found himself summarily ejected

from Peking and set down north of the great wall in his own bailiwick of Manchuria which, in a fit of high dudgeon, he proceeded to proclaim independent of Peking.

President Hsu resigned, and Li Yuan Hung was persuaded once more to take up the burden of the presidential office. Wu Pei Fu was now the commanding figure in the country, and high hopes were entertained of him by both Chinese and foreigners. But he refused to accept office in the new government and, thus escaping responsibility, proceeded to apply pressure to the administration from the outside. President Li reconvened the old parliament in Peking. Their three-year mandates, of revolutionary validity only in the first place, had now run for over ten years, and it was only by a severe stretch of courtesy that they could be considered as representing the country. Such doubts were strongly confirmed when they took up their political rôle once more. Tsao Kun, having sat on the fence during the recent fighting, was now at work with money in an effort to secure the empty honor of the presidency. Through General Feng Yu Hsiang, widely known as the "Christian General," he forced President Li to resign. That accomplished, Tsao Kun arranged to pay each member of parliament voting for him the sum of five thousand dollars (silver) and was elected as soon as the arrangements were complete.

The Tsao Kun crowd, or as it is known in China, the Chihli clique, were now supreme in all northern China except Manchuria, and they held several provinces south of the Yangtse. One that they had not been able to obtain was Chekiang, whose tuchun, a follower of

Tuan Chi Jui, retained his hold not only on the province but on the port of Shanghai in the neighboring province as well. The extensive opium-smuggling which goes on in the vicinity of this port furnishes a large revenue to the officials in control, who connive at it. The next move of the Chihli clique was therefore to secure control of Chekiang and Shanghai. Their efforts were successful, but only at the cost of bringing on another war with Chang Tso Lin. Wu Pei Fu hastened north to direct the operations against the Manchurian invader. While he was thus holding the front, in October of 1923, General Feng Yu Hsiang suddenly turned against him and occupied Peking in his rear. Wu escaped by sea and retired to the province of Honan, a beaten but not a broken man.

Feng formed a provisional government and his first act was to violate the imperial palace, eject the emperor, who fled to the Japanese Legation, remove much of the palace treasure, and abolish the agreement of 1912 which fixed the status of the imperial family. In consultation with Chang Tso Lin, Feng agreed to the return to power, or at least authority, of Tuan Chi Jui, the discredited Anfu leader who had been ejected for his Japanese affiliations in 1920. Tuan went to Peking and became provisional chief executive, an unexplained wave of modesty deterring him from assuming the title of president.

While these events had been transpiring in the north, Canton too had had its excitement. In the summer of 1922, Chen Chiung Ming had betrayed Dr. Sun and driven him from the city. The old revolutionary leader had a strange hold, however, and before many months

he was back again, and Chen himself was in exile. As efforts were made to get together a semblance of a government in Peking, it began to be evident that if Sun Yat Sen could not himself establish a government for all of China, it was equally impossible for anybody else to establish one over his opposition. The Peking leaders, therefore, invited him to the capital to confer with them on the situation. Sun accepted, but he was a changed man. The severe strain of the last years had told upon him physically, and the disappointments he had suffered had led him to seek solace from those ready dispensers of consolation, the Bolshevik agents in China. He died shortly after his arrival in Peking, the capital of those who treated him as an outlaw for the greater part of his life. His followers in Canton succeeded in re-erecting a government based upon his principles, welcomed the assistance of Soviet advisers and set about the task of organization and reconstruction.

Feng Yu Hsiang's betrayal of his master, Wu Pei Fu, rebounded to the immense advantage of Chang Tso Lin, who extended his control not only over Tientsin and Shantung but south to Nanking and Shanghai. It added little, however, to the security of Feng himself, who quickly realized that he was the only obstacle to Chang's control of all north China and that he was marked for early elimination. His position northwest of Peking, with only a weak grip upon the capital, was precarious. He had no great cities, no arsenals, no sources of food or other supplies. Without help he was doomed.

But aid was at hand. Russia would help in return for

his acceptance of Russian dictation. Feng was constrained to accept, and Mongolia was forthwith turned into a drill-ground for Russian-trained Mongolian troops to support him against the Manchurian dictator. All the regular traffic across the Gobi desert was suspended, and every available motor-car requisitioned to carry arms and munitions and other supplies from Russian territory to Feng's bases at Kalgan and Dolonnor. This Russian support put Feng in position to take full advantage of the discomfiture of Chang Tso Lin when the latter was outflanked in the south by forces friendly to Wu Pei Fu and compelled to withdraw to Tientsin. Feng advanced and, first having purchased the defection of one of Chang's most trusted generals, he turned Chang's defeat into something resembling a rout. It looked for a time as if Chang were done for and Feng would become master of north China.

But the resources of Chinese leaders and the peculiar intricacies of Chinese politics hold infinite surprises for a waiting world. At the very height of victory something seemed to go wrong in Feng's organization. He faltered and fell back. Chang, on the other hand, recovered himself. He captured and tortured to death the general who had accepted Feng's offers. He re-organized his forces and once more turned his face toward Peking. Most remarkable of all he made a truce with his old and bitter enemy, Wu Pei Fu, and the two joined forces against Feng. In the face of such a coalition Feng was powerless. He withdrew, first to Nankow, then to Kalgan, and then into northern Kansu and southern Mongolia. Here he quartered his Kuomin-

chun—or National Army—and departed for Moscow to await developments.

This victory restored Wu Pei Fu to some degree of eminence. Hardly had it been won, however, when he learned that his position was threatened in his own territory. The Cantonese, because of Russian advice or in spite of it, had succeeded in so organizing their government that their attention could be turned once more to affairs in other parts of the country. They had also developed an able military leader in General Chiang Kai Shek. He had been pressing northward into Hunan for some time without seriously disturbing the situation in Hupeh and the other provinces farther north which acknowledged the leadership of Wu. Suddenly, in August of 1926, the Cantonese forces began a real invasion of Wu's territory. They took Changsha, the capital of Hunan, and pressed on to the Yangtse, capturing the great cities of Hankow, Hanyang and, after a desperate four weeks' siege, Wuchang.

All of these victories and defeats advanced not an iota the political situation. When Feng seized Peking he placed Tsao Kun under guard and recalled Tuan Chi Jui. When Chang and Wu drove Feng out of the capital, they deposed Tuan and released Tsao. But they did not restore Tsao to presidential honors, and since that time they have not been able to come near enough to an agreement on a division of offices and spoils to erect even the semblance of a government for the republic. The effect of this remarkable condition on the country seems to be practically nil. It gets along as well, or as badly, as it did when there were officials in all of the numerous offices of the Chinese capital.

If the story of the political vicissitudes has been sketched with some detail, it is not because those details in themselves are important. What is of real significance is what is not there. The great lack in the whole story is the absence of any evidence of an aptitude for national organization. We should not of course expect the uncouth millions of common people, who have never had in all their lives or in all their traditions the slightest connection with national affairs, to step forward and save the country. But the paucity of men of brains and education who have come forward in the crisis is discouraging. And the microscopic effect which those who have come forward have had, is even more so.

It is quite to be expected that under these circumstances the question should be raised as to the ability of the Chinese to organize a national state. They never have done so. The popular participation in national affairs has been limited to an upheaval every few decades or centuries which destroyed the existing régime. Once that negative task was accomplished, popular participation ceased. Creative ability of a political order has never manifested itself. After a period of confusion a new dynasty was established either by a native chieftain or frequently by an invader. And a new cycle began.

The revolution of 1911 has run true to form. It swept away the tottering Manchu dynasty and, despite the paper constitutions and laws which emanate from Peking, no government has taken its place. The imposture which masquerades as such, illegitimate offspring of a promiscuous militarism, has none of the qualities which constitute a state. The real political

entities in China to-day are a congeries of shifting principalities held neither together nor apart by any political principle or practice. They are the appurtenances of rival military barons whose sole aim is the acquisition of power and office and the increased opportunities for accumulating wealth which they bestow upon the holder. China as a united nation exists only in the minds of her youthful patriots and in the recognition of foreign Powers.

China is at present in its recurrent period of chaos following the downfall of its dynasties. If history is allowed once more to repeat itself, a new despotism will arise at the appointed time and the republic will pass into the limbo of forgotten things. The despotism may be of native origin or it may take the form of rule by an outside Power or Powers—in short, a colonial government by some more highly organized nation or nations.

It is more probable that the impact of the Occident, the importation of Western ideas and methods, and their reaction upon the ancient Chinese forms, will shape a new China. The progress of industrialism, the social changes now taking place, and the assimilation of new ideas are all factors contributing to the reshaping of China. They too may give us some indication of what its final form will be.

VIII

CHINA CATCHES UP WITH THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

CHINA'S economy is essentially agricultural and essentially mediæval. Eighty-five per cent of the Chinese are engaged in agriculture, and the efforts of eighty per cent are required to supply the nation with food. Before the advent of the foreigner this economy was nicely balanced. Production just sufficed for consumption and each individual was fairly sure of a living, albeit an extremely meager one.

The people lived in innumerable villages, frequently walled for protection against marauders, each village the home of one, two, or half a dozen families. These families farmed, and in general owned the surrounding fields. They worked and lived as family groups. What the family produced the family consumed. So no individual was ever without sustenance and support. If he was ill he still shared in the family income, and the widow and the orphan were likewise cared for. By this coöperative effort in the families, the population managed a fair degree of economic security.

Here and there among these villages were towns, the home of the wealthier families, the gentry, those who owned and leased land to tenant farmers. In these towns were to be found the beginnings of a primitive industry. Here were the artisans and the artificers, the

carpenters and the blacksmiths, the devotees of the various crafts which demanded something more than the winter evenings of the farm village for their pursuit. These artisans catered to an almost exactly measurable demand. They could tell in advance how many articles of their manufacture would be needed in their district during the coming year. It had always been the same, why should it be different next year? They could procure their material and plan their labors accordingly. And they could almost cast up their accounts at the beginning of the year and tell how much they would earn by the end. Theirs too was a balanced economy.

Out of these innumerable villages and the smaller number of towns there arose a certain surplus which could be spared for purposes of outside trade. The amount was small for any district. Few crops were raised for sale and few industries were conducted with more than the local market in mind. Yet there was a small trading surplus and this gravitated to certain of the larger towns which thus became commercial centers. These cities were often the seats of the provincial governments as well, and in them centered the more active life of China. Here were more elaborate industries, still handicrafts to be sure, but on a larger scale, with apprentices and journeymen serving under the masters. Here were bankers and money-changers. Here were merchants of wide interests. Here were the headquarters of the guilds, the ever-present associations which in the larger world of commerce and trade took the place of the family in the smaller world of village agriculture. And below all this multitude of officials

and bankers, traders, and artisans was another multitude—the coolies—the pack-horses of Chinese civilization, the carriers, the boatmen, the men who sold their muscles with no extra charge for the meager brain-power that sometimes went with them. Yet even these were fairly balanced against the demand. For each coolie was a member of a family somewhere in the nearby villages. When the demand in the city offered him a greater return than he could expect on the farm, he went to the city. He worked as long as it was worth his while. When work fell off, he could return to the village, and once more take his place on the farm and in the family.

The self-sufficiency of this mediæval economy was evident at another point. While it is a bit broad to say that the Chinese have the best food in the world, rice, and the best clothing, cotton, silk and fur, and therefore need nothing from the outside world, yet there is a large measure of truth in it. The soil of the country furnishes material for the mud-huts of the north as the bamboo and wattles furnish the homes of the south. Where rice is a luxury, wheat, millet, and sorghum are to be had. Cotton, silk, and furs are available where these can be used. The Chinese people can get along very well without any help from the lands beyond their borders. They could probably come nearer to establishing an entirely independent economy than any civilized people in the world to-day. Herein we may look for some explanation of the disparity between the actual foreign trade of China and the vision of a market of four hundred million buyers.

That vision, however, was as much a fact in the Occi-

dental world as was self-sufficiency in the Chinese world. The traders of the West knocked repeatedly at the door. They offered a great variety of wares collected from all corners of the world. Finally they found something that interested the Chinese. It was cotton-yarn. Here was something they knew and used and which the trader offered them more cheaply than they could get it at home. This was the beginning of legitimate trade, paralleling the introduction of the reprehensible traffic in opium.

These two items, cotton and opium, served to breach the walls of Chinese self-satisfaction and exclusion, and other articles followed through. Just how much of the resistance to foreign trade was due to official self-seeking, how much to xenophobia, and how much to an instinctive realization of the dangers to the established economy of China it brought in its train, would be difficult to determine. Yet each new-fangled contraption from the West when it was introduced into China, upset some portion of the delicate balance between production and consumption, between supply and demand, which had been the chief characteristic of the old Chinese economy. The first railroad, for example, was built between Shanghai and Woosung. No sooner was it placed in operation than the porters, carters, wheelbarrow men, and others dependent upon the old carrying service between these two points, found their occupation and their livelihood gone. With starvation staring them in the face, they rose in the strength of desperation and made things so uncomfortable for the officials that they found the money to buy the railroad, lock, stock and barrel; and they tore up the rails and

shipped the whole affair over to Formosa. No different in motive are the frequent attacks upon foreign steamers in the upper reaches of the Yangtse River. For centuries the trackers have made their living towing the junks against the swift current. It is estimated that three million people were dependent upon these trackers for a livelihood. The steamers that breast this current under steam power bring doubt and despair to the trackers who, unaccustomed to the amenities of modern competition, attempt to save their livelihood by driving out the steamers. And it is only within the last few years that street-cars could be operated in the streets of Peking, because of the opposition of the 28,000 rickshaw pullers who earn their daily bread by transporting Peking's people from one point in their city to another.

The industrial revolution has played havoc with the economic status of the masses in every country which it has reached. Its trail of suffering in England is familiar to all of us. But in China its consequences have been particularly severe in proportion to the slight extent to which it has penetrated into the life of the country. When England established a factory, many people were thrown out of work; but the factory absorbed the labor of many of them, and a world-wide market soon permitted an expansion which gave employment to the remainder. But in China the main upheaval has not come from the establishment of factories or other enterprises. It has come from the sudden influx of machine-made goods which can be sold cheaper than the old hand-made article. The artisans are deprived of their market and there is no factory to which they can go for employment. They are stranded on a rock in a fast-

rising tide of deadly competition. It is only when the foreigner discovers that he can erect a factory in a Chinese treaty-port and produce the same goods cheaper than he can in his own country that the factory comes to offer work to a fraction of those who have survived the starvation period.

The Chinese artisans have received a measure of protection because of the high cost of transportation. In a country where roads in the Western sense were unknown, goods were transported in carts or wheelbarrows or on the backs of man or beast. The cost of such transportation runs as high as twenty to fifty cents per ton-mile, an effective barrier against any deep penetration of foreign-made goods. But the same foreigners who had goods to sell secured concessions to build railways across the country and began to run steamers up its rivers, so that this barrier of transportation expense began to break down. To be sure these instruments of industrialism bring new activities into the country, but they cause severe stresses and strains during the period of adjustment. The opposition from the Chinese who are thrown out of economic balance is pitted against the desire of the foreign capitalists to make profits out of an almost ideal situation. Here is a country already built up, with an enormous traffic in both persons and goods waiting to be carried. There is no long and expensive pioneering period to go through. A railway can pay profits almost from the day it is opened. Operating expenses are hardly thirty per cent of earnings. The pressure of capital for such opportunities is great. Yet the counter-pressure is also great. The result is that in a country one-third again as large as the United States,

the railroads total less than eight thousand miles in length, while the United States has two hundred and fifty thousand miles.

The difficulties of the Chinese do not end with the introduction of cheaper goods and cheaper transportation. The coming of railways and steamers also serves to bring a greater and greater area of China into contact with the world market. Prices in that market for food-stuffs and raw materials are frequently higher than in China. Thus there ensues a drawing off of these commodities with a consequent rise in the price level which again disturbs the economic balance in China. The artisan in the interior of the country, even the one who is fortunate enough not to have to meet the competition of foreign machine-made goods, finds the cost of his materials and the cost of his living mounting while machine competition may be lurking just around the corner to take advantage of any price increases he may attempt to enforce.

The impact of the industrial revolution on the delicately balanced economy of China has produced conditions which we find it difficult to comprehend in this country. The old order kept the population just above the starvation line, but the coming of the industrial age has sunk a vast proportion of the people below it. It is estimated that thirty million Chinese are continually attempting to sustain life on less than the minimum required for subsistence. Thousands of these die daily; yet it is only when some great catastrophe such as a flood or a drought concentrates millions of starving in one area that we hear of a famine in China and are asked to contribute to rescue work. Of the famine that

is present every day we hear little; and the three million or more that die each year of starvation, due to lack of adjustment to changing conditions, are accepted as representing the normal mortality of the Chinese people.

For all of these ills it is quite natural that the Chinese should blame the foreigner. It is the foreigner who builds the railroads, who runs the ships, who sells the machine-made products, and who pays higher prices for the raw materials and the foodstuffs. Everywhere the foreigner is the active and visible agent of the industrial revolution. What more natural than that the Chinese villager in his ignorance should ascribe his desperate condition to the enterprises of these foreigners? Surely before the foreigner came, he had none of these difficulties. What an excellent opportunity for the political agitator, who sees his own advantage in rousing the anger of his people against the foreigner, to denounce the Powers, their treaties, their concessions, and all their works as things of evil, as the bane of China, and to urge the purging of the land from the malign influence.

Yet the connection of the foreigner with China's difficulties is largely fortuitous. Without accepting all of the implications of economic determinism, we may perceive the manner in which economic forces make their relentless way. China has simply been overtaken by the industrial revolution which is working in every other part of the globe as well as in the Flowery Kingdom. Perhaps we should say China has caught up with that revolution. At any rate this industrial Frankenstein, call it blessing or blight according to your

philosophy, has begun operations in China and if China can tame him, she will be the first country in the world to accomplish the task. It happens that the foreigners, because of their greater activity and enterprise and their ready capital have been the instruments of the revolution, but it would have moved on just as relentlessly without them. There is nothing the foreigners are doing in China to-day which the Chinese would not do to-morrow. There is nothing the foreigners are doing which the Chinese are not doing to-day. The foreigners have built railways; so have the Chinese. The foreigners have erected factories; so have the Chinese. The foreigners have engaged in importing and exporting; so have the Chinese.

If all of the foreigners were to be miraculously removed from China at one wave of a magic wand, there would be no change for the better so far as the economic conditions of the Chinese people are concerned. The process of industrialization would go on just the same. Possibly it would move a bit more slowly because of the shortage of native capital and the difficulty of borrowing foreign capital without foreign supervision, but it would go on just as surely, just as uncompromisingly as it does now. The slowing down of the process under such circumstances would be to the detriment of the Chinese, for they will not achieve the security of an economic balance again until the industrialization process is well advanced. For the advancing of this process the great need is capital and that capital must come from abroad. It will come less and less easily as anti-foreign feeling is fostered in China. The agitators of Young China, playing upon the antagonism toward

foreigners for their own ends, are making it more difficult to improve the very conditions they are quick to ascribe to foreign activity.

While an intensification of the process of industrialization would hasten the day when the balance would be restored, it would also increase the severity of the shock of the old system. The transformation would be more painful but it would be more quickly over. It has proceeded very leisurely so far. The extremely small railway mileage has already been mentioned. Other industries have been as backward. The number of power-driven cotton spindles in China, for example, did not reach a million until 1915. Japan had passed that point twenty years earlier and India forty years earlier. In 1924 there were only one hundred and fifteen cotton mills in China with a total of about three million spindles. Japan, with one-eighth the population, has some two hundred mills and over four million spindles. The development of the other industries is on substantially the same scale as the cotton industry. The consumption of iron and steel in China affords another interesting measure of the extent of its industrialization. The United States uses one hundred and eighty times as much iron and steel per capita as China; England and Germany about a hundred times as much; Japan ten times as much; and the world as a whole thirty times as much.

There are no exact figures for the number of laborers working under the factory system, but the total is a few hundred thousand at most. Those in Shanghai, the greatest industrial center and the place where the highest wages are paid, receive fifteen cents to a dollar

(gold) a day. While the cost of living is fifty to a hundred per cent higher than in 1912, it is still possible to feed coolies in lots of ten at two dollars (gold) each per month. The workers are drawn from the surrounding villages just as they were in the pre-industrial days. They come because they can get more for their work in the factories than they can at home. As soon as this condition ceases, they return to the villages and again take their places in the family economy. While the conditions are hard and growing harder every year, there is still enough resilience in the family system to take up most of the slack. Nevertheless a definitive breaking away from the family system is perceptible. A regular working class is slowly forming in the cities, a class made up of whole families who have definitely broken from the soil, the beginnings of a proletariat.

Here again is a class peculiarly susceptible to incitation against the foreigner. The foreigners own and operate many of the mills, and labor disputes afford an opportunity for agitators to turn the antagonism against the employer into hostility against the foreigner. This was precisely what happened in May of 1925. A labor dispute at a Japanese mill had resulted in a riot and the death of a Chinese rioter at the hands of a Japanese guard. The students arranged the demonstration of May 30 as a protest; and their diatribes were aimed, not at employers as such, but at the foreigners as murderers. What under normal circumstances would have been a labor outbreak became under the conditions prevailing in China, an anti-foreign demonstration. When the demonstrators clashed with the foreign-officered police in the International Settlement of

Shanghai and attempted to disarm them, the police fired and six of the student leaders were killed. We have already seen how this incident was made the occasion of a widespread movement against the foreigners in general and the British in particular. It led almost directly to the renewal of the demands of the Chinese for tariff autonomy, the abolition of extraterritoriality, and the surrender of the foreign concessions.

What effect would tariff autonomy have upon the industrialization of China? This question is somewhat closely bound up with others. What schedules will the Chinese establish? Will extraterritoriality be abolished at the same time? Will the foreign residential concessions be discontinued? Each of these matters, alone and in combination with the others, will have its effect upon the industrialization of China.

Suppose for a moment that a protective tariff would enable Chinese industries to raise their prices, increase their production, add to their profits, and speed up their development. A primary requisite would be additional capital. This capital is not available in China, and it would take the best part of a century to bring China to the desired degree of industrialization if the new capital had to be created out of the process itself. The only other source of capital for industrialization purposes is in foreign countries. Will not such capital be available to China if adequate profits can be expected? If the foreign capitalist can build his factory in a foreign settlement where he can receive from his government protection against military adventurers, and if the capitalist can have the management of his plant in the hands of foreign managers whom he trusts, such capital

— will be available. It is so now, in fact. But take away from the foreigner the concession areas, ask him to build his factory in a district ruled by Chinese mandarins appointed by the local *tuchun*, ask his foreign managers and superintendents to bring their families and live in Chinese towns instead of in foreign settlements, and ask them to give up the protection of extraterritoriality. I fear the amount of foreign capital that would come in under these circumstances would be hardly sufficient to hasten appreciably the industrialization of China.

It is all very well for the Young Chinese, who, unlike the Young Japanese of an earlier day, have for the most part chosen politics instead of economics as their medium of expression, to say: "Very well, we'll get along without foreign capital and foreign managers. China can stand on her own feet!" But pomposity will not do the trick. China cannot stand on her own feet economically. She can continue to lie on her back as she is now, but her people must suffer accordingly. China's crying need during her era of industrialization is new capital; and, like every other nation with similar needs, she must borrow capital on the terms imposed by those who have it. Nor need there be any humiliation in that position. European capital built most of the railways in the United States. It was only a dozen years ago that the United States began to be a lending instead of a borrowing nation. A people just entering the industrial period must borrow from those long adjusted to it, and China can be no exception to this rule.

"Yes," answer the Chinese students, "America borrowed money from Europe, but it was handled by American companies with American managers." So it

was, and frequently with little credit to our national honesty. Perhaps that experience is one reason why China cannot borrow on the same terms. But there is another phase of the question. Large enterprises demand the corporate form of organization, and the Chinese morality has not yet adapted itself to corporate management. In the handling of his family affairs and his individual business transactions, the Chinese is one of the most honest men in the world. Put him in public office where he handles large sums of public money, however, and his ability to transfer that money to his own pockets is prodigious. His loyalty is not to the country, not to the principle of honesty, and in this case honesty is not a remunerative policy. His chief concern, his primary duty, is to accumulate for his family. In his mind the right of his family to monies on which he can lay his hand is far superior to the right of any vague abstraction such as the public, or the country. Such peculations are not condemned by the Chinese. On the contrary they are the basis of many of the large fortunes of the country. The owners of these fortunes are among the great men of the land and are honored as such.

Apply this same moral concept to the corporation and it at once becomes evident why this form of business organization has not been widely adopted in China and why the foreigner capitalist will not turn his money over to the tender care of Chinese managers. When a Chinese takes office in a corporation, his first duty is to find remunerative jobs for every member of his extensive family who is not better provided for elsewhere. Nepotism is a virtue, not a vice, in China. And when

nepotism has done its worst—or its best—we have a whole clan legitimately and illegitimately absorbing the funds of the corporation, a process which even the wealthiest of them cannot long withstand.

With conditions in China as they are, then, it is apparent that the greatest need of the country is additional capital for industrial development. This capital must be obtained from abroad. It will not be available except under a large measure of foreign control. This control must be exercised in such a way as to secure to the foreigner the advantages he now enjoys in the residential concessions or foreign settlements, and the protection he receives from extraterritoriality. China may squirm and fret as she will. She may even be successful in making it intolerable for the foreigner to live within her borders. But any such success will be a boomerang which will injure the Chinese more than it can ever injure the foreigner. In direct proportion as China restricts the activities of foreigners she retards her own development through, what is of necessity, one of the most difficult periods for her people in all their history. The success of the Young China enthusiasts in limiting foreign activity in the economic field will be purchased at the high price of further suffering on the part of the masses of the Chinese people. This result may swing the pendulum to the other extreme in time; and even the Chinese leaders may be forced to recognize the truth of the dictum of Dean Frederic E. Lee, one of the closest students of China's economic conditions: "Not less but more foreign assistance and control will be necessary if China is speedily to extricate herself from the political and financial chaos in which

she now finds herself." This dictum receives the tacit approval of President Goodnow, who has had the opportunity to study the question intimately from the political side.

The probable extent of the industrial development of China cannot be exactly determined. The myth fathered by Richthofen that China possesses inexhaustible stores of coal and iron has now been exploded. China's reserves of these minerals, the essentials of any extensive industrial development, have been measured. The result does not indicate that China is to become one of the great manufacturing countries of the world. The whole available iron ore reserve of China is about one twenty-fifth of that of the United States. America has manufactured into iron and steel in the last ten years more ore than the whole reserve of China. Larger supplies of coal are to be found in China, but much of it is unfit for coking, and still more is too remotely located for commercial development. While these quantities are not large enough ever to make China a serious competitor as a manufacturing nation in the world market, they might be sufficient to enable her to go far toward supplying her own needs for manufactured goods. They will not even do that, however, until they are properly developed. And they cannot be developed by political slogans. Anti-foreignism is a poor crutch when foreign help is imperative. If her leaders will realize that the main cause of China's ills is not foreign domination, but the industrial revolution, and will devote themselves as earnestly to meeting that as they have to the far less serious political encroachments of the foreigners, they

will the sooner lead China once more into the light. They will find too that when they have met the real issue and won, they will have no more difficulty than had Japan in ridding themselves of any unjustifiable invasion of China's rights or infringement of China's sovereignty by other Powers or their nationals.

IX

UNDERMINING THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

AS the family is the natural economic unit in China, so it is the established social unit. It is not easy for the average American or Englishman, soaked in our highly individualistic culture, fully to comprehend the significance of the family as a unit in China or Japan. Here one thinks in terms of self, as an individual; there one thinks in terms of the group, of the self as a part of a larger unit, of the family. The gain of one is the gain of the family; the loss of one is the loss of the family. Honor to the individual is honor to the family; and the shame, even the responsibility, for wrong done by the individual, is the shame and the responsibility of the family. The debt of the individual is the debt of the family; the obligation of the father is the liability of the son. This vicarious assumption of responsibility extends even to criminal liability. In the full measure of punishment, whole families have been banished or even put to death to atone for the offense of a single member.

Nor is the family confined to father, mother, and minor children as we are apt to think of it. It embraces all of the living kin unto the most distant degrees. It frequently includes adopted sons and daughters, and wives of sons are counted in the husband's family. The family in China approaches our idea of the clan or the

gens rather than the limited family group of Anglo-Saxon lands. Frequently these oversize families live in the same establishment, a residence consisting of court after court fairly overflowing with children and mothers and fathers. When the family passes the capacity of such a residence, others are built adjoining, and in time a village appears. Thus through the centuries have been built up the uncounted villages of China, each sheltering one, two, or half a dozen families or clans.

The headship of the family is supposedly held by the eldest brother and frequently this is the actual fact. By a process which is characteristic of China, however, some other member often is recognized as the family head. He is not chosen by any election. He holds no credentials of office. By superior ability or sheer dominance he wins the recognition of juniors and seniors alike and takes over the direction of the family affairs. It is a process of gravitation of responsibility to those best able to bear it, and is accepted and acquiesced in by all concerned for the very practical reason that it works.

Where there is but one clan in a village the head of the clan is also the head of the village, in fact there is no distinction between the two. Where there are several families, however, in a single village, the affairs of the village are supervised by the various family heads, who are known as the "elders," a term denoting respect as well as age. Among these also the leadership gravitates to the one best able to carry its responsibilities, and the one so selected represents the village in all its relations with the governmental authorities. All negotiations are carried on by him and he is in a measure

responsible for the proper conduct of the village and all its people. When he fails, the respect, authority and responsibility which have been his gravitate to some other without formality of recall or ceremony of election.

Thus within the purview of the family and its natural extension, the village, the Chinese have perfected a system of government which, with a minimum of machinery and regulation, provides a most efficient instrument of administration in the hands of the men best able to manage it. If the same measure of efficiency could be extended to the larger spheres of province and nation, the Chinese would not be in their present governmental chaos. But the system is limited by its very nature to the smaller units. It revolves around the idea of family. In larger spheres the sense of family is lost and there is no parallel moral obligation to the more comprehensive constituency. Hence the break in the character of public service the moment it passes out of the family sphere. Hence the striking contrast in what the West calls honesty between the Chinese conduct of individual or family affairs and the conduct of public or corporate affairs.

The inner meaning which gives vitality to the family group is its religious function. The respect accorded the head of the family during his life is sublimated after his death into a form of adoration. The worship of his revered spirit becomes a primary duty for the living members of the family. This worship is conducted by the new head of the family, presumptively the eldest surviving son of the recently deceased parent. Not only must this son perform the devotional ceremonies to his

deceased father, but he must take over the worship of all of his forbears. They not only typify the family and offer it guidance and protection, but they are the family and their worship is the highest duty known to the Chinese.

Custom requires that this ancestor-worship be conducted by a male descendant. Females are utterly disqualified. The obligation which, after the worship itself, rests most heavily upon a Chinese is the procreation of male progeny. No Chinese can attain to the full glory of manhood until he has a son. Long before he is called upon to conduct the ceremonies of ancestor-worship, his family expect him to enter the marital state and to assume the obligations of parenthood. His marriage is a family matter. Chinese society does not bring young men and women together in social intercourse, so there is no opportunity for natural mating. When the time comes for the young man to marry, it is the family that undertakes to find a bride for him. With the help of marriage-brokers all of the available material is investigated and a young woman of proper age, suitable family connections, and passing feminine qualities is selected for him. He is allowed no personal choice in the matter, but is expected to acquiesce without question in the family decision. In fact he may never see the chosen one until the actual ceremony of marriage. The relationship between husband and wife, then, is in no sense a personal one. It is purely a social relationship and its primary purpose is the begetting of male children. How far-reaching is the importance of this factor is evidenced by the fact that, if no male child blesses the union within a reasonable time, a concubine

is brought in to produce the child, who then becomes the son of the legitimate wife. The social and moral implications of this system are vastly interesting, but their discussion here would take us too far afield. For our present purpose the important fact is the insistence of Chinese society upon the existence of male descendants.

This demand for boys has a particular bearing upon the economic and political conditions of China. Its consequences would not be serious if it was satisfied with the arrival of one son. But, without any knowledge of the statistics of infant mortality, long and bitter experience has taught the Chinese that the chance of the first-born male's survival to maturity is between one in five and one in ten. One son therefore is but a beginning. If one would be assured of a living male descendant to carry on the family worship, one should have ten sons. In fact, it is just as well not to set a limit but to have as many as possible! Daughters of course do not count, but they come as often as sons and the house rapidly fills up with the numerous members of the oncoming generation.

So firmly imbedded in the Chinese mind is the duty to ancestors that the economic and social consequences of this reckless procreation seem never to have been borne in upon it. The unlimited multiplication of the number of mouths to be fed and the loss of many children before they can possibly reach years of productivity constitute a drain upon the resources of the family and in the aggregate upon the resources of the nation, that is in no small measure responsible for the present deplorable state of the Chinese people. The

birth-rate of the country is close to the human maximum not only because it is free from any of the usual inhibitions, but also because the religious and social tenets of the people give an additional impulse to the primordial male urge to procreate.

Such procreative recklessness, however, has its penalties. Whatever havoc modern statisticians have been able to raise with the mathematical formula in which Malthus stated his law of population, they have not been able to upset his main tenet that population tends to outrun the food supply. If a close study of the statistical evidence from various parts of the world leaves doubt in the mind of the student, let him go to China and look about him. There he will see the laws of Malthus in actual operation. There a birth-rate free from all limitation has produced and is to-day producing the precise effects which that realistic philosopher insisted that it would. The increase in population has been so rapid that it has far outstripped the available food-supply; and thirty million or more Chinese, nearly ten per cent of the population, are fighting a losing battle below the line of minimum nourishment, are living in a state of semi-starvation.

In the train of this excessive population increase come the four positive checks to population which Malthus mentioned, disease, war, plague, and famine. The prevalence of disease among the lower classes in China is obvious to any observer. So common is it that Professor Ross suggests that it has evolved a special resistance among the Chinese, that the weaker individuals die off, and that those that remain are those specially adapted to survive under sanitary conditions which

would spell death to the average Occidental. The widespread militarism of China with its million and a half of men under arms, a condition quite inconsistent with the pacific repute of the Chinese, is but the positive check of war in operation. The ease with which these so-called soldiers transform themselves into bandits when they suffer defeat, or when their pay is stopped, is well known. As soldiers or as bandits their chief occupation is to prey upon the country. There is no legitimate means of livelihood open to them. Fortune has placed arms in their hands and these arms they use to secure themselves a living, even though this be at the cost of violent death or starvation for those whom they despoil. Plague in the form of cholera or influenza sweeps across the country with startling frequency and its toll is fearful. But famine is the most effective of all the checks. It stalks abroad through the length and breadth of the land. Now and again some great catastrophe such as a flood or drought increases the number of its victims in one locality and the outer world hears of "a famine" in China. But "the famine" is existent in China every day. No sun goes down but marks the passing of thousands dead from starvation. The numbers of the people must be cut down and if disease, war, and plague are not sufficient, famine may be depended upon to fill up the toll.

The Chinese accept all of this with philosophical calm. They have become accustomed to it and look upon it as the natural means of preserving a proper balance between numbers and food. Famine relief on any adequate scale and of wide application is a product of foreign origin. Some mandarins have taken it up

because it offers the opportunity to handle additional funds, but the idea and, in most cases, the execution are foreign. To the Occidental the prevalence of these conditions is unbearable. The sight of innumerable dead and dying revolts him. He must rush help to the suffering and food to the starving. He must bring medical aid to the sick and save lives where lives can be saved. So we have the country dotted with foreign hospitals and dispensaries, with devoted doctors and nurses serving in exile a strange people. So we have elaborate organizations for the expenditure of millions of dollars subscribed by the generosity of America and other countries. Much and excellent work is done in extending aid to the stricken Chinese.

Yet if ever a business labored under the curse of Sisyphus it is this of famine relief. In a country so overcrowded that one man in every ten is barely holding on to life with the last ounce of his strength, the problem is desperate. A rise of only a fraction of a copper in the price of food means that hundreds of thousands more must fail in the effort to sustain life. Picking up one man who has fallen, restoring him to health and strength and turning him loose once more to compete with his fellows, means that some other must go down. One life is saved, but it is at the expense of another and the net result is nil. Sending money to the country to buy food for the starving operates in the same way. It puts sustenance into the mouths of those relieved, but the inevitable rise in prices puts as many more below the starvation line. We save those in sight and condemn those beyond our view. China is like a huge raft crowded far beyond its capacity with ship-wrecked human beings.

Many are swimming about in the water, but for each one pulled aboard on one side some one else is pushed off on the other side. The raft will hold no more. The only real famine relief in China would be to bring in from the outside the food necessary to sustain those at present starving, not only for this year, but for the rest of what would then be their natural lives. We should thus relieve the present surplus, but long before they had passed from the scene another generation's recruits to the ranks of the helpless would be crying for relief, and we should in turn have to add them to our number of dependents. Famine relief as such is a wholly inadequate attack upon the problem.

In expressing this view I have been charged with pessimism. But I see no good to be accomplished by blinking the facts of the problem. Only by facing them shall we come to a valid solution, a richer source of optimism perhaps than self-deception. This valid solution has two inherent essentials. The first is the development of China industrially. This has been dwelt upon at some length in the last chapter. The Chinese economic machine must be so improved and modernized that it will be able to carry the load of the Chinese population. We must not only enlarge the over-crowded raft, we must convert it into a ship which, instead of drifting helplessly at the mercy of wind and wave, can be steered to a desired port. The necessity of securing help from outside for this purpose has already been emphasized. It is as obvious in the case of China's need for industrialization as it is in the case of the drifting raft. This need has been clearly recognized and acted upon by the foreign executives of famine-relief organ-

izations. Wherever funds are available, they are devoted to flood-prevention, river-conservancy, road-building and even to farm loans, that China's economic structure may be strengthened.

It will work only a temporary alleviation, however, to bring about the industrialization of China if the load to be placed upon the ship is to be increased so rapidly that by the time it is completed, it will be as sadly overloaded as the raft. In other words, China's efforts for salvation must include an abandonment of the present practice of unlimited sexual indulgence and the reckless overproduction of human lives. This aspect of the question has rarely been brought home to the Chinese by their self-appointed Western tutors. So thoroughly has our civilization been imbued with the injunctions of the Catholic Church and of the militaristic governments of Europe that even Protestant sects are reluctant to recognize the importance of this question in our own countries. In China, where emphasis upon it is of vital necessity, there is all too little attempt to make it clear. Missions and mission hospitals have striven nobly to bring the blessings of modern medicine to the Chinese, but the teaching of the only social precept which would make it a permanent gain has been frowned upon as it still is in the United States.

The difficulties of introducing the idea of limitation of births into China are enormous. It runs counter to all the religious and social practice of the people. And yet it involves no attack upon the main citadel of Chinese family life, ancestor-worship. It is hardly as serious an assault as that made by the preaching of Christianity. For the main desideratum of ancestor-worship is not a

plenitude of offspring, but the assurance of a male heir. If the Chinese can once be got to see the fact that fewer children would increase the survival value of each, the way is open. That they can be got to see this I can testify from my own experience with Chinese students. After several lectures on the principles of population, the subject has been discussed in classes of mature students and they have quickly argued themselves into the advocacy of a lower birth-rate as a means of improving conditions in China.

The inroads already made upon the stubbornly resisting social patterns in China show that they can be changed, even though slowly. The first and most direct assault from the Occident was made by the Christian missionaries. The Christian doctrine is difficult to harmonize with the theory and practice of the essential principles of Chinese family life. It negatives ancestor-worship and it substitutes individualism for the family ideal. The resistance of the native institutions has been most stubborn and the progress of Christianity almost pitifully small from the point of view of numbers. The entire Christian community of China, Catholic and Protestant combined, numbers well under three million souls, less than three-fourths of one per cent of the population. Not a prodigious result after a century and a quarter of labor. Yet the influence of these labors has been perceptible in far wider circles than the size of the actual Christian community would indicate. I do not accept at its face value the claim of some missionaries that for every Christian convert many are led to Christian points of view and Christian attitudes. I doubt if this would greatly extend the circle of the Christian

community if understood in the way that the missionaries would have it; namely, that the good influence of Christianity has spread farther than conversion and that many Chinese have been led to better and more spiritual lives by their contacts with foreign and native Christians. But there is good reason for believing that what may be called the destructive effects of Christianity have been much more widespread. Its emphasis upon individualism has gone far to shatter the respect for parental authority among the members of the younger generation. Its denial of the validity of ancestor-worship has done much to break down the moral restraints among these same young people. This destructive work is a necessary preliminary to any change of mental outlook and it is only to be regretted that the constructive side has not been equally successful.

Even more powerful than Christian teaching in its tendency to break down the restraints of the old Chinese morality is the education of Chinese students in Occidental schools in China and the sending of students to American and European universities. Here again they come into contact with a rampant individualism, the acceptance of which puts life upon a wholly new basis. They see and associate with young people who reckon naught of duties to ancestors or duties to much of anything else for that matter. The respect of these ebullient American youths for their parents rests upon them lightly. The freedom of action enjoyed by both sexes is a revelation to the Chinese, especially the free play allowed the mating instinct. Once comprehended, even vicariously, freedom in this regard is not readily sur-

rendered. Young China resolves to put up no more with wives chosen through the negotiations of their elders, but to choose their own mates from among those whose experiences are similar to their own.

The carrying out of this resolve to exercise their own choice in marital matters strikes at the very root of the whole system of family governance. If the young man throws off the parental guidance in the selection of his wife and these two, imbued with the Western conception of family life, establish a separate household, there is little hope of the reassertion of parental authority in any other field. For better or for worse Young China has freed itself from the leading strings of its elders. Conservatism is dethroned and the enthusiasm of youth is to enjoy a freedom hitherto unknown in the annals of China.

The actual number of students thus affected is a handful in comparison with the total of the Chinese population. But circumstances have conspired to give them a weight and an influence magnified out of all proportion to either their numbers or their importance. In the first place they are "scholars," and Chinese tradition ascribes the highest respect to the scholar. He is not only the guide and adviser of all who have the honor to know him, but as we have seen, it was from the ranks of the scholars that the very governors of the people were chosen. This traditional respect for education would in itself greatly enhance the influence of Young China. But in the present juncture there are other factors to give it additional weight. These young men are not only scholars in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, but they are scholars educated in the

mysteries of that dreaded Occidental culture whose impact upon China threatens to subvert her whole civilization. Surely they must have learned the secrets of the strength of the West—and its weakness. Surely with this knowledge they are the best guides for China in her contest with that Western culture for her own survival. With a universality approaching unanimity, then, China has turned from her “elders” and her traditional leaders and sits with mouth agape at the feet of these young prophets, in childlike confidence that they will be able to save China from the enemy, or herself, or whatever it is that ails her.

In this manner has been created the strange spectacle of a great nation, despairing of help from its ancient gods, turning for leadership in the greatest crisis of its history to a group of fledgling bachelors of arts and doctors of philosophy, the later and more mature years of whose education have been spent, not in China or studying China, but in a strange land studying an alien culture. There could be no more expressive gesture of despair. And herein is its greatest significance. It is not that the enthusiasm of youth is undesirable or unworthy. Youthful enthusiasm in protest against aged conservatism has put new vitality into many a nation and kept it in the way of progress. But where age and wisdom surrender in despair to the immature and inexperienced judgments of youth, we have a situation fraught with the gravest danger to China and all who have to live with her.

The first prescription of these young leaders was the substitution of a republic for the ancient monarchy. A constitution was carefully compiled from all the con-

stitutions of the West with which their hurried reading had brought them into contact. It provided for a president, a bi-cameral legislature, and a judiciary—all the dressings of the best republics of the West. We have seen how it worked: the president a fiction, the legislature a memory, and the judiciary a hope. And China reduced to chaos such as she has not seen for centuries.

There was little in the results of their first experiment upon the living body of China that warranted further confidence in the youthful leaders either by the people or by themselves. Their Chinese heritage and their Western training united, however, to give them a complacent self-confidence and they carried on. If the republic was not a success, it was not because conditions were utterly unsuited for it. It was not because the Chinese people were almost wholly illiterate. It was not because they had never had the slightest experience in working the machinery of government. The failure simply could not be due to their own lack of insight, nor to any defects in the Chinese people. It must be—in fact it was—due to the foreigners!

The students hastily recalled the four or five months spent in acquiring the terminology of international law. They remembered their definitions of sovereign states with their independence and their equal rights. They did not stop to recall that these independent sovereign states had corresponding responsibilities. They rushed forth and denounced the foreign infringements upon China's sovereignty. The path to China's rehabilitation lay across the dead bodies of the unequal treaties. There was the enemy. And they began their campaign of denunciation of the treaties and all the

UNDERMINING THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

structure of international intercourse and trade that rested upon them. Never a thought that these treaties were but symptoms of China's real disease. Never a heed to the comparative unimportance of a few mosquito bites to a patient dying of hemorrhage. When their attention was called to the necessity of doing some constructive work first, of establishing some authority in China whose sovereignty could command the slightest respect from the Chinese themselves, of erecting a government which could assume the obligations as well as the rights of sovereignty and offer some measure of protection to the persons and property of foreigners as required by other rules of international law which they found it easier to forget, they waved it all aside with the plea that every nation had a right to self-determination, to govern itself as well or as ill as it saw fit. They did not realize that in the light of history this was an invitation to imperialism rather than an effective protest against it.

In the midst of their devoted excitement, they suddenly found encouragement from an unexpected quarter. Their attack upon the treaty Powers was received with enthusiasm by Soviet Russia. She too had a score to settle with Britain, with Japan, with America. More power to the students! Her ambassador praised, flattered, and egged them on. Some, being so inclined, received money. Others, being sufficiently enthusiastic without it, did not. But new facilities were offered them in their labors. Organizers were placed at their disposal. Tons of literature were delivered to them for distribution. Their hands were upheld at every crisis. Strange new labor organizations flocked to their standards. They

were fairly beside themselves with the intoxication of their own success.

This student propaganda has not been without its effects, both good and bad. It has focussed the attention of the treaty Powers upon the abuses of the rights granted them under the existing treaties. It has brought them to the point where they are willing to discontinue the abuses and are prepared to abrogate even the rights as fast as China is able to assume the corresponding responsibilities. It has spurred some Chinese leaders to appreciate the necessity of doing constructive work to meet legitimate criticisms of the Powers before the latter can be expected peacefully to surrender their treaty rights. It has dragged the whole Chinese problem out into the glare of public discussion so that the world has a much greater knowledge of conditions in China and of the whys and wherefores of the dispute between China and the Powers.

On the other hand the student agitators have fomented an anti-foreign spirit reminiscent of the fatal xenophobia of earlier decades. They have incited their countrymen to attacks upon foreigners and foreign rights in China in a manner usually confined to savage rather than civilized countries. This course has aroused an answering resentment among the foreigners, which will make the more difficult any constructive coöperation for the solution of China's problems. It will take many a year to bridge the chasm of hate the students have placed between their countrymen and their teachers.

Toward a concrete solution of China's fundamental problems it is difficult to see where the student agitation

has made the slightest progress. The basic economic weakness they have not bettered, nor are they as a class even thinking about it. The task of industrialization they have scarcely honored with their recognition. The matter of over-population they choose to ignore. And in regard to the political reorganization of the country, they content themselves with the general untruth that they are devoting as much attention to that as they are to the abolition of foreign rights. Thus the social upheaval they have caused in the country by taking the leadership from the hands of abler and wiser men has been out of all proportion to the results accomplished. Their efforts have been largely wasted because they have refused to turn them to the difficult actualities of China's real problems, but have chosen instead to spend them upon the more spectacular pastime of inciting the more ignorant of their countrymen against the foreigner.

That this effort must exhaust itself in the same way that the equally insincere Bolshevik propaganda did, is inevitable. Bolshevik influence waned from the day of Karakhan's ultimatum on the Ivanov imprisonment. Already there are signs that the influence of the students and the hotter heads among the leaders of Young China is waning likewise. There is perceptible a toning down in the nature of the demands. A spirit of willingness to compromise begins to appear. More of the ancient Chinese reasonableness is to be observed. The more conservative classes are again making their influence felt. Once more the voice of the "elders" is to be heard. Coöperation and mutual concession again appear as possibilities.

This does not mean that the young Chinese are necessarily losing their hold upon the imagination of the Chinese people. It means rather that they themselves are growing up. They are learning by their own mistakes. They begin to perceive that the affairs of nations are not settled by dogmas and cut-and-dried formulas. The value of adjustment and accommodation is being borne in upon them. In fact they are no longer "Young" China and therefore they are becoming the more truly—China.

Yet there is grave danger that the leaders of Young China, however clearly they may see the danger, will not be able to quench the fires they have lighted. Revolution traditionally runs to the left. Lesser men, whose ambitions for prominence have not been satisfied in the earlier stages of the movement, are always ready to denounce the increasing reasonableness of the original leaders as surrender to the enemy and to incite the rank and file to still more radical action. A striking example of this tendency is afforded by the events of early January, 1927, in Hankow. Despite the complete control by the Cantonese forces, radical agitators incited the mob to attacks upon the foreign concessions and produced a situation which the Chinese authorities were either unable or unwilling to control.

In such developments lies the Chinese menace to the peace of the world. The ancient stable social organization of China has been undermined. Great sections of it are already in disorder and more will follow. The students have set the disorganized mass in motion against the foreigner. Even though their wiser leaders may see now that salvation does not lie that way, will

they be able to stop it before its momentum spends itself in widespread destruction? That is the question which gathers a larger foreign fleet in Chinese waters than ever before. That is the aspect of the matter which makes every move in China a matter of international import and keeps the attention of the world riveted on this storm center of the Far East.

X

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

THE political, economic, and social eruptions which are shaking Chinese civilization to its foundations have had their inevitable repercussions in the intellectual life of the country. Just as the old political forms were found ineffective to meet modern conditions, just as the economic organization was found inadequate to carry new burdens, just as the social structure was found to be cracking under the added weight, so were the ancient forms of thought and literature found inappropriate for the expression of the mental life of a period of development. A revolt against these forms was certain to follow the attempts to reform Chinese life in other directions.

The classical Chinese literature is the heritage of many centuries. It is redolent of antiquity and glories in its formalism. It has little desire to soil its skirts by any association with the life of the people. It is an art, esoteric, the pastime of trained minds. As such it has drawn quite apart from the living tides in Chinese evolution. It is as much the instrument and the avocation of the educated fraction as was the Latin literature of our own Middle Ages. The "wen-li" or classical character in which it is written is just as incomprehensible to the average man as was Latin to the mediæval peasant. It has consequently become an

anemic expression of a literary cult without roots in the life of the time and without the vitality of a living growth. It is part and parcel of the old China, the China that is passing because it is outgrown.

The minds that were stirred to thought by the great changes that were coming over the face of the land, the philosophers who wished to analyze the new forces at work, the politicians who wished to devise new vehicles of government, the agitators who deemed it their duty to stir the people to action, all of these felt the increasing need of literary expression at a time when the traditional medium was losing the last measure of its validity. Sooner or later some one must muster courage to break with the past and to write new thoughts in the language of to-day. China was destined to have its Dante, its Wycliff, its Luther as surely as was Europe. It is indicative of the newness of China's break with its past that the first work in the vernacular appeared as late as 1917. Dr. Hu Shih wrote an article in that year pointing out the need of a new intellectual medium and urging the use of the widely known Kuanhua, or mandarin speech, as its vehicle.

Hu Shih, like many of the other leaders of new movements in China, was educated in America. He went first to Cornell, where he devoted his attention to agriculture. His interest in philosophy and literature soon led to his transfer to the Faculty of Arts, from which he was graduated with honors in 1914, at the age of twenty-three. He continued his studies at Columbia, delving deep into both Chinese and English philosophy and literature. This work led him to the conviction that a radical reform was necessary in China,

and furnished the background for his historic article and many others which have followed. Dr. Hu has written a number of scholarly studies, several dramas, and over a hundred poems, all in the present-day Chinese vernacular. He is now Professor of Philosophy at the National University at Peking and enjoys an undisputed leadership in the intellectual life of modern China.

Hu Shih is not alone. He has been followed by a host of young men who have seized upon his precepts and put them into practice by the translation of foreign works, the writing of commentaries and expositions, and the production of creative work in prose, poetry, and the drama. Professor Porter cites the following as among the titles to be found in a modern Chinese bookstore: Complete Works of John Dewey, The Social Theories of Bertrand Russell, the Principles of Soviet Government, the Scientific Development of Chinese Resources, History of Chinese Philosophy, The Chinese Classics Written in Common Speech, the Significance of Ibsen in Modern Culture.

These excursions into new fields of learning are typical of the intellectual temper of the time. Not only in literature and philosophy, but in science, in economics, in sociology, in politics, and in education is there a spirit of inquiry abroad, a distrust of authority and tradition, a readiness to accept ideas, however new and whatever their origin, upon the basis of their apparent worth. The learning of the world and the ages has been laid under contribution and is being subjected to a new evaluation from the point of view of China's needs. As is to be expected much of the work is crude, it is often super-

ficial and not infrequently puerile. But it has a core of sound scholarship, a strain of true worth which is destined to survive while the less effective efforts will fall away or be swept aside.

This new literature has completely superseded the older type in the favor of the reading public. It has not only absorbed the attention of those who have always devoted themselves to reading, but by its timeliness, its intimate connection with the crowding problems of the day, has attracted the notice of a wider constituency. Once more literature and philosophy have assumed their rightful place as a vital part of the cultural life of the nation. Their devotees have won new reverence which has gone far to keep the scholar in the forefront of those the nation delights to honor. Chinese thought has in truth undergone a renaissance.

This new movement is in part the effect and in part the cause of a resurgence of vitality through the whole body politic of China. The culture of the Chinese, like that of other great nations, has ebbed and flowed over long periods. The flood tide of the Confucian period before Christ was followed by the ebb in the days of the Hans. The new flood under the T'angs at the time when Europe was being united under the leadership of Charlemagne gave way to another ebb. In it flowed again under the Mings to retreat once more under the Manchus. Chinese leaders to-day firmly believe that the country is in the beginnings of a new flood, a new upsurging of that marvelous racial power which has made of Chinese civilization one of the wonders of the world. This consciousness of renewed power is called the Hsin Ch'ao, the New Tide, a designation which

embraces all of the new movements and ideas which are finding their expression in the surging life of present-day China.

The Hsin Ch'ao is not a vain seeking after novelty for novelty's sake. Like our own Renaissance it turned first to a minute reëxamination and a careful reëvaluation of the art, the literature, and the philosophy of the past. The old culture was studied deeply in order that the new might draw nourishment from its soundest roots. The New Tide is therefore not a shallow worship of things new because they are new. It is rather a revitalization of the whole body of Chinese culture.

Typical of the better aspects of this new national consciousness, is the renewed devotion to education. The searching analysis of the new thinkers, assisted by such sympathetic foreign philosophers as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, has made clear the radical defects of the traditional Chinese system of education, but it has in no way destroyed the belief in the value of education as such. There is a constant endeavor to construct a new system which shall carry modern values and be adapted to the needs of the China of to-day. The work of the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education has been carried on despite the existence of civil war and other evidences of national disunion. Perforce its work has been confined largely to the realm of theory because no educational system can actually be installed until there is a government strong enough to instal it and with resources enough to pay for it. But there is much theoretical work to be done, and in the vast mass of new proposals and conflicting ideas perhaps it is as well that action should follow

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

leisurely. The educationists of China have devised four systems of schools within the last twenty years, and changes are made at less expense if only the plans and not the working system have to be changed. The latest plan was adopted by the association in 1922. Since then expert committees have been at work on the details of the courses and in 1925 the completed project was approved by the Tenth Conference of the National Federation of Educational Associations and submitted to the Ministry of Education for promulgation.

Far more dramatic than the devising of systems for the future schools of the republic, are the activities of the student movement. Mention has already been made of these in connection with the failure of the students to interest themselves in the economic needs of the country and their inability to measure up to the opportunities for leadership which came to them as the Chinese people realized that the ancient methods were no longer able to sustain the national life. The student leaders have been obsessed with the spectacular side of politics and more often than not they have chosen the course of hastily considered action rather than a slower and less dramatic course of well-thought-out construction.

Student political activity first made itself felt in 1906, when it stimulated the boycott against America because of the American attitude on the racial question. The students as such took no prominent part in the Revolution, however, nor were they heard from during the dark days of 1915 when Japan was enforcing acquiescence in her Twenty-one Demands by means of threats and ultimatums. But by 1919 the students were thoroughly aroused. To the Shantung affair is due the

new impulse which was to throw the students into the forefront of national action. When the Peace Conference refused to heed the plea of China's delegates and awarded Shantung to Japan, the students started an anti-Japanese boycott, which did more perhaps than any other one thing to convince Japan of the greater benefits to be derived from Chinese friendship than from Chinese hostility. The students went to the Chambers of Commerce and the merchant guilds in every city of China, and in the novel name of patriotism prevailed upon them to refuse to handle Japanese goods. They reinforced this resolve by persuading the people to refuse to buy them. In some places huge piles of Japanese wares were publicly and ceremoniously burned.

The students conceived that it was not only Japan that was at fault. The men in power in Peking at the time were the members of the notorious Anfu Club, well-known for their pro-Japanese attitudes and much more interested in filling their pockets with Japanese yen than in protecting the public assets of China. The students of Peking set out to purge the government of those whom it considered traitors. They broke into and demolished the furnishings of the house of the chief of the pro-Japanese ministers, while he and two of his colleagues fled to the Legation Quarter. The government attempted to suppress the demonstrators, but the students responded with a strike and began a vigorous campaign to enforce their views. They won on every point. The three ministers were forced to resign. The Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. And the students returned in triumph to their classrooms.

Flushed with success the student leaders determined to carry on the work they had begun. Organization work was undertaken and proceeded apace. Student unions were formed in all the centers of China with branches in nearly all the schools and colleges. These are federated in a national association. Busy corresponding secretaries keep all parts of the country informed of passing events. Thus it is that an event which normally would be of no more than local significance may suddenly become an affair of national, even of international, importance.

Much of the energy generated in this new movement was at first turned into constructive activities. The students all over the country established "neighborhood" schools where they offered a modicum of instruction free to the children of the poor. They devoted themselves not only to book-learning, but introduced playground activities to the wondering youth of the Chinese villages. Flood and famine work gave them added opportunities for service and when the relief work was over, special studies of the conditions of living were undertaken. Crusades have been organized to spread a knowledge of public hygiene and sanitation.

Such endeavors are worthy of all praise and if they had been entered into whole-heartedly by the mass of the students and made the principal object of their endeavors, China and the world would have been deeply in debt to her educated sons. But these outbursts of public service were somewhat sporadic and largely personal. The fires of enthusiasm burnt low before the messages of hope and progress were carried to more than the merest fraction of the host which is China. And

then there were distractions. It is hard to keep one's mind upon teaching youngsters the rudiments of the ideographic system when one's comrades are addressing emotional multitudes on the wrongs which China suffers at the hands of the foreigner.

One movement did manage to get fairly well established. This was the Mass Education Movement. The aim of its leaders was the prompt abolition of Chinese illiteracy. They selected one thousand simplified characters and undertook to teach these to the whole population of China. The thought was that if all China could read these thousand characters, then all China would be able to peruse political pamphlets and hasten the day of China's emancipation.

Somewhat extravagant claims are made for the extent of this movement. It is asserted that as many as eight million adults have been taught to read. To arrive at the reality, one must discount this figure as heavily as one would the first offer of a Chinese curio merchant. It is more probable that the number of those reached can be counted in the hundreds of thousands. Nor does it follow that because a man has learned the thousand characters he has the ability to read understandingly an article or tract couched in ordinary phraseology. Before literacy can become of any real value in a democracy it must include the ability to read, weigh, and choose intelligently between opposing views and conflicting interpretations. The graduates of the thousand-character course have only the beginnings of such ability. And if they had, there is nothing available for them to read except the political sheets, handbills and other propaganda of the student move-

ment itself. Thus the chief result of the movement so far has been to extend somewhat the range of voice of the student orators. While the actual achievement of the Mass Education Movement has been exaggerated, its purposes are admirable and its teachings as a first step toward literacy are invaluable.

Unfortunately, the greater part of the vitality of the student movement has been turned into less productive channels. Orators with political proclivities have almost completely captured it. The too easy victory of the students in 1919 went to their heads. If ministers and presidents and even foreign Powers could be made to heed their demands, why not use the authority which was evidently theirs? They practiced in their schools and colleges. They demanded the deciding voice in all matters connected with the institutions, except the raising of money. If an instructor incurs the displeasure of his classes, the administration must choose between his dismissal and a student strike. Resistance to student demands frequently means the eventual removal of the president himself. Examinations are held or not as the mood of the student body dictates. They have reduced the situation in many of the schools and colleges to a sheer absurdity. The only educational process which it can reasonably be claimed is going on is the training of young politicians in the delicate arts of intrigue and intimidation.

Their appetites waxed by what they fed upon and they evolved expanding visions as their greatness grew. No matter of local, national, or international concern was placed at issue but they undertook to decide it. Officials from the president of China down, teachers from

the minister of education down, chambers of commerce with their staid and wealthy merchants down to the simple tradesmen of the wayside stands, all trembled at their glance. So powerful is the name of patriotism when it is misused.

In May there occurred the riot at the Japanese mill in Shanghai, when a Japanese guard shot and killed a Chinese rioter. May 30 was set for a demonstration against the conditions prevailing in this Japanese mill. The story of the conflict with the foreign-officered police has already been told. Six of the students were killed. It was the signal for a terrific outburst of anger against the foreigner. The slaying of thousands in the meaningless wars of China's *tuchuns*, the drowning of thousands in China's preventable floods, the starving of thousands in China's undernourished families, the dying of thousands from disease in China's unsanitary villages, all were mere trifles compared to the shooting of those six students. It is not necessary to palliate the action of the police—there is room for severe criticism of their procedure, as Justice Johnson, the American member of the Court of Inquiry, has shown—to point the moral in regard to the readiness of the students to work themselves into a fury over swallowing a gnat while whole trains of camels go down without even a gulp.

Their widespread organization was at once set in motion to produce the most dangerous and futile thing in the world, hatred of one people by another. Anti-foreignism was fanned throughout the land; the British, as has been noted, being the special objects of wrathful denunciation. Nationalism became a sacred fetish,

before which all of the ordinary virtues must be sacrificed. The students as the high-priests of the new idol undertook to direct the sacrifices. They collected funds for distribution among the striking laborers. They forbade the merchant to remove his foreign goods from his warehouse for sale to the public. The latest misdeeds of the diabolic foreigners were painted in satanic colors, and the gospel of hate spread far and wide by the distribution of handbills and cartoons. As Rudlay Thomas says: "Strict devotion to the cause of truth can hardly be said to have characterized this campaign of propaganda. The slightest details were grossly exaggerated, and the facts were used or abused in accordance with the needs of a particular situation."¹

This campaign of general despise and hatred of the foreigner was paralleled by a resuscitation of the agitation for the abolition of the so-called unequal treaties and the cancellation of all the rights granted to foreigners during a century of intercourse. This cancellation included the taking over of all the vast and valuable properties built by the foreigners and with the foreigners' money. Hongkong, Kowloon, Formosa, South Manchuria, Shanghai, and the remainder of the foreign settlements all were to be swept into the waiting hand of China as a sort of fine for the wrongs the foreigners were alleged to have committed. Foreign rights were to be abolished and foreign values built upon those rights transferred to China at one stroke, contract obligations or the equities of any case to the contrary notwithstanding.²

¹ *Current History*, July, 1926.

² See Chapter XI.

Into the arguments along this line was mixed much high-sounding phrase about independence, self-determination, international law, national sovereignty, etc., and the too often confused ideas of the students on these subjects were raised to fever heat and passed on to their excited audiences. It was at this point that Americans, Japanese, and especially Britishers thought they detected the unscrupulous hand of Moscow. The campaign of the students assumed too much the air of a continuation of the earlier preachings of the Bolshevik agents. Whether the directors of Soviet policy actually started this phase of the student agitation, or whether, once started they found it so much to their liking that they egged it on with men and money, and if the latter, to what extent, is not and may never be fully known. That they were vastly pleased with it and encouraged it mightily there has been no attempt to conceal.

The most radical manifestation of the destructive effort of the new forces at work in China is the anti-religious, or anti-Christian movement. The Bolsheviks enshrined the dictum of Marx: "Religion is the opium of the people," and the Chinese aspirants for a share of his fame reëcho his sentiment. The Chinese intellectuals who are leaders in the New Tide have approached the question of religion with an open mind. Under the influence of Bertrand Russell's criticism of the religion of the organized churches, many of them have assumed a skeptical attitude. Perhaps one-third of them are hostile or at least indifferent to religion.

Whatever may be the authority of Marx and Lenin among the intelligentsia, the characterization of Christianity as the advance-guard of Western imperialism

probably has a local origin, though it still savors of Moscow. The proponents of this view are most bitter. Says one of them in the *China Weekly Review* in an article entitled, "Why the Foreign Devil?":

By self-appointment they set out upon a crusade to make all the Orient like themselves, flaunting the superiority of their products and the consolations of their Bible. By force they have broken down the policy of isolation, overlooking the paramount question whether East and West were intellectually and spiritually prepared to enter into close relationships—though physically brought face to face. As fish see the bait but not the hook, so they see the profit of commercial expansion, but not the peril of international rivalry and racial conflict. Attempting little to scrutinize our customs, traditions and institutions, and misconceiving change for progress, they label us as a conservative race whenever we take a critical look at the alien conditions they urge us to adopt. Well might we exclaim: "Western Civilization is nothing more than Bibles, bullets and beer!"

It is against this alliterative background that socialist and radical agitators have linked Christianity with capitalism and urged the suppression of all mission work. In 1922 these spirits were successful in starting a strong anti-Christian movement among the students in China. It endeavored to make things as unpleasant as it could for the meetings of the Christian Federation and the National Christian Conference in the spring of that year; but after that it settled back into a pamphlet-eering stage, from which it rejoices over any assault upon Christianity or Christian missions without exerting itself overmuch to bring about such assaults. These exertions it can safely leave to the student movement in general, because the latter has become so anti-foreign

that it is as ready to attack missions as any other work of the foreigner.

From this brief summary it appears that the New Tide of China, manifesting itself in a literary renaissance among the Chinese intellectuals, runs through the gamut of humanistic inspiration, educational endeavor, social service, the creation of a national consciousness, to a nationalistic self-assertion at the expense of it matters not whom, a super-heated xenophobia and the condemnation of religion in general and Christianity in particular. Through all of this range of interests its chief exponents are immature students trained for the most part in the foreign schools they traduce and in the foreign learning they condemn. The result may be looked upon as proof of the danger incurred in putting the new wine of the West into the old bottles of the East. There undoubtedly is danger in it. It is almost certain that some of the bottles will be cracked and others will effervesce mightily, spurting quantities of vitiated Western stuff into the upper air.

But that is not sufficient reason for discontinuing the effort on the part of either East or West. China is in the throes of industrialization, a phenomenon which is Western only in that it happened to strike the West first. The West has learned something of what to do with it. That knowledge China needs and will need to improve upon. She may make a mighty pother against the foreigner and all his ways, but the knowledge of the West she must have, or she will succumb. Her New Tide and her renaissance are evidences of her renewed vitality. That it will take some time to coördinate and control the manifestations of this vitality is to be ex-

pected. We may even be sure that some one is likely to get hurt in the process. But that need not blind us to the nature of the work that has to be done. The constructive elements in China must be recognized and assisted. The discordant and destructive elements must be suffered to exhaust their force by the violence of their own efforts, or they must be suppressed by other forces. The constructive forces may be few and they may be feeble, but it is they that must build China into a modern state if ever she is to attain that goal.

XI

DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

IN surveying the situation in China for the purpose of finding what constructive forces are at work, there is much room for discouragement. It is not that constructive forces do not exist. They do, in great potency. But for the most part they are so misdirected, wasting their power for destructive ends, or attempting futile or dangerous things, that it is easy to despair of their final accomplishment.

The most obvious forces in China to-day are attempting to realize a constructive policy on the "strong-man theory" of government. In the back of the mind of each of the prominent tuchuns, back of his ostentatious talk of his desire to "unify" China, there undoubtedly lurks the ambition to bring this unified China under his own autocratic sway. The tuchun is by nature a believer in the strong-man theory and he creates his ideal strong-man in his own image. If any one of the present contestants for power were able to establish his authority over the armies, territory, and people now ruled by all his opponents, the logical culmination of his ambition would be to follow the time-honored Chinese custom and establish himself as autocratic ruler of all the Chinas, as emperor and founder of a new dynasty if it might be, as absolute dictator behind some republican façade if not.

This strong-man theory has numerous supporters

among both Chinese and foreigners. Its Chinese advocates are silenced under the vociferous democratic propaganda of the students, and its foreign proponents speak only as individuals. Nevertheless, the foreign governments have frequently toyed with the idea and speculated upon the possibilities of realizing it. Some of them looked with favor upon the efforts of Yuan Shih Kai to establish himself upon the Dragon Throne. But others, notably Japan, were obstinately opposed to Yuan personally; and, at that time, the more outspoken of the Japanese had no hesitancy in saying that Japan could not afford to see a strong and united China rise to power almost within sight of her shores. These external discouragements, combined with antagonisms of various kinds at home, served to frustrate Yuan's ambitions and he passed from the scene.

Since his death one aspirant after another has offered himself as a candidate to become the strong-man of China. Tuan Chi Jui, Chang Hsun, Chang Tso Lin, Wu Pei Fu, and Feng Yu Hsiang are the best known names on the list. The last three of these still share with Sun Chuan Fang and Chiang Kai Shek the hope of realizing their ambitions. But each of the three has had an opportunity and has failed to rise sufficiently above the level of his competitors either to eliminate them or to subordinate them to his own authority. Sun and Chiang have still to show their mettle with Chiang at the present writing the more likely, probability.

The rise of a real strong-man, an actual ruler of China, would go far to solve many of the aggravating Far Eastern problems now muddling along to a termination rather than a solution. Even Chiang Kai Shek,

the actual extent of whose receptivity to Soviet ideas is still a matter of considerable doubt, might be welcome to foreigners from this point of view. Any leader who can stand on his feet and speak for China, any ruler, whatever his course to power, who would keep promises and meet obligations, could restore China to her proper place among the nations and would have little difficulty in securing the abrogation of those impairments of China's sovereignty of which her spokesmen complain.

Although the arrival of a strong-man might solve many Far Eastern problems and place the relations between China and the foreign Powers on a basis more nearly approaching normal, it would not solve China's great internal problem, which, as we have seen, is a combination of at least four factors: the political transition from absolutism to democracy in the matter of organizing a modern national state; the development from an agricultural to an industrial economy; the transformation from a social order based upon the family to one based upon the individual; and the expression of a reawakened mental life. None of these movements would find its fruition under a restored absolutism in the Chinese tradition. All of them would be partly or wholly arrested and, under repression, would be storing energy which in a short time would burst its bonds and again throw the country into a turmoil. Under these circumstances, while we might accept the arrival of a strong-man with a sigh of relief, he would bring a respite rather than a reformation; and Chinese and foreigners alike would have to prepare themselves for the day when the struggle would be taken up again, probably with even greater bitterness than before.

The possibility of China's breaking up into a number of smaller entities, each governed by its strong-man, a *dénouement* which often seems more likely than any other, offers an even more unsatisfactory solution. In the presence of the conflicting foreign ambitions and interests which have been described, any partition of China, whether it comes from the centrifugal forces within the country, or from without, is almost sure to precipitate antagonisms which may mean the partial or entire subjugation of China and in an international struggle of the first magnitude.

For example, Manchuria would seemingly be one of the first sections of the country to attempt to stand alone. The Japanese influence there, freed from the restraints imposed by the international concert at Peking, would rapidly be developed into something resembling a protectorate. The Russians, seeing this coming, would intensify their efforts to secure a privileged position in the country, and we should have the stage set for a repetition of the tragedy which was enacted in Korea at the end of the last century.

Pending the development of the action of that tragedy, the Russians would consolidate their position in Mongolia, taking that over bodily into their empire. There is no power in Mongolia, China, Japan, or elsewhere that could prevent that. And from a Russian protectorate in Mongolia as a base, a new Russian drive toward the sea could be launched. Here again Russia and Japan would be brought into conflict; the one ready to exert her final effort to secure access to the Pacific, the other equally ready to spend her last ounce of strength to prevent the realization of that ambition.

North China would incidentally fall to one or the other or be divided between them.

Britain, long suffering at the point of exasperation from a Russian-encouraged boycott of her trade and attacks upon her other interests in China, would hardly sit idly by in the face of such events. Either at Canton or Shanghai the struggle might be forced into the field of arms and the outcome of such a contest would not, under ordinary circumstances, be in doubt. The southern coast and the Yangtse Valley would in some form or other be constrained to acquiesce in British domination.

France, seeing the other nations extending their imperial spheres, would not consent to be left behind. Her old sphere in Yunnan and Kwangsi would be redrawn on the map and gradually reduced to dependence upon France.

Thus would China, as an international entity, pass from view. There would be sections undisposed of, but the mass would be partitioned. The Chinese would have need of all their philosophy and all their complacent recollection of their ultimate absorption of their former captors to meet this overrunning of their country by the modern Powers.

The danger to those Powers themselves is already apparent. Japan and Russia would be at each other's throats in the north. The hostility between the British and the Soviet system is so fundamental that little would be necessary to involve Britain in the conflict. France would have the choice of supporting Britain against Russia or of thrusting at Britain's back. In the delicate balance of European politics, it would be a wise

man who could say to-day which she would do or that she would do neither. And with France in on either side, the way is open for the entanglements of European politics to draw in other Powers with dire consequences, which need not be developed here.

The outlook for a solution of the problems of the Far East through the coming of a strong-man as a ruler of all China, or by the partition of the country into several autocratic states, is therefore anything but bright. The conditions within the country demand something other than a dictator. The conditions outside demand even more insistently something other than partition. These two sets of conditions limit the operation of all constructive forces.

It is easy to point out the difficulties and dangers of the two most obvious solutions, the establishment of a dictatorship and the break-up into smaller states. But when we come to explore the other possibilities, the outlook is far from encouraging. I am quite aware that this statement arouses the fervid dissent of the spokesmen of Chinese nationalism. To them their new-found patriotism is a religion, which is to bring salvation to their distracted country; and they are quite ready to launch anathemas against any one with the temerity to ask how this is to be done. But until that question is satisfactorily answered, they must not cavil at the reluctance of rational-minded people to accept them at their own valuation. Enough has already been said of the general attitude of the student movement and its *alter ego*, Young China, so that the reader is familiar with the tendency to avoid real issues and their obsession by the idea that all that is necessary to put China on the

road to peace and happiness is the abolition of foreign treaty rights.

An examination of the demands of Young China is illuminating. They are set forth in a manifesto issued in September, 1925, by the Chinese Students Alliance in the United States. This alliance, while it may have no authority to speak officially for "Young China" as a whole, is a typical group and its manifesto is a fair representation of the aims of the movement. It contains nine demands. Each of them begins with the words: "That the Powers must . . ." There is no suggestion in the whole document that China must. That China must establish a government; that she must abolish the *tuchun* system; that she must respect any obligations toward others; that she must introduce any suggestion of honesty and loyalty into her public life; that in sum the Chinese must do anything under heaven but what pleases them at the moment, never crosses the minds of these young patriots. All of the ills of China are due to the arrogance of the foreigner. The Chinese are blameless; they need no admonition. There is no "must" for them.

What must the Powers do? First they "must restore to us our lawful territory including the ceded territories of Hongkong, Maritime Province, Amur Province, Macao, and Formosa, the leaseholds of Port Arthur and Dairen, Weihaiwei, Kwangchowwan and Kowloon, and all concessions and settlements." Hongkong and Formosa were captured from China in war and ceded by her after defeat. "Yes, but war is wrong," says Young China. "You took these from us by force, therefore you must return them to us." But whence came

China's title to the Maritime Province, Amur Province, and Formosa if not through war? The only jurisdiction she ever exercised in the Siberian territories was the exaction of tribute, enforced by punitive expeditions if the annual toll of furs was not forthcoming. Formosa, too, was a tributary. And farther back all of the territories mentioned came to China by conquest. I once called the attention of one of the most prominent student leaders to this. His reply came promptly: "I am as much ashamed of the misdeeds of my own ancestors as I am of those of yours." Magnanimous, no doubt, but why, my young friend, insist upon the present generation of foreigners restoring what their ancestors seized while you continue to enjoy the benefits of your ancestors' rapacity? And in view of your own rather inconsistent position, is it not going a bit strong to ask that the millions and millions of value which have been built up by foreigners in Hongkong, Vladivostok, Macao, Formosa, South Manchuria, and in the concessions and settlements, values created where there was little or nothing before, be turned over to you without compensation or guaranty? And if you are able to justify this demand according to your own moral principles, why should you be surprised if sometimes a question is raised as to your sincerity when you talk about equity and fair-dealing?

The Young China spokesmen have made much of the inequity of the arrangement whereby the control of the foreign settlements is retained by the foreigners although a large majority of the population is Chinese and they pay more than half the taxes. "Taxation without representation" is another Western catchword that

comes readily to their lips. None could illustrate more aptly the incongruity of Western slogans when the attempt is made to apply them in China. To be sure the large Chinese majority in Shanghai—eight hundred thousand as compared with thirty thousand foreigners—is taxed and as yet has no representation on the municipal council. But they moved into the foreign settlement despite this condition from places which were wholly under Chinese jurisdiction. It would not be fair to say “from places where they enjoyed the right of representation on the taxing body,” because such places do not exist in China. They remain in Shanghai under the condition complained of, because they prefer it to moving back under Chinese jurisdiction. Why? Because their lives, their health and their property are safer there. In the summer of 1926 an epidemic of cholera swept over the region around Shanghai. A thousand deaths a day were reported from the native city and the towns circling the foreign settlement. Less than a dozen deaths from cholera among foreigners and Chinese occurred in the settlement. How long would such a contrast prevail if the administration of the foreign settlement were turned over to the Chinese? Compliance with the demand for equal representation would of course mean that. It would be hailed with delight by the students as a vindication of China’s sovereign right and by the military adventurers as a heaven-sent opportunity to secure the richest booty that ever fell to their lot. Beyond the immediate loss and destruction which would follow such a rendition of the settlements and concessions, there would be the further injury to China from the forcing out of foreign managers and

DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

with them the foreign capital which, as has been shown, is indispensable for the rehabilitation of the country.

This aspect of the question has appealed to no less a Chinese authority than Marshal Sun Chuan Fang himself, the tuchun who controls Shanghai and the neighboring provinces. In a speech to a meeting of the Chinese gentry and merchants of the district in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, he said:

Whenever I come to a treaty port I feel thoroughly humiliated not only because a treaty port is a standing reminder of our loss of sovereignty, but also because whenever we pass from the concessions into Chinese territory we feel that we are crossing into a different world. The former is the upper and the latter is the underworld, for nothing in the Chinese territory—roads, buildings or public health—can be compared with the concessions. This is the greatest of our national humiliations, much greater in my opinion than the loss of sovereignty. . . .

In recent years the people of China have gradually acquired a national consciousness and with one voice have demanded the rendition of concessions and the abolition of unequal treaties, but "empty-mouthed" demands are useless. If we want to have the concessions abolished we must make the necessary preparations, otherwise even if the Powers hand over the concessions to us at once, we shall find ourselves utterly unprepared to receive them.¹

It remains to record that Dr. V. K. Ting, appointed Mayor by Marshal Sun to improve conditions in the native city of Shanghai, is making progress in putting these ideas into practice.

The next demand of the students is that the Powers "renounce all claims to the so-called spheres of influence." As the Powers have long since done this and the

¹ Memorandum No. 8, American Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin.

spheres of influence are now of historical interest only, this need not detain us except as an indication of the need that was felt to pad out the case against the Powers. True, the "spheres" may gain a new significance if China continues to disintegrate, but in that case it will be because China has failed to do some of the things which, despite the complacency of her student patriots, China herself *must* do.

The third demand is that "the Powers must withdraw all their police and troops from our territory and their naval vessels from our inland waters." This is a reasonable demand, just as soon as China can so organize her own forces that she can give ordinary protection to foreigners in her cities and foreign shipping on her rivers. The foreign Powers would gladly forego the obligation of this police duty and save the great expense involved, if they could do so in justice to their own nationals. But loudly as the students may cry for the removal of these foreign forces, such events as the continual firing on foreign vessels on the Yangtse and the rioting in the foreign settlements cry still more loudly for their presence. It is in no sense against China that these foreign forces are directed. Their guns are never turned against, nor is their presence used to overawe, the Chinese government. They are directed against those Chinese of bandit tendencies who are beyond the control of the Chinese government. The presence of these foreign forces is not in itself a derogation of Chinese sovereignty; it is merely the means adopted by the foreigners to protect themselves and their property in those parts of the country where Chinese sovereignty does not function. There was a time when advantage

DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

was taken of isolated incidents greatly to increase the number of foreign troops in China. Thus Japan maintained a large garrison at Hankow for some time. But these were withdrawn after the Washington Conference and the foreign forces are now at the minimum consistent with the duties of the foreign governments to protect their own nationals in sections of the country where no other protection is offered them.

The fourth demand is that the Powers must "remove the restrictions upon our right of self-defense with regard to Tientsin, Taku, the route between Peking and the sea, and the neutralized territory north of the Kwantung Province." This refers in the main to the provisions of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 inserted upon the insistence of the Powers after they had been compelled to carry on warfare for two months against the insurrectionary Boxers in order to relieve their ministers, their families and staffs, and numerous missionaries who were besieged in the Legations at Peking. In so much as China had failed in the most sacred duty of a civilized country, the protection of the envoys of other states, the Powers deemed it necessary to provide against a repetition of the suffering and death among their nationals by forbidding China to close the passage from the sea to Peking and thus again cut off the Legations. This right too is one the Powers would resign the moment they could depend upon China to assume the obligation for which it was designed to serve as a substitute. The students claim the provision is obsolete, has outworn its usefulness, and is merely an affront to the dignity of China. If this were true it might readily be abolished. But the Legations have been isolated several

times in recent years by the manœuvring of contending factional armies, and the students themselves are largely responsible for the spread of anti-foreign feeling among all classes of the people. Having brought about a condition which bears some sinister resemblance to that prevailing just before the Boxer attack upon the Legations, they now ask the Powers to give up the protection they sought as a result of that attack.

The fifth demand is closely allied to the fourth. It reads: "That the Powers must waive all special privileges which international law does not sanction but are now enjoyed by the Legation Quarters at Peking." The Boxer Protocol also provided that the Powers should have the right to fortify the Legations against an attack similar to the one they had just sustained. The reasons for this are obvious and, as in the case of the way to the sea, continue valid until China can assure the Powers that the Legations are henceforth safe from attack. A word should be said about the clause "which international law does not sanction." The students are quick to cite international law against the rights of the Powers but loathe to recognize it as in any wise applicable to the obligations of China. Having carried their studies to the reading of the general principles of the subject and finding that sovereignty implies various things which do not prevail in China, they hasten to cite these principles to prove foreign aggression. But international law is a statement of the principles put into practice in the actual relations between states. It is based largely upon treaty provisions, and treaty provisions are made to cover special cases as well as general ones. The Boxer Protocol, signed by all the great na-

tions of the earth, including China, is quite as good a basis for international law as any other treaty. The sanction of international law is as applicable to the provision to which the students object as to any other phase of international relations.

The sixth demand is "that the Powers must give up their extraterritorial rights." This subject of extraterritoriality has already been discussed, and the reasons why the Powers should not be required to give up these rights until China has adopted laws and established courts which can enforce them are apparent. It is not necessary to review them here. It should again be pointed out, however, that there is no disposition on the part of the Powers to continue the extraterritorial régime beyond the time when the Chinese government can actually administer modern Chinese law where foreigners are concerned. Again the action of China is a condition precedent to the action of the Powers.

The seventh demand is "that the Powers must abolish the present conventional tariff and restore to us our tariff autonomy." This matter also has been dealt with at some length and it has been pointed out that the Powers have met in conference at Peking, have agreed to tariff autonomy beginning January 1, 1929, and have attempted to arrive at an arrangement for the interim period. The Conference came to a standstill, however, because there is no Chinese government to appoint Chinese delegates. There is something fantastic about a nation demanding rights while it is so disorganized that it cannot appoint representatives to receive them. It would seem that even the students might admit that in the case of tariff autonomy at least,

"China must" have a government to accept it before it can be restored.

The eighth demand is "that the Powers must forfeit their claims to special administrative advantages regarding the customs administration, the salt gabelle, and the postal and wireless administrations." Perhaps in no one of their activities would the students have warmer approval from the old mandarins than in this effort to drive the foreigners out of the various revenue services of the Chinese government. An honest foreign administration devoted to the idea of strict accountancy has been the bane of every Chinese official who has dreamed of the vast fortunes to be made if only he could have the handling of this money. The customs and salt revenues, as has been shown, constitute practically the sole cash income of the Chinese government. Let us suppose for a moment that this demand of the students were complied with. The foreign officers of these services would be replaced by Chinese officers. The Chinese officer, even if, as would probably not be the case, he were a student with thoroughly Western ideas of the handling of public funds, would, without the protection of foreign Powers, be wholly at the mercy of the local *tuchun*. Is it reasonable to suppose that Chang Tso Lin would allow any funds collected at Manchurian stations to be sent to officials at Peking, whom he did not control? Would Sun, from the lower Yangtse, or the Cantonese from the middle Yangtse? The Canton government made one effort to take over the customhouse at Canton, and was only prevented from doing so by foreign gunboats. Not a cent of the money collected as customs or salt duties would ever

reach the central government. And yet it is to give that government more revenue that the students demand tariff autonomy.

The consequences of granting this eighth demand would be even more serious than the passing of Peking from the scene. Most of the customs revenue and much of the salt revenue is pledged to the service of foreign indebtedness. The students say this service would be continued under Chinese officials. But if the pledge to continue the foreign administration until the indebtedness is paid is to be so lightly broken, what reason is there to believe that the pledge to devote the money to that indebtedness would be kept? Adventurers of the type that rule in China are not prone to allow large sums to slip through their hands to fulfill obligations which are to benefit them not at all. The service of the indebtedness would cease and the Powers would be forced to action. There would be no virtue in looking to Peking because that city, deprived of all its income, would have long ceased to have any significance in China's affairs. The Powers would have to deal with the *tuchuns* who were collecting the money. They would thus have to recognize them as the actual rulers over certain territories. Thus would be effected the very partition of China which Young China professes to deplore and the disastrous possibilities of which have been pointed out.

The last demand of the student manifesto is "that the Powers must revise the present treaties with regard to Tibet and Outer Mongolia." Here we return to the Chinese imperialism, traces of which were found in the first demand. Tibet and Mongolia are not Chinese.

They are conquered territories. Both have frequently been in revolt against Chinese domination. While it has at times been hard to justify British penetration into Tibet and still more difficult to approve the Russian methods in Mongolia, their title to be there is only less valid than China's because it has been more recently asserted. Such claims as this, while they would probably be recognized in any readjustment following the reestablishment of a Chinese state, are most unfortunately included in a manifesto setting forth the wrongs which China is supposed to suffer. They serve to justify in one paragraph the sort of aggression against which the students are protesting in another. If China is going to play the imperialist game she must be ready to lose as well as to gain. If she is to rest her case on international justice, she must come into court with clean hands, and be ready to sacrifice what she herself has seized by military force. She will then get a more sympathetic hearing than when she asks to have it both ways.

"This is a declaration of our rights. China knows no salvation until these are met." So opens the final paragraph of the manifesto. This suggests a patient dying of fever who refuses to make any effort to conquer his disease until a scratch on his arm has been cured. I have heard it urged repeatedly that it is the existence of these foreign rights which alone prevents China setting her house in order; that if they were once abolished China could forthwith restore internal order and assume her external obligations. That is simply not true. There are results of the present system which are not helpful to China; but they are trifling and their elim-

ination would make so little difference in China's ability to solve her own problems, that it is little less than dishonest to dwell upon them. For example, the complaint is frequently made that a discredited politician or a defeated militarist can escape into the Legation Quarter or the foreign concessions and thus avoid punishment for his crimes. This is true and, in so far as real and not political criminals are concerned, regrettable, but to charge China's troubles to this is absurd. Every nation has borders across which its criminals can escape and it takes what precautions are necessary to prevent it. Italy and Spain both have fugitives in France upon whom they would like to lay hands. Almost every state in Europe and in South America is in similar case. But they do not throw up their hands and deplore their inability on that account to maintain their national integrity. Again it is urged that the right of extraterritoriality is abused in the interest of those who sell arms to the various Chinese factions. It undoubtedly is so abused as long as it is there, but are the Chinese so naïve as to believe that if extraterritoriality were abolished the *tuchuns* would no longer be able to import arms? A favorite excuse for China's sorry plight is that it is the foreign Powers who support this or that *tuchun*, and thus keep the country in turmoil. There is evidence to support this charge. But will the abolition of foreign treaty rights affect this practice in the slightest? Has Russian support of certain factions ceased with the "surrender" of Russian treaty rights?

All of this is mere whimpering. China can go to perdition fast enough without any assistance from outside, if her leaders will not attack the real evils which beset

the country instead of concentrating all their best efforts upon trifles, which will disappear without effort when the main task is accomplished. Mr. Silas H. Strawn, the American representative at the Customs Conference, stated this very plainly in a speech to the students at Tsing Hua College. He said he had "thus far seen no convincing evidence that China's present-day troubles are in any degree attributable to the so-called unequal treaties or to the imperialistic attitude of the foreign Powers. On the contrary, the evidence seems to be overwhelming that the troubles of China are to-day internal rather than external, and that unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, tariff autonomy, and imperialism are political slogans which are availed of by agitators to excite the people of China into a frenzy of criticism and unrest."

All of the criticism of the student movement does not come from foreigners. Tang Shao Yi has already been quoted, and there are many other Chinese who have not hesitated to point out the weakness of the student contentions. A typically Chinese statement is that of Chang Chien, a man who has striven nobly for his country's betterment and who has conducted China's greatest and most successful industrial and civic experiment, at Nantungchow. He is quoted as follows:

At first the student movement was limited, but in course of time it gradually spread to all parts of the country and the influence of the students has become very great. Now the students have become so powerful that they cannot be checked. They refuse to take examinations; they transgress the school regulations; they hold meetings on any pretext; they join this and that political party and movement. The students undoubtedly love their country, but, alas,

DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

they eventually ruin it. Instead of competing with one another in their studies, our students are struggling with their immature impulses, and doing so without weighing the facts. They want to cancel treaties all at once, and interfere with other peoples' government. They think that when they are angry, the whole world will yield, and whatever they say can command the respect and confidence of the whole world.¹

The student movement, as at present conducted, is driving in directions which spell destruction rather than construction. Probably nothing more fatal to the hopes and aspirations of China could happen than that all of the student demands should suddenly be granted. But the movement should not on that account be deplored as a merely destructive force, or dismissed as an insignificant one. The students, despite their callow ideas and their adolescent assumption of all knowledge and all virtue, are one of the most vital and may become one of the most useful forces in China. They have aroused the Chinese people to a sense of their national unity. They have done much to spread an interest in public affairs. They have in some slight degree increased the percentage of literacy among their countrymen. They have brought to a distracted people a leadership whose average of devotion to the public interest is probably as high as that of most politicians. They have given China a voice which has compelled the world to listen.

All that is to the good. What they have failed to do is to develop a few, even one, great leader; one whose devotion to his country is beyond question, who is pos-

¹ Memorandum No. 5 of the American Chamber of Commerce of Tientsin.

sessed of real insight into the problems of his country, and who has the courage to stand against the tide and say what must be done. Thus far no such leader has appeared, but it may not be too much to hope that amidst all the aspiration and faith of the students such a one may come. Then can the tremendous power of the student movement be turned to constructive work and no more shall China's friends have to listen to puerile explanations about how it is necessary to pull down before you build up, while conditions in the country go daily from bad to worse because its leaders will not start to build.

The present purposeless destructive agitation is merely stirring up international hatred. That its effect upon the Chinese themselves is passing is probable. No people, least of all the Chinese with their preoccupation with the mere business of earning a livelihood, are going to listen unendingly to agitation and indulge themselves without limit in costly boycotts unless they begin to see something in the way of profitable results. The students must begin to plan something constructive or they will pass from the picture as a force of any kind. They cannot be driven or persuaded to this by others, but there is reason to hope that the increasing maturity and understanding of the student leaders themselves will soon lead them to a more statesmanlike attitude. That attained, they will cease to impugn the motives of every one outside their own supporters, will welcome honest criticism, will accept coöperation, and devote themselves to the real business of rebuilding a state in China.

There is a foreshadowing of such action in the Canton situation. Canton has perhaps a larger quota of

foreign trained students in its official circles than any other city in China. Among these there have come to the front leaders with constructive ideals. Because of the wave of antagonism against the Occidental Powers and Japan, and because the Soviets saw to it that assistance was ready for them on favorable terms, they have accepted Russian help and guidance. Much has been accomplished toward establishing a modern government in Canton and the provinces which it controls. There has been a tendency on the part of the Russians to use Canton in their battle with the other Powers, especially Great Britain. But the Chinese, while not averse to a boycott against Hongkong, have refused to let the Russians have full sway, as witness the wholesale dismissals by General Chiang Kai Shek, when the Soviet agents forgot that they were not in complete control. There is too much worldly wisdom among the Cantonese leaders for them to be deceived into the belief that their future lies in close association with Russia. They know the necessity of coöperation with the United States, Great Britain, and Japan if they would lift China out of the morass into which her antiquated methods have brought her. They are willing to use the Russian association for what it is worth and as a foil to secure better treatment from the other Powers. But when the time is favorable, there is every reason to believe they will renew their relations with the West. All they need to do to put China on the road to recovery is to assure themselves that there is no aggressive motive behind the Western assistance, and then to accept it as freely and make as good use of it as they have heretofore of the second-hand Russian article.

The hope of China then lies in her students, in the Young China movement, now most strongly coördinated in Canton. But it is to be realized only as that movement grows to maturity and casts aside its adolescent obsessions. As long as it continues in its xenophobic activities, it is driving toward destruction for China and infinite danger for the rest of the world. If it can arrive at understanding in time, it can turn the destructive forces into constructive work before it is too late, and begin the foundation of the new Chinese state. There has yet appeared no other force in China that has the power to save China and the world from a great tragedy.

XII

WHITHER?

IT is necessary to shape national policies not alone on what may happen in the indefinite future but with special reference to what is most likely to occur to-morrow or the day after. It is the utter uncertainty of what may happen in the immediate future that renders doubly difficult the planning of a policy toward China. In the seething chaos of a volcanic crater anything is likely to come to the surface. It may be some substantial material, which, when it cools, will form a solid crust; it may be superheated and explosive elements, which will spread indiscriminate death and destruction. China to-day is just such a seething volcano whose choking smoke and blighting heat give constant promise of a coming eruption.

As we have seen from our examination in the last chapter there is a reluctance on the part of the moving forces in the country to turn to constructive work. The war-lords may struggle on for decades before any one of them secures a hegemony which he can maintain. The students may continue to expend infinite vitality in destructive xenophobia. The Chinese spokesmen urge us not to hurry their people. They say China has been through these unsettled periods before in her history and has always emerged whole. Give us, they say, a

few decades, or a few centuries if need be; a century is but a day in the life of China. This is masterly atavism. A century may be but a day in the life of China, but it is many days in the life of the Occidental peoples. They are not content to be born, live, suffer, and die with a mere hope of some bright future they will never see. The Chinese may have done this many a time in their past, but they have never done it in the midst of the twentieth century—and it seems improbable that they ever will. The twentieth century insists upon action and if China does not comply, the action will almost inevitably come from outside. It is this that the friends of China would urge upon her youthful leaders, the sheer necessity of turning their efforts into effective constructive work before their chance is gone.

This has been the keynote of American policy during the recent tension. It may well serve as the guiding line for future policy as long as there is a possibility of the Chinese availing themselves of the opportunity thus offered to them. It is the logical continuation of the traditional American aim, a China sufficiently strong to hold her own against all aggressors. That aim is as valid to-day as it has been at any time during the past century. It would come nearer to resolving all the problems of the Far East—I fully realize it would create many new ones—than any other development. It would eliminate the degenerating warfare between Chinese factions. It would place an insurmountable barrier between Russia and Japan. It would deal with Britain and France on a basis of equality and in a spirit of mutual accommodation. It would protect the lives and property and encourage the trade and commerce of all foreigners,

extending equal opportunities to the nationals of every state, without discrimination or favor.

Thus and thus only could the American policy achieve its success. But what possibility is there of its fulfilment? What chance is there of a strong independent China? When in any foreseeable time can the disintegrated forces of the nation become sufficiently coördinated to produce any lasting improvement? When will any one of them turn itself in the direction of progress? These are matters of speculation. We have already seen that the evidences of useful endeavor are none too encouraging. But that does not warrant despair. A nation with the inherent resilience of the Chinese has an almost unlimited power of rejuvenation. The adolescent period in that rejuvenation should not be overlong where the sense of racial maturity is so much a part of the national character. There is still room for the hope of working out the American policy and so long as that hope exists, there is little doubt that Washington will continue to pursue a course which leads in that direction.

Meanwhile the elements in the present situation must be kept clearly in mind, so that, in avoiding the Scylla of aggression we may not be drawn down into the Charybdis of inactivity. There are four outstanding elements which must be in varying degrees determinative of the American course.

First among these is the demoralized state of China and the utter inability of the Chinese government to assume and discharge the responsibilities which a complete restoration of its sovereign rights would entail. It is clear from what has been said that it would be no

favor to China to throw upon her the burdens of modern statehood until she has made some progress along the way to national organization. Such a premature shifting of the load would simply invite disaster and precipitate clashes almost certain to result either in the partition of China, an onslaught of nations in the Far East, or both.

Second, there is the fact that Great Britain and Japan, the Powers most criticised as imperialistic by the Chinese, are at present disposed to a policy of coöperation in assisting China to achieve her national integrity. This is not wholly a matter of which party happens to hold the reins of power in either country. Both are at present governed by conservative groups, so that on the face of matters a change of the party in power might result in an even more liberal attitude toward China. The controlling factor in both cases, however, is not the current philosophy of officialdom, but the international situation which makes a conciliatory policy seem desirable as long as present conditions last.

The third factor is that there are strong influences in both Japan and England which demand a more aggressive policy in order to protect their investment and trade interests. Especially in the case of Great Britain are these influences reinforced by the overwhelming sentiment of the British in Hongkong, Shanghai, and other centers in China. These interests are highly critical of the conciliatory policy now being pursued by their government, insist that it is destroying British prestige not only in China but throughout the Orient, and demand that a forward policy be adopted for the purpose

of restoring the British position and giving adequate protection to British subjects, their investments, and their trade.

The fourth factor is the present world position of Soviet Russia. A declared enemy of the capitalistic Powers in all the world, Russia is leaving no stone unturned to weaken the position of the four Powers with the largest interests in China; Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States. We have seen how she has attempted to turn the Chinese nationalistic movement to her own purposes and with what unscrupulous disregard of her professions of friendship she has carried on an aggressive policy at the expense of China. As long as China remains impotent, any concessions made to a nominal government, any restoration of sovereign or other rights, must be considered with a view to their benefiting China not an iota, while they may become excellent instruments in the hands of Russia to pursue her relentless battle against the non-communistic Powers.

Faced with these conditions, the task of charting a day-to-day course for American policy becomes an extremely delicate one. Secretary Kellogg in his speech at Detroit on September 2, 1925, reiterated the cardinal principles of this policy. He said: "In brief, that policy may be said to be to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, to encourage the development of an effective stable government, to maintain the Open Door or equal opportunity for the trade of nationals of all countries, to carry out scrupulously the obligations and promises made to China at the Wash-

ington Conference, and to require China to perform the obligations of a sovereign state in the protection of foreign citizens and their property."

This statement brings the traditional American policy down to date. "The integrity of China," "stable government," and "the Open Door" are old and well-defined slogans. The two new propositions are addressed to the present situation. The promises made at Washington are to be carried out: this injunction is made to the various Powers concerned. China is to be required to perform the obligations of a sovereign state: this admonition is for China. The Secretary accepts for America the difficult task of bringing all parties to the Far Eastern problems to its point of view. Imperialistic impulses are to be held in check and China is to be given a chance to work out her salvation. But China herself must work it out. Neither America nor anybody else can undertake that task. The reconstruction of China is, in the last analysis, a task which must be accomplished by the Chinese themselves.

With the assembling of the Customs Conference at Peking in October of 1925, America was quick to feel the delicacy of the rôle she had essayed. Her representatives first made it clear that the United States demanded a fair opportunity for China, and that any recrudescence of the old bullying tactics or any attempt to take advantage of China's weakness would be strongly resented by the United States, and if persisted in, might induce America to take independent action in coming to an agreement with China. This intimation met with little criticism among the Powers represented in the conference. They were prepared to deal with

China on the basis America demanded. But it brought vehement criticism from groups in the United States who had large investments or held unpaid claims against China. These interests felt that any such suggestion was bound to encourage the Chinese to an intransigence which would put out of the question anything but an abject surrender to their demands. To their way of thinking, the conduct of the American representatives indicated that they were "in full retreat" before the Chinese.

Then came the incident of March, 1926, when the entrance to the Pei-Ho was mined by the Kuominchun to prevent the entrance of Chang Tso Lin's transports. This action was a direct violation of the Boxer Protocol providing for unrestricted passage between Peking and the sea. The United States, in duty bound to assert its treaty rights until the reason for them had disappeared and they had been duly surrendered, joined the other Powers in what amounted to an ultimatum to the Peking authorities demanding the immediate removal of the mines. The ultimatum was complied with, but this action of the American representatives met with as ardent criticism from their own fellow-countrymen as had the previous warning intimation to the Powers. This time it was the more liberal elements and a number of missionaries who deplored the peremptory demand upon China. They protested that the Boxer Protocol was obsolete, that it was an affront to Chinese sovereignty, and that it should no longer be relied upon by the Powers. As for the action of the United States in signing the ultimatum, that was the victory of aggression. The United States had "joined the imperialists."

The two incidents and the two reactions illustrate the delicacy of America's position. The intimation that the United States might take separate action was a warning against any attempt to bully China at the conference. Its purpose was to assure China the fullest opportunity to turn the conference to constructive use. It was certainly not a surrender to the Chinese, and was no indication that the State Department was "in full retreat." On the other hand the signing of the ultimatum was quite necessary as notice to China that the way to her salvation did not lie along the road of ignoring the treaties and the rights of foreign Powers and their nationals. It was an effective refutation of the suggestion that America was "in full retreat." But it was as certainly not evidence that America had "joined the imperialists." American advocacy during the conference brought an early agreement on tariff autonomy to commence January 1, 1929, and various other points were being negotiated in such a way that China was practically assured of substantial gains from the conference. The United States had not "joined the imperialists": the "imperialists" had joined the United States; quite a different process.

In spite of the criticism to which almost any move through the complicated maze of Chinese relations will receive, the long-approved policy of the United States demands that, so long as the present state of extreme tension shall last, it hew as closely as it may to this median line which leads between the incitement of imperialistic resurgence on the one hand and encouragement of Chinese intractability on the other. American statesmanship is attempting to direct a team of runaway

horses along a road which leads between a swamp and a precipice. If the frightened animals swerve toward the swamp, the driver must throw his weight to the other side. If they lunge toward the precipice, he must drag them back toward the swamp. It is not that he wants them to plunge into the one or to fling themselves from the other. He is merely trying to keep them in the road and praying that they will run themselves out before they dash the carriage to bits with he knows not what resultant injury to himself.

In proportion as American policy becomes more liberal or more insistent toward the Chinese, both the factors of Chinese intractability and the factors of British and Japanese aggressive influences are given added weight. Only by holding closely to the golden mean can there be hope of winning through a most difficult task with some measure of success for American ideals. Only so can China's integrity be assured, only so can equal opportunity be won for all foreigners in China's trade and commerce. Only so can the antagonisms of the surrounding Powers be neutralized and prevented from precipitating a conflict.

America's rôle is in a sense that of holding the ring while China fights out her struggle against internal disintegration. If the United States can hold the cooperation of the Powers in repressing the interests among their own peoples that demand aggressive action, until such time as China is able to stand upon her own feet, she will have succeeded in one of the most difficult tasks that ever faced her diplomacy. So far she has succeeded, but every day makes the task more difficult. It is by no means certain that the British, Japanese, and

French governments can indefinitely restrain those of their nationals who insist upon more aggressive action to bring order out of the Chinese chaos.

Especially is this true if the Chinese continue to give these groups provocation to urge their stronger policy. Such incidents as the attack on the foreign settlement at Shameen and the rioting at Hankow arouse hostility against the Chinese, while they deprive the more liberal-minded foreigners of the basis for urging the continuance of a liberal policy.

It is such incidents as these that shake the whole steadying influence of American policy in China. So distorted is the present Chinese attitude toward foreigners that there seem to be insurmountable difficulties in the way of arriving at an understanding. Any injury to the foreigner is nationally applauded, and any defense, let alone reprisal, on his part is denounced as a brutal attack upon China. Such an attitude can prevail only so long without bringing its evil consequences. It is essentially a war psychology, and sooner or later is bound to generate an opposing war psychology. Under such circumstances the influence of those who demand aggressive action is vastly enhanced and it becomes but a short step into actual war.

The unruly elements among the Chinese have got more or less out of hand. There is grave danger that these unruly elements will run amuck and carry ruin and destruction to foreigners and peaceful Chinese alike. If they do so, there is bound to be retaliation by some one or more of the foreign Powers. Retaliation is almost inevitably converted into aggression and may easily take on the aspect of conquest. In the highly

combustible atmosphere in China, it should be avoided at all costs unless the United States is willing to forego its whole policy with regard to the integrity of that country.

The Cantonese authorities, under the leadership of General Chiang Kai Shek, now dominant in South China and on the Yangtse, hold the key to the situation in their hands. If they assume an attitude of intransigence and attempt the forceful ejection of foreigners, a serious clash is hardly to be avoided. If they or any other group undertake seriously the task of government, preserving order among their own troops and people and protecting life and property among Chinese and foreigners alike, the Powers will meet them more than half way and the road to an early settlement of the vexed problem of China and the Powers is open.

REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I

- OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM, by *Woodhead, Arnold, and Norton*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1926.
- THE CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1924, and the same for 1925. Tientsin Press. Tientsin.
- CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA. *W. W. Willoughby*. Washington. Carnegie Endowment, 1922.
- CURRENCY, BANKING AND FINANCE IN CHINA. By *Frederic E. Lee*. Washington. Government Printing-Office, 1926.
- WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHINA. *Rodney Gilbert*. London. Murray, 1926.
- OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA. *Gowen and Hall*. New York. Appleton, 1926.

CHAPTER II

- FOREIGN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN CHINA. *W. W. Willoughby*. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.
- CHINA AT THE CONFERENCE. *W. W. Willoughby*. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1922.
- CHINA AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE. *T. Y. Sze*. New York. Revell, 1926.
- FOREIGN FINANCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA. *T. W. Overlach*. New York. Macmillan, 1919.
- EXTRATERRITORIALITY, ITS RISE AND DECLINE. *S. S. Liu*. New York. Longmans, 1925.
- TREATY PORTS IN CHINA. *E. S. Tai*. New York. Columbia University Press, 1918.
- AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA. *Tyler Dennett*. New York. Macmillan, 1922.
- WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE FAR EAST. *Stephen King-Hall*. New York. Scribner, 1924.

REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER III

- ANGLO-CHINESE COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY. *A. J. Sargent*. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1907.
- THE BREAK-UP OF CHINA. *Lord Charles Beresford*. New York. Harper, 1899.
- ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE. *A. L. P. Dennis*. Berkeley University of California Press, 1923.
- CHINA AND THE WEST. *W. E. Soothill*. New York. Oxford University Press, 1925.
- WHY CHINA SEES RED. *Putnam Weale*. New York. Dodd, Mead & Co., 1925.

CHAPTER IV

- EXPANSION OF RUSSIA. *F. H. Skrine*. Cambridge. University Press, 1904.
- THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC OF SIBERIA. *Henry Kittredge Norton*. New York. Henry Holt & Co., 1923.
- RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST. *L. Paslovsky*. New York. Macmillan, 1922.
- FOREIGN POLICIES OF SOVIET RUSSIA. *A. L. P. Dennis*. New York. Dutton, 1924.
- OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM, by *Woodhead, Arnold, and Norton*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1926.

CHAPTER V

- JAPAN YEAR BOOK, 1920, 1921, 1924, and 1925.
- DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. *T. F. Millard*. New York. Century, 1919.
- JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICIES. *A. M. Pooley*. New York. Dodd, Mead & Co., 1920.
- ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM. *Soyeshima and Kuo*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1925.
- JAPANESE IMMIGRATION. *R. L. Buell*. World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1924.
- THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. *R. L. Buell*. New York. Appleton, 1922.

CHINA AND THE POWERS

CHAPTER VI

- AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA. *Tyler Dennett*. New York. Macmillan, 1922.
- CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN THE FAR EAST. *Stanley K. Hornbeck*. New York. Appleton, 1916.
- THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. *R. L. Buell*. New York. Appleton, 1922.
- CONFLICT OF POLICIES IN ASIA. *T. F. Millard*. Century, 1924.
- EUROPE AND THE EAST. *N. D. Harris*. Boston. Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1926.

CHAPTER VII

- CHINESE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. *William S. A. Pott*. New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1925.
- CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1924 and 1925.
- THE FIGHT FOR THE REPUBLIC IN CHINA. *Putnam Weale*. London. Hurst, 1918.
- MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA. *H. M. Vinacke*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1920.
- CHINA UNDER THE REPUBLIC. *K. S. Latourette*. New York. Institute of International Education, 1921.
- CHINA: AN ANALYSIS. *F. J. Goodnow*. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.
- DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE IN CHINA. *K. W. Show*. New York. Columbia University Press, 1926.
- THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CHINA. *K. Eu-Yang*. Shanghai. St. John's University, 1922.
- OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM, by *Woodhead, Arnold, and Norton*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1926.
- CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA. *W. W. Willoughby*. Washington. Carnegie Endowment, 1922.
- THE CONSORTIUM. Carnegie Endowment. Washington, 1921.

CHAPTER VIII

- CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1925.
- PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN CHINA. *H. M. Vinacke*. Princeton University Press, 1926.
- CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. *C. C. Batchelder*. Current History, August 1925.

REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

- FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA. *C. F. Remer*. Shanghai. Commercial Press, 1926.
- THE TARIFF PROBLEM IN CHINA. *C. Chu*. New York. Longmans, 1916.
- RAILWAY PROBLEMS IN CHINA. *M. C. Hsu*. New York. Longmans, 1915.
- CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS. Annual Reports on the Foreign Trade in China.
- THE INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA. *D. K. Lieu*, in *Remer's Readings in economics for China*. Shanghai. Commercial Press, 1924.
- OCCIDENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM, by *Woodhead, Arnold, and Norton*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1926.
- THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE FAR EAST. *C. K. Leith*. Foreign Affairs, April 1926.

CHAPTER IX

- CHINA: AN ANALYSIS. *F. J. Goodnow*. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1926.
- CHINA AWAKENED. *M. T. Z. T'au*. New York. Macmillan, 1922.
- MODERN CHINA. *S. G. Cheng*. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1919.
- THE PROBLEM OF CHINA. *Bertrand Russell*, Century, 1922.
- PEKING, A SOCIAL SURVEY. *S. D. Gamble*. New York. Doran, 1921.
- THE GILDS OF CHINA. *H. B. Morse*. New York. Longmans, 1909.
- WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHINA. *Rodney Gilbert*. New York. Stokes, 1926.
- THE CHANGING CHINESE. *E. A. Ross*. New York. Century, 1911.
- CHINA: LAND OF FAMINE. *W. H. Mallory*. New York. American Geographical Society, 1926.

CHAPTER X

- CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM. *H. F. McNair*. New York. Stechert, 1925.
- THE MASS EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN CHINA. *J. Y. C. Yen*. New York. Stechert, 1925.
- THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE EAST. *George Matthew Dutcher*. New York. The Abingdon Press, 1925.

CHINA AND THE POWERS

CHINA'S CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANITY. *L. C. Porter.* New York.
Missionary Education Movement, 1924.

CHINA MISSION YEAR BOOKS.

CHINA YEAR BOOK, 1924.

CHAPTER XI

VILLAGE AND TOWN LIFE IN CHINA. *Leong and Tao.* London.
Allen & Unwin, 1924.

MODERN DEMOCRACY IN CHINA. *M. J. Bau.* Shanghai. Com-
mercial Press, 1923.

CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. *E. T. Williams.* New York.
Crowell, 1923.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHINA. *C. T. Wan.* Baltimore, 1917.

RECENT EVENTS AND PRESENT POLICIES IN CHINA. *J. O. P. Bland.*
Philadelphia. Lippincott, 1912.

Index

Index

A

American Policy, 131, 137, 244,
251
American interests, 125
Ancestor-worship, 186, 195
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 60, 70,
102, 136
Anti-foreignism, 174, 200, 214,
240
Army and Navy, 15

B

Battle of Concessions, 134
Birth-rate, 187, 193
Bolshevism, 69, 92, 104, 120
Boxer Indemnity, 34, 47, 83, 93
Boxer Revolt, 33, 36, 57, 78, 148
Boycott, 65, 99, 108, 210
British Dominions, 61
British interests, 67

C

Canton, 9, 52, 63, 98, 157, 159,
161, 164, 240, 253
Chang Chien, 238
Chang Hsun, 155, 157, 221
Chang Tso Lin, 50, 86, 96, 99,
110, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163,
221
Chiang Kai Shek, 100, 164, 221,
253
Chen Chiung Ming, 157, 158,
161
Chicherin, 95
Chihli clique, 160

Chinese demands, 226
Chinese Eastern Railway, 37, 77,
81, 83, 85, 96, 98, 99, 106,
112, 113
Chinese government, 146, 185,
197
Chinese politics, 146, 210, 220
Chinese Revolution, 151, 165
Christianity, 194, 216
Concessions, residential, 27, 93,
227
Consortium, 108, 137, 157
Constitution of 1923, 4, 5
Constitution, Provisional, 1912, 4
Conventional Tariff, 25, 41
Coöperation with Powers, 132,
139
Cost of living, 173, 176
Cotton, 170, 176
Courts of law, 12, 44, 50
Cushing, Caleb, 26, 74
Customs Administration, 34, 36,
43, 234
Customs Conference (*see* Tariff
Conference)
Customs Duties, 24
Czecho-Slovaks, 104

D

Dairen, 112, 226
Dewey, John, 206, 208

E

East India Company, 52
Economic system, 167
Education, 195, 208, 213
Empress Dowager, 57

CHINA AND THE POWERS

Extraterritoriality, 26, 41, 43, 45,
49, 55, 74, 83, 93, 138, 233
Extraterritoriality Commission, 47,
51, 138

F

Family system, 167, 184
Famine, 173, 190
Famine relief, 191
Far Eastern Republic, 82, 85
Feng Kuo Chang, 7, 156
Feng Yu Hsiang, 96, 100, 160,
161, 162, 221
Finance, 16
Foreign loans, 34, 108, 122, 137
Foreign trade, 23, 52, 98, 124,
174
Foreign troops, 36, 37, 108, 230
Formosa, 226
Four-power Treaty, 70, 107
France, 56, 137, 224

G

Gold-franc controversy, 47
Great Britain, 52, 91, 139, 154,
224, 246

H

Hankow riots, 202
Hart, Sir Robert, 35
Hongkong, 25, 33, 65, 70, 91,
99, 226
Hsu Shih Ch'ang, 7, 9, 156, 158,
159, 160
Hu Shih, 205

I

Imperialism, 22, 54, 73, 94, 102,
105, 133, 136, 175, 200, 223,
227, 235, 246, 248, 250, 252
Indebtedness, 16, 34
Industrial revolution, 171, 178,
182

Integrity of China, 131, 134,
135, 137, 247
Intellectual movements, 204
Iron, 176, 182

J

Japan, 60, 62, 70, 77, 79, 81, 83,
87, 97, 102, 109, 136, 141,
143, 154, 223, 246
Japanese Immigration, 142
Japanese interests, 121

K

Karakhan, 86, 87, 95, 99, 100
Kellogg, Secretary, 247
Kiaochow, 33, 97
Knox Plan, 80
Kolchak, Admiral, 82, 106
Kowloon, 33, 91, 226
Kuominchun, national army, 163
Kuomintang, 153
Kwangchonwan, 33, 226

L

Labor, 176
Laws, 10
Leased territories, 33
Legation Quarter, 36, 232
Li Yuan Hung, 6, 8, 151, 152,
154, 156, 160
Liaotung Peninsula (*see* South
Manchuria)
Likin, 46, 59
Literary, 18
Literature, 204
Local government, 185

M

Mackay Treaty, 58
Malthusian laws, 189
Manchuria, 78, 96, 99, 102, 103,
105, 110, 114, 135, 223
Maritime Customs Service (*see*
Customs Administration)

INDEX

Mass Education Movement, 212
 Missionaries, 126, 194
 Mohammedans, 98
 Mongolia, 80, 83, 94, 100, 103,
 105, 163, 223, 235
 Morality, 180
 Most-favored-nation clause, 22,
 131, 133

N

Nanking, Treaty of, 25, 55
 Nationalism, 39, 63, 92, 225
 Nerchinsk, Treaty of, 1689, 74
 New Tide, 207, 218
 Nishihara Loans, 122, 138

O

Open Door, 33, 134, 135, 137,
 247
 Opium, 55, 170
 Opium War, 24, 55

P

Parliament, 7, 153, 155, 157
 Parliament, Tuchun's, 8, 156, 158
 Partition of China, 32, 223
 Peace Conference at Paris, 45,
 210, 212
 Peking, Treaty of, 1860, 74
 Philippine Islands, 125, 133
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 1905, 79,
 118
 Post-office, 35, 37, 234
 Protocol of 1901, 36, 57, 231,
 249
 Public Opinion, 18

R

Railway concessions, 31, 148, 151
 Railways, 170, 173
 Renaissance, 205
 Russell, Bertrand, 206, 208, 216

Russia, 52, 59, 69, 73, 110, 143,
 223, 241, 247
 Russo-Chinese Treaty, 1924, 86,
 113
 Russo-Japanese Treaty, 1925, 118
 Russo-Japanese War, 60, 79, 102,
 131, 135

S

Saghalin, 85, 108, 119
 Salt Gabelle, 35, 234
 Settlements, foreign (*see* Conces-
 sions, residential)
 Shameen Incident of June 23,
 1925, 63, 177
 Shanghai, 25, 28, 62
 Shanghai Incident of May 30,
 1925, 62, 100, 214
 Shantung, 61, 62, 83, 97, 103,
 105, 107, 108, 209
 Siberia, 81, 104, 105, 108, 226
 Sinkiang, 98
 South Manchuria, 33, 77, 78,
 102, 103, 109
 Soviet activities, 83, 88, 94, 99,
 100, 101, 163, 199, 216, 241
 Spheres of influence, 32, 229
 Strawn, Silas H., 238
 "Strong man" theory, 220, 222
 Student Movement, 39, 41, 45,
 93, 128, 175, 179, 181, 196,
 209, 225, 238, 241, 242
 Suffrage, 10
 Sun Chuan Fang, 221, 229
 Sun Yat Sen, 9, 152, 157, 158,
 159, 161, 162

T

Taku incident, 249
 Tang Shao Yi, 12, 17, 238
 Tariff autonomy, 41, 48, 68, 121,
 138, 178, 233
 Tariff Conference at Peking, 47,
 248

CHINA AND THE POWERS

Telegraph, Cable and Wireless,
38, 143, 234

Tibet, 235

Ting, V. K., 229

Trans-Siberian Railway, 77, 86,
112

Treaty of 1858, 56

Tsao Kun, 7, 10, 156, 159, 160,
164

Tsingtao, 33, 60, 97

Tuan Chi Jui, 7, 161, 164, 221

Tuchuns, 12, 17, 91, 108, 155,
156, 220, 234

Turkestan, 98

Twenty-One Demands, 103, 109,
110, 154, 209

U

Ungern von Sternberg, 82, 92, 112

United States in China, 71, 85,
105, 106, 124, 155, 215

Urga, 80, 94

V

Villages, 167, 185

Vladivostok, 77, 112, 114, 117,
227

W

Wanghsia, Treaty of, 27, 74, 128

Wanh sien Affair, 65

Washington Conference, 37, 38,
45, 61, 85, 107, 111, 136, 137

Wei hai wei, 33, 226

World War, 60, 81, 154

Wu Pei Fu, 100, 101, 159, 160,
161, 162, 163, 164, 221

Wu Ting Fang, 152

Y

Young China (*see* Student Move-
ment)

Yuan Shih Kai, 6, 7, 151, 153,